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FOREWORD

The Personal Experience Monograph Program provides
U.S. Army War College students the opportunity to write
about their personal involvement in their profession. The
monographs written through this program cover a wide
range of subjects and stem from a variety of motivations.
Students in the USAWC Class of 1998 wrote a unique group
of monographs focused on operations in Bosnia. This
compendium is comprised of a set of those monographs
covering experiences by branch, thus presenting a fairly
comprehensive overview of the deployment of U.S. forces in
support of the Dayton Accords.
The contributors were all commanders of battalion or
equivalent-sized units. They were encouraged to write in
their own personal style and relate events as they
experienced and interpreted them. Some conclude their
monographs with explicit “lessons”; in other monographs
the lessons must be teased out.
The reader is encouraged to use this publication as a
goad to reflect upon his or her own personal experiences in
military service, and perhaps to take the time to write
thoughtfully about them. While official after-action reports
are valuable, the business of command and leadership as
treated in such reports is generally presented in relatively
sterile terms. In these monographs, the reader will see a
more thoughtful and expressive examination of the art of
command and leadership.

LARRY W. WORTZEL
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Dr. Douglas V. Johnson II
This collection of monographs has been assembled from
the 42 Personal Experience Monographs written by the U.S.
Army War College (USAWC) Class of 1998. The Personal
Experience Monograph program was instituted
immediately after the Gulf War with the original purpose of
capturing first-person histories of various aspects of that
war. The program rapidly expanded to include any military
experience that might prove useful to others. When the
USAWC Class of 1998 arrived, it was evident that a great
many had recent experience in Bosnia that might prove
useful to others who would eventually serve there. The
collection assembled here was chosen for the wide variation
of branch functions and the centrality of the initial
deployment issues addressed. The authors speak for
themselves with minimal editorial interference.
The reader should draw his or her own conclusions from
this collection, but I would like to suggest that some of the
following thoughts are worthy of further consideration and
discussion.

•

We have an incredibly talented military at present,
capable of doing what seems impossible with little
warning and limited guidance.

•

While our operations are tightly centralized so far as
policy formulation is concerned, we have been forced
by circumstances to rely upon decentralized execution
to an unusual degree. This has forced us to depend
upon junior officers and noncommissioned officers in
ways we have talked about for decades, but have
1

seldom practiced. The actual practice seems to be
bearing fruit and is worth extending.

•

The imagination and inventiveness of American
soldiers have not diminished one whit; neither has
their capability to endure senseless guidance, rotten
conditions, and lousy weather. They continue to
demonstrate that essential soldierly quality, the
ability to endure.

•

Whatever peace operations training is being
conducted at the Combat Maneuver Training Center
(CMTC) is right on the mark. Further, that training
appears fully effective in transforming combat
soldiers into peacekeepers/ enforcers. To reverse that
training after the soldier departs his peace operation
assignment—i.e., to restore a combat orientation—
does not appear to take undue effort.

•

We have a married Army. A major consequence is that
the most important position in a deploying unit, after
the commander (and arguably after the operations/
plans officer), is the Rear Detachment Commander.
Captain Basil H. Liddell-Hart was correct in noting
that “even the bonds of patriotism, discipline, and
comradeship are loosened when the family itself is
threatened.” The state of morale on the home front
underpins that on the operational front.

•

Finally, muscular peacekeeping is not really that
different, operationally, from real combat. But
tactically the differences are substantial, and at the
tactical level, where junior leadership is operating,
the training and discipline of the American soldier,
his NCOs, and officers shine brilliantly.

This compendium is offered on behalf of those who did
their duty well.
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CHAPTER 2
SIGNAL PREPARATIONS
FOR OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR
IN THE FORMER REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA

Colonel Peter G. Dausen
FIRST KNOWLEDGE
I first heard of the Yugoslavia problem in early 1992; it
had been going on for awhile. But as I recall it had not been
looked at seriously as a potential contingency operation
until about that time. I was working as the Chief of the
Communications Watch Division for the National Military
Command Center in the Pentagon, so I had a pretty good
view of all the hot spots for the U.S. foreign policy. I also
heard a lot of the scuttlebutt. As 1992 grew to a close, the
talk was that we were heading off to do Operation
RESTORE HOPE in Somalia to avoid becoming involved in
Bosnia, which was viewed as a “tar baby”: Once in, you do
not get out. April 1993 found me deploying to Somalia for
RESTORE HOPE as well for a United Nations (U.N.)
follow-on operation, CONTINUE HOPE. While deployed in
Somalia, I learned that my future assignment would be to
command the 72nd Signal Battalion, a European Theater
tactical signal battalion for supporting echelons above corps
(EAC). In the winter of 1994, while attending PreCommand Courses and corresponding with my future
command, I discovered that the 72nd was already on the
books to be used in Bosnia if the United States agreed to get
involved on the ground there.
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BATTALION COMMAND
I assumed command of the 72nd Signal Battalion on
June 10, 1994, and was immediately briefed on the “Bosnia
Plan.” It was apparent that this plan had been pretty fluid
for some time because there were a lot of blank parts—and
even more that others did not agree with, particularly
within the 7th Signal Brigade itself. We already had
elements of the 72nd deployed to provide “Bosnia Theater”
support: a large extension node switch (LEN) and a large
tactical satellite (Tacsat) hub terminal (TSC 85B), with a
team of wiremen and signal leadership in Zagreb, Croatia,
to provide communications for the Joint Task Force (JTF)
Operation PROVIDE PROMISE; a small extension node
switch (SEN) attached from our sister battalion, the 44th,
with a Tacsat link terminal (TSC 93B), wire team, and
leadership to provide communications support for JTF
Operation ABLE SENTRY in Skopje, Macedonia, formed to
prevent escalation of the conflict into Greece; and a large
message switch (TYC 39) in Dal Molin Air Base, Vicenza,
Italy, to provide record copy of the air tasking order for
Operation DENY FLIGHT, which was restricting a
potential Balkan air war. However, 1 month later, instead
of the expected Bosnia deployment, we found ourselves
deploying to Africa. For me it was redeploying, but this time
to Rwanda, for Operation SUPPORT HOPE. SUPPORT
HOPE needed only a small but well-conducted network.
We learned many worthwhile lessons. A key lesson dealt
with task organizing: Putting complementary signal
equipment together from different organizations into
flyaway packages. On the equipment/team level, this
consisted of medium and large packages of switching
equipment and transmission equipment (normally
Tacsats). On the battalion level, this involved the division of
network areas of responsibility.
SUPPORT HOPE had no sooner ended than the brigade
was involved in putting in the theater architecture for
Exercise Atlantic Resolve, a massive simulation-supported
4

exercise that looked at a NATO deployment to Atlantis, a
hypothetical European country in conflict. Three guesses as
to who Atlantis was. (Hint: It starts with the letter B.) This
time the network was fairly large; the exercise lasted an
entire month. Again we all learned some great lessons.
Again the battalions were task-organized, but this time we
sent out both battalion control elements (BATCONs). And
the brigade put together a “joint SYSCON” (systems control
element). Although the joint SYSCON had its supporters
and detractors, the idea worked. It had a future. During this
exercise, the 44th mainly supported the areas inside the
immediate exercise box at Grafenwoehr, Germany, while
the 72nd had responsibility for the western side of the
network, which was everything outside Grafenwoehr to
Kaiserslautern and Stuttgart. Although no one knew what
the future would bring, the experience for the 72nd in
command and controlling (C2) an extensive network, widely
spread geographically, would prove to be indispensable. I
was on an autobahn overpass observing our convoy
procedures when I had another foretaste of the future. My
Mobile Radio Telephone (MRT) rang, with the ”Brigade
Three” giving me a warning order to deploy yet another
Tacsat team to the Bosnia theater—this time to the island of
Brac for support of a high-level intelligence mission called
Operation LOFTY VIEW II. The team deployed in early
December 1994. This should have been an omen for us, but
there was too much to do, and the future was probably the
last thing on our minds at that time.
Near the end of 1994, the priority for the entire brigade
was the coming move from its home in Karlsruhe to
Mannheim, Germany. It was a move that consumed all of us
for at least 6 months, maybe a bit more. Again, the lessons
from Operation MOVE TO MANNHEIM were many. The
first for us was in organizing large-scale movements by rail.
We had no idea at that time that this would later prove to be
the transportation of choice to Bosnia. Second was in
wargaming and establishing subordinate organizations in
two locations, Mannheim and Karlsruhe, while continuing
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all training, maintenance, and other programs. This split
operation proved to be the “straw-man” for split operations
for the 72nd in Bosnia. Third was the lesson in conducting
split operations themselves throughout the entire battalion:
what information was critical, what absolutely needed to be
tracked, how did you conduct meetings in two places, how
did you keep critical members of the organization informed
in real time, how did you keep team cohesion over a large
geographic separation? These lessons proved to be greatly
beneficial when we got ready to do the deployment.
In late May 1995 while we were still in the midst of the
move, the brigade got a good scare: Deployment looked
likely, and we did some intense planning. This planning
helped a great deal in getting us ready later. However, some
new plans came out of this intense time. The U.N. was losing
control; the fighting was reaching a new level of intensity.
There was a lot of concern about U.N. peacekeepers getting
captured as well, especially in the so-called U.N. safe
havens of Gorazde, Srebrenica, Bihac, and even Sarajevo.
Even as we were planning for helicopter airlift to get the
peacekeepers out of these safe havens, Srebrenica and then
Gorazde quickly fell to the Serbs. It seemed like Bihac would
be next. Brigade plans at that time had the 44th, with its
battalion headquarters in Italy, controlling all the
reach-back locations from Italy to Central Region. The 72nd
was supposed to support downrange with its battalion
headquarters at Zagreb because it was already controlling
the assets there. The Mountain Shield series of exercises
was born out of this planning. They were supposed to
simulate the Southern European Task Force (SETAF)
performing helicopter rescue of U.N. peacekeepers in Bihac,
with assistance from V Corps aviation. The 44th had the
lion’s share of these exercises, since SETAF was supposed to
be executing them from Italy. We supported with tactical
satellites and set up our BATCON at our Heidelberg switch
location, which was the reach-back for the Zagreb and
Skopje missions. The first exercise was in June 1995. We
were supposed to use a new bird for our tactical satellites,
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the NATO 4B. This satellite had not been used before, but it
was planned to support any possible Bosnia network. NATO
4B quickly became a new cussword for tactical satellite
operators. It was obvious that there was a significant
problem. Our most experienced operators were having great
difficulty getting on the bird. And once on, we were
experiencing significant problems with the switch digital
transmission groups (DTGs). Every time we would
troubleshoot and seemingly isolate the problem, the
symptoms would change. The tactical satellite operators
struggled through. We sent e-mail forward through
command channels documenting the problems.
During July, the brigade decided to run the entire
Grafenwoehr rotation for weapons qualification and soldier
skills. It was a week with a tremendous amount of moving
parts, forcing a lot of decentralized decisionmaking, with a
centralized command and control. In terms of synthesizing
staff coordination across the brigade, the week at Graf was
an outstanding success. We got our share of weapons
qualification done, too. Brigade Exercise Rolling Eagle was
next on the calendar—2 weeks in August. Colonel John O.
Welch was the Brigade Commander. What made this
exercise so worthwhile was his decision to use this exercise
to train by the numbers. We had many new soldiers since
the move in June, creating almost completely new
organizations. The net result was that the soldiers gained
renewed confidence; all transmission shots came in,
including great performance by TROPO. The 72nd
BATCON put its fledging crew through its paces, and we
built on the coordination among BATCON Operations, S2/3,
and Administrative Logistics Operations Center (ALOC),
S1/4, that had served us so well through Atlantic Resolve
the previous year. The 324th Signal Company put its new
switch teams through their paces as well, and the Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC) continued a
great support tradition. All in all, it was a tremendous
train-up exercise! September was supposed to be an
off-month to allow the unit to catch up on some necessary
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company training and log efforts, as well as finish off leave
schedules before the school year got into full swing again. It
was not to be. Although Srebrenica and Gorazde had fallen,
the new push was for Bihac. SETAF wanted to ensure that
its TF Lion could adjust to a new possible location, so on
short notice we combined forces for Mountain Shield II. MS
II was again in Graf. The 72nd provided C2 over the
reach-back locations in Heidelberg. Again, there were lots of
problems with the NATO 4B satellite. At least this time we
got to meet with the NATO Communications Organization
and Signal Support Activity (NACOSA) and the Regional
Satellite Support Center (RSSC) representatives about the
problem during the exercise. This set the stage for a
follow-on test later in November.
October 1995 brought a plethora of new training
requirements, mine awareness, etc. The only real difficulty
was that certification for these tasks could be acquired only
through the Seventh Army Training Center (7ATC) at
Grafenwoehr, which led to large logistics requirements as
we worked to get soldiers trained through each of the
required U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) wickets. At the
same time, we (the commanders and staff) were meeting
regularly to work what we knew of the mission
requirements. At this time the battalion still had not gotten
firm guidance on missions and customers. Consequently,
and coincidentally, no one was allowed down-range to see
the actual ground we were to set up on. An Allied Force
Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) team, which really had no
concept of our needs and really was not concerned with
them, had done the only surveys of our NATO sites. They
were mostly accounting for the Tactical Satellite Ground
Terminal (TSGT) and other NATO assets that they would
be bringing into the theater. EOM October/November
brought planning for Brigade Exercise Soaring Eagle,
which was originally planned to be the follow-on exercise for
Rolling Eagle. It would incorporate several networks
together, including 22nd Signal Brigade (MSE) and ARRC.
As it turned out, the dynamic nature of the planning at this
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time led to a significantly down-scaled exercise, executed
within the greater Mannheim area within our kasernes. 1st
PERSCOM was exercising their ability to put out support
teams at the same time; they used our exercise to provide
their transmission paths. Additionally, it was the first time
we got to integrate the 414th Signal Company (NATO) into
the picture, which was especially significant for the 72nd;
we received two complete platoons for attachment in Zagreb
and Sarajevo. Finally, 5th Signal Command used our
exercise as a vehicle for providing their certification of our
capabilities to perform the assigned mission.
During the previous summer, there had been a
significant military occupational specialty (MOS) change
for the Signal Corps: all satellite operators were put into one
MOS—31S. During the same period, we had a tremendous
turnover of our tactical satellite operators. As a result, we
did not have nearly enough 31Ss to man all our tactical
satellites, nor many experienced operators. We put together
a plan to integrate a school-trained 31S with an experienced
senior operator or team chief, who intensely trained them
for approximately 1 month. We were unable to fence the
whole month because of the amazingly high operations
tempo (OPTEMPO): every other day Pre-Deployment
Preparations (PDPs) (does the clinic have DNA kits now or
not?), every day a new training requirement, etc. Hence,
during the certification, 5th DCSOPS expressed some
doubts whether we would be able to do the mission.
Needless to say, we were stung by their evaluation, which
did not consider our plan or where we were on the timeline.
But performance over time is the true test. So our plan was
eventually justified by the great performance of the tactical
satellite operators and network throughout the
deployment. On the final day of the exercise, Commanderin-Chief USAREUR General William W. Crouch came to
visit and check on us. He seemed to be impressed with our
state of readiness.
The next couple weeks of November were absolute
craziness. Any new requirement that could be thought up by
9

the USAREUR staff was thought up and implemented,
requiring us to execute as soon as possible, of course. We
were all convinced that the sooner we deployed, the better
off we would be. Thanksgiving came with visits from our
new Commanding General, Brigadier General Robert L.
Nabors, as well as a visit from the 21st TACOM
Commander, Major General James Wright, who told us that
he had been traveling throughout Hungary looking for a
place to stage the U.S. National Support Element, with no
luck so far. So the planning continued. We were still without
“eyes on ground.” Mission assignments within the brigade
were finally solidified: the 72nd would provide NATO
support, and the 44th would support U.S. forces. Task Force
72nd Signal was slowly being formed. We were having
regular mission briefs with extensive reviews of personnel
assignments; each person’s qualifications and state of
training were intensely scrutinized. We were also having
soldiers packed out at this time; their private vehicles
(POVs) were interned into special covered warehouses at
Spinelli Kaserne.
When were the trains coming? Everything was lined up
in the motor park and ready to go. Fortunately, we had an
extra area where we could post the different vehicle serials
dependent upon their mission area. We continued to work
through the Thanksgiving weekend. Then we got word that
rail cars were being posted for us out at Coleman Barracks.
USAREUR Forward was trying to get out at the same time.
So it turned out to be a bit of a race to see who would load the
first trains. This was quite a turnaround, since the previous
estimate was that the 44th, providing U.S. national
communications support, would deploy to theater first
because the peace treaty agreements were still being
worked, and U.S. troops were not supposed to enter the box
until there was complete executive approval. Well, we
started moving the MilVans to Coleman Barracks amidst
tremendous press coverage. CNN, Reuters, and all our local
publications interviewed us. The troops handled the press
superbly.
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That night we started moving the first serials out and
started loading onto the train. This went on throughout the
night and the next few days. Every time a new German rail
inspector came, we had to change the method of loading; no
one seemed to have a clear understanding of the required
standards, including the Deutsches Bundesbahn. We still
did not know what to expect on the passenger cars and
dining cars. The Branch Movement Control Team (BMCT)
said there would be a dining car, but that was about it.
Things were really beginning to move fast now. We
finally got authorization to send an advance party down to
Croatia. We would send the S3 as well as Lieutenant Feher
and Lieutenant Kelly, who would each be heading an
element to Ploce and to Split. The train loading was going
well now, in full swing. By close of business (COB)
Wednesday all the trains for the NATO enabling forces were
loaded. But there was no order to move the trains, so they
sat on some rail sidings outside of Mannheim while we
waited and waited. Families were anxious, but no
information came. Rumors were that Friday, December 8,
was the day. The advance party flew out of Frankfurt early
Thursday, so we cut the soldiers loose to spend some final
time with their families and friends—a 4-hour string was
required. Friday started out the same way, no news. We had
a 0900 formation and cut the soldiers loose again. By 1200 I
figured that nothing was going to happen that day. But I
thought that I had better get my bags squared away just in
case. I still figured it would be Monday. Out of the blue, at
1430 my MRT started ringing. It was Colonel Welch. They
got approval, and the first two trains were to pull tonight, at
2100 and 2330. Would we be ready?
I started the alert process with the first formations set at
1700 hours. Things were going well; it had been well
rehearsed. At 1500 I got another call on my MRT while I was
working double-time to get my bags packed. Colonel Welch
again. They moved up the times on us: would we be ready at
2000 and 2100 for the trains to pull out? No problem,
everything was still on track, and it should work with the
11

new times. Ops Center at the battalion was already being
established. At 1615 hours, as I was heading out the door,
my MRT rang again: They moved up the time again to 1800
and 2000. Would we be ready? Also, for the first time we
heard something about needing only a supernumerary
guard force of five soldiers to travel with the trains. I told the
boss at that time that no changes could be made. We will
ride it out and see what happens. It was bedlam at the
battalion; phones were ringing off the hook; families were
milling about. Command Sergeant Major got the first
formation together. Trucks with personnel bags were to
follow the buses to Coleman Barracks and then to the train
station. The weather was bitterly cold, as it had been all that
week during the rail-load.
Somehow we got the first buses out to Coleman Barracks
loaded with soldiers, with a separate bus for family
members. I drove out to Coleman Barracks with my family
in our car. Confusion reigned out there as well. Where was
the first bus? A big send-off committee was there, complete
with USO music, the American Red Cross with lots of goodie
packages, families, the Commanding General, and a huge
American Flag. The 293rd BSB had done a super job of
staging the event. Finally, the first bus got there. I found out
that the first train had to pull by 2000. We were still on
schedule.
Yes, it was true, only a guard force of five soldiers was
required for each of the trains with the complement of
soldiers for those lifts traveling by buses to Croatia on
Monday, December 11. We had organized the teams that
way when we first got the news, just in case. Finally, after
loading personal bags, inventory, and securing weapons in
the baggage car, amidst flashing of cameras and well wishes
from loved ones, the first train pulled out. The second went
faster, the tense moments were over. There was no word on
when the rest of the five trains would pull out or when the
additional buses would go.
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Saturday morning began with the holiday parade
through the housing area. The day before seemed almost
like a memory already. Yet I felt like a deathrow prisoner
savoring his last few hours. Noon hit, with the phone
ringing again. The rest of the trains would pull out that
night, between 2000 and 0200. Again, only five guards per
train were required. The remaining soldiers would travel by
bus on Tuesday. Saturday night went infinitely better.
Amazing what a day of practice will do! It was another long
cold night; we finally got home about 0330. I got to celebrate
Sunday Mass one last time with the family. Then we spent a
quiet day, resigned to a Monday departure. Monday was
well organized. The buses were there. However, it was
difficult just getting everyone to finish their good-byes and
get on the road. Good-byes are so tough! We were finally on
our way.
The buses were fairly comfortable, at least for the first 6
hours. Power on the MRT went fast, so I found myself
scrambling at the rest stops trying to find places to get a
charge. The sun set, and we were still on the road, traveling
through Austria to Slovenia. At the Slovenian border we
encountered our first difficulty in crossing. I remember
seeing some young men, locals, who were encouraging us,
declaring that only the United States could fix the present
situation. The Croatian border was next.
We were beginning to close in on Zagreb. When we had
left, we were not sure where we would be staying the night.
Now it was locked in; we would be staying at the Panorama
Hotel. The bus drivers originally stated that they knew
where they were going. But now it became apparent that
once in Zagreb, they were clueless. We wandered around in
two tourist-sized buses, trying to find the Panorama Hotel.
Fortunately, because it was 0130 in the morning, there was
not a lot of traffic on the streets. It was a bit of a helpless
feeling, without phone communications (MRT did not work
once we passed the Slovenian border), and without maps. So
we wandered about searching for the Panorama. It felt a bit
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like the Jewish exodus wandering around the Sinai trying to
find the promised land.
Finally we saw a small sign marked Panorama Hotel
and navigated to it. Then the bus drivers figured that the
front awning was too low for them to get under, so they
parked in the rear of the hotel and wanted all of us to carry
all of our bags around the building. There was no rear
entrance. After a bit of haggling, they finally reconsidered
and got the buses pulled back around. It was now 0230. But
we had arrived for our first night in Croatia!
SETTLING IN AND INSTALLATIONS
The Panorama Hotel was like a class B communist hotel.
But it sure beat tents! Of course we had our tents, stoves,
latrines, and all the field gear you can imagine coming on
the trains. Zagreb was a big city—you cannot imagine
camping out in the middle of it. It would be like setting up at
Rockefeller Center in New York City with business still
going on. Without a reconnaissance and survey of the
mission area and customers, we were certainly burdened
with a lot of extra equipment.
Several of the trains were combined at the border. One of
them was already in. The other was due in the next few
hours. The trains for Split and Ploce were going straight
through to Split, where both would unload. The Ploce team
would then road-march to their final destination. So we
found ourselves in quite a different type of situation—
planning a rail unloading operation after just a wink of
sleep in the lobby of a hotel in downtown Zagreb. December
12 dawned early, with cloudy skies and some snow on the
ground. There were lots of unknowns and concerns. Topping
the list was where we supposed to set up. Our major
customers, Implementation Force (IFOR) Headquarters,
were in a military compound downtown now called the U.N.
compound because that’s where the U.N. had its headquarters and would still operate from until the Transfer of
Authority (TOA) to NATO. My S3 Operations Officer, Major
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Gordon Johnson, who had come a few days earlier as part of
an advance party, told me that there was a military
compound across a busy city street that looked promising. It
was still being used as a high-level school for Croatian
senior officers. But the Croation military authorities had
relinquished control of a large building for the IFOR
Support Command Headquarters, commanded by Major
General Farmen, another one of our customers. There was a
large parking lot, complete with basketball goals in front of
the building. It looked very adequate for our needs as long as
the look angle for our satellite dishes could clear the
four-story buildings.
I could check that out in a bit. But now we needed to find
out who was in charge of the land to provide some sort of
permission for putting one of our signal sites there. I found a
colonel in the U.N. compound who was assigned as the IFOR
HQs Commandant. The IFOR staff was not fully
functioning at this time; it was still being organized. I
introduced myself and explained why he needed to allocate
space to us in the adjacent compound parking lot. He had a
Croatian officer on his staff. They deliberated. After a bit of
haranguing and wringing of hands, he agreed. We parted
amiably. Later I found out that there was a turf dogfight
between him and the IFOR Support Command HQs
Commandant who also claimed to be responsible for the
same ground.
Meanwhile, that OK was good enough for me. The S3 and
I then set off to check out the rail unloading operation under
the responsibility of the 72nd Signal Battalion HQs
Company Commander, Captain Shorty Glover. We were
still confined to traveling together in the S3’s rental car
acquired during the advance party. Shorty also had his
hands full trying to coordinate his transportation assets (a
26-passenger bus and a 9-passenger van), meals for the
troops, and accounting for all the soldiers. Just as we
arrived at the railhead, so did the press. And I found myself
giving an interview to CNN in the midst of snow flurries.
Fortunately, true to his character, Shorty was doing a
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marvelous job of coordinating the efforts at the railhead.
Work was progressing well.
The next critical issue was where to locate the additional
equipment that was not being positioned downtown at our
newly acquired signal site in the Croatian compound. We
had two unit motor pools with us, as well as all the support
equipment necessary to conduct field operations for an
entire year. Camp Pleso, a U.N. site by the Zagreb airport
about 12 miles away, was a possibility. So that was the next
stop to arrange for parking the equipment.
Again, space was at a premium. Only potential mud
holes were left—not conducive to conducting maintenance
operations. Clearly no one was in charge. The U.S. Marine
Corps Commander of the USJTF Operation PROVIDE
PROMISE claimed that he still had a viable mission; he did
not acknowledge the pending transfer of authority (TOA)
that was to take place in 2 weeks. He refused to release any
assets for our use. We had been providing communications
support for PROVIDE PROMISE for the last year and a
half—now we had to convince the commander to let us swap
out our own equipment (an AN/TSC 93B satellite link
terminal for the AN/TSC 85B satellite hub terminal). The
smaller terminal would easily be adequate for requirements
of the JTF. However, the larger hub terminal was necessary
for the major signal center we were constructing downtown.
Even though the JTF would not lose any service, no one likes
to see their mission being taken over. So negotiations were
tougher than they needed to be.
Finding an administrative parking area conducive to
maintenance for approximately 40 vehicles (one-and-a-half
tons to 10 tons in size) was a problem. The U.N. was no help
whatsoever. They really seemed to resent our presence.
Finally, with no solution in sight, I decided to exercise
squatter’s rights. There was a road on the edge of the airfield
that did not appear to be getting too much use. So we started
parking the vehicles on both sides of the road, keeping them
out of the mud and leaving a single center lane. That would
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have to do for the time being. It was not pretty but we could
sort it out later, maybe even acquire a contract in town. At
least we were out of the mud.
The U.N. had the only heavy crane in Zagreb, so we
needed to coordinate the use of it to download our communication shelters off the trucks and position them in the
Croatian compound parking lot. Fortunately, the U.N.
crane operator was easy to get along with. He provided some
really great assistance.
Things seemed to be coming along well. By the end of the
first day, we had the setup of the downtown signal site
pretty well underway. The larger train still needed to be
unloaded the next day. More coordination meetings were
necessary. Guards were required for the trains, for the
downtown signal center, and for the vehicles parked at
Camp Pleso. And another several busloads of soldiers
arrived in the middle of the night and needed to be
quartered. Some were sent to another hotel, the Hotel
Holiday. The Brigade S3, Major Frank Grove, was
coordinating a contract for this entire hotel complex. It was
on the outskirts of Zagreb and could house the entire
brigade headquarters as well as our battalion. This was a
much more modern hotel right off the highway, a trucking
firm behind it with a large fenced in motor park area. It
looked ideal for our needs too, especially with the potential
of contracting for motor-park space inside the fenced yard.
The next day was extremely cold, with blizzard
conditions. Captain Shorty Glover really had a tough job
now. On top of the limited transportation, he had to get
soldiers from two locations and rotate them to prevent any
cold injuries. The only redeeming factor from the cold
weather was that the media decided it was too cold for them.
So at least we had time to ourselves to get the job done.
When I arrived at the Croatian compound, Captain
Dwaine Boteler, the signal site commander, immediately
told me that he had been ordered to move by the IFOR
Support HQs. This was their area; they were responsible for
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it. They did not want us there or need us. I did not have to
wait long to hear their point of view personally. Only a
moment after I heard the news from Captain Boteler, a very
large and irritated U.S. Army colonel came up, loudly
announcing himself as the Chief of Staff for the IFOR
Support Command. By the look of things, this was not going
to be easy. But I was bound and determined not to move
from this location, especially since they wanted this parking
lot to have room to park their administrative vehicles close
to the building. After much bantering and negotiating, we
finally agreed on a solution. He needed additional guards for
the street-side post. I agreed to contribute them, but I
wanted some space closer to the building. So we agreed to
reposition our vans as long as our Tacsat communications
terminals stayed put. I provided him a working tactical
telephone so he could call his home station in Germany, the
continental United States (CONUS), or anywhere else. He
quickly realized our value to him. We were quickly
assimilated into his headquarters, complete with security
badges and a large office room to put our Administrative
and Logistics Operations Center (ALOC) into. So things
moved along well for awhile.
The next 3-4 days were filled with crises and more
coordination. At the end of 72 hours, despite all the
additional challenges, we already had our base network in,
with signal sites at Sarajevo, Ploce, Split, Naples,
Heidelberg, Mannheim, Landstuhl, and Hungary. The
technical part of the mission was progressing well. The
soldiers were performing outstandingly, beyond all
expectations—they were making a tough mission look easy.
The director of the Combined Joint Command Control
Communications Center (CJCCC) was Colonel
Rodakowski, the 5th Signal Command Deputy Chief of Staff
for Operations (DCSOPS). He was in charge of coordinating
all the communications assets for the mission—a very
daunting task considering all the diverse communications
contributors to this mission. During a meeting that first
weekend (December 16, 1995), he shared his concern about
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the Sarajevo site for the IFOR Forward HQs at the
Residency (the former residence of Yugoslav Prime Minister
Marshal Joseph Tito). It seems the plan was to link up the
communications with Zetra Stadium, the signal site on the
outskirts of the city: it supported the Ace Ready Reaction
Corps (ARRC) Forward HQs. The link was less than a mile
as the crow flies, but it had to go across a high ridge and
apartment buildings and was connected by no less than four
different communications means. Since signal support for
the IFOR Forward HQs was the mission of my battalion, he
asked me to go to Sarajevo and do some on-the-ground
signal surveys. The following Tuesday (December 19), the
first flight out found me and CW2 Banner, our brilliant
Tacsat warrant officer, aboard a C17 bound for Sarajevo.
Once in Sarajevo, we soon discovered the dire living
straits of our soldiers supporting the ARRC at Zetra
Stadium. Captain Dave Alexander and the 58th Tacsat
Signal Company had arrived 5 days earlier. They had put in
communications and were bedded down at Zetra. This was
the location of the ice skating events of the 1984 Olympic
Games, where Dorothy Hamill of the United States had won
the gold medal. The stadium roof was very badly damaged
from the shelling. The main stadium floor was flooded with
approximately 3-4 inches of water throughout. The toilet
facilities were Mideastern, only a hole with footprints. They
were inoperable, overflowing with an unbelievable stench.
The water did not work anywhere in the building: no
showers, no laundry. Water for cooking and cleaning had to
be carried in. Our soldiers had to sleep on cots in hallways
under the stadium seats—the driest place they could find.
But they were still under water. I quickly found the
Headquarters Commandant (HQ Commandant), an
Australian officer assigned to the ARRC, to tell him of my
displeasure and to hear his assessment of the situation.
According to him, his engineers were working very hard but
had been unable to fix the plumbing. Maybe in another week
or two. But they had already been there 5 days. In addition,
he said he would be moving in Karomic portable toilet
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containers as well. I told him I understood that he felt he
was doing the best he could, but this was a very unhealthy
and unsatisfactory condition. It was not being fixed fast
enough. I intended to inform my higher command and
request assistance. When I informed my Brigade
Commander about the deplorable conditions, he told me to
report it directly to the Commanding General (CG) of 5th
Signal Command. The CG was very supportive and assured
me that he would do whatever he could to improve the
situation for the soldiers. Next I called the ALOC to contract
for floor lumber for the tents to get the soldiers out of the
water—but there was no guaranteed method to get the
supplies to Sarajevo. Postal service was not working yet,
and the flights in were extremely erratic. There is really a
price for being the first in!
The next day I awoke in four inches of water that had
seeped in during the night. Breakfast consisted of cold eggs
and baked beans, served in a dimly lit area. Water
constantly dripped onto the food. It felt similar to being in
Fort Douamont in Verdun, where we had taken the
battalion officers for an Officer Professional Development
(OPD) just 5 months previously. Today was the TOA to
IFOR; it was time to survey the communications for the
Residency, located in a heavily wooded lot in the city, with
an extremely high ridge on one side and high-rise
apartment buildings on the other. It did not look like a
promising location to set up a Tacsat for a direct shot. The
look angle would not clear the trees, the ridge, or the
high-rise buildings. Additionally, the IFOR Forward HQ
Commandant, a U.S. Army colonel assigned to AFSOUTH,
was not very inclined to give any assistance. In fact, he made
it plain that he had no room to quarter any more soldiers. He
did not care about communications. His sole concern was
how to accommodate CINC IFOR Admiral Smith and his
staff, who were arriving in about a week to man the forward
headquarters.
After looking around, CW2 Banner and I both agreed
that our only possibility was to elevate the Tacsat
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antennaes so that the look angle would have a higher
baseline, thereby clearing the obstructions. Then we hit
upon the idea to download the communications shelters
from the vehicles and put the entire shelter on the flat part
of an adjacent roof, with the antenna mounted on top of the
shelter for additional height. The roof looked strong enough.
But we double-checked with an engineer, who verified our
assessment. An ambitious plan: but according to our
calculations, it looked workable. It had to work—there was
no good alternative. Admiral Smith was due in a week. I
made a couple of calls to Colonel Rodakowski to let him
know the promising results of our survey, then another to
the Battalion ALOC to get them started on acquiring more
lumber for the roof platforms. Our other trains, full of signal
equipment under the control of Captain Doug Muller, C
Company of 44th Signal Battalion (attached to Task Force
72nd for the support of IFOR Forward), were on the way to
Split.
Our flight back was due in that afternoon, but a sudden
snowstorm kept the plane on the ground at Zagreb. We were
stuck at the airport with no communications to either
Captain Alexander at Zetra or to the IFOR personnel at the
Residency. We needed to get back as soon as possible to work
the planning. Time was critical! We met a German colonel
who was in a similar circumstance; he thought he might be
able to get a couple vehicles to try it by road if the plane did
not fly in the morning. He offered us a ride the next morning
at 0800. He would come back and pick us up at the airport.
CW2 Banner and I had neither a place to go nor any way to
contact anyone. So we looked around for a place to bed down
for the night. The airport area was the scene of the heaviest
fighting around Sarajevo. It was really battered, not much
resembling an airport at all. But we found a couple of cots,
and even a German newsman hunting for a story. The next
morning the plane again did not fly. But promptly at 0800,
the German colonel came by to pick us up. He explained that
we were going to take the Serb corridor, a more direct route,
because the TOA declared it open. Then he smiled and
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promptly chambered a round in his pistol. Well, there was
no turning back now. We followed suit, climbed in the rear of
the vehicle, and began a wild trip through the Serb corridor
and down the snow-covered mountain passes to Mostar and
Ploce. After one major rest stop, we arrived back in Zagreb
the next morning at approximately 0400. After thanking
our German comrades, we quickly reported in and hit the
sack for a couple hours of sleep. The next day would begin
very quickly, with much planning for the return trip to
Sarajevo with convoys of equipment.
The first thing the next morning was an operational
situation report (SITREP) from the battalion headquarters.
Everything was progressing extremely well under the able
leadership of my Executive Officer, Major Phil Minor, and
my S3, Major Gordon Johnson. Major Minor had developed
a very effective administrative and logistics operation using
the ALOC. And Major Johnson was handling the reins of the
Battalion Control (BATCON) with uncommon savvy.
During an early visit to the CJCCC, Colonel Rodakowski
verified the need for urgency for the Sarajevo IFOR
communications mission. “Need you to lead the convoy to
Sarajevo ASAP and ensure the communications installation
for the CINC. The communications need to be in by the 28th
of December,” he explained. I told him there were lots of
moving parts to this operation. If everything went according
to schedule and the planets were aligned perfectly, we had a
good shot. The plan: CSM Spence, my Battalion Command
Sergeant Major, and I, along with CW2 Banner and some
able NCOs, would set out early the next day (Christmas
Eve) in a four-vehicle convoy filled with lumber and supplies
to Split. At Split we were to join up with Captain Muller,
help organize their convoy on Christmas Day, and lead
them to Sarajevo early the next day. That would give us
about 2 days to build a roof support, coordinate crane
support to lift the shelters and antennas, and get the
satellite shot in—certainly a daunting task, to say the least.
Meanwhile in Zagreb, Major Johnson had his hands full
working military/commercial interfaces so that anyone
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could dial through the U.S. system or the U.N. system (now
leased by NATO) to reach their party. Additionally, we
found that our big-city downtown location was fraught with
problems for communications. We originally thought that
we would overhead our cables across the street from highrise building to high-rise building. However, a city
ordinance forbade that. Even a special plea to the mayor did
not help. He did say that he would provide city engineers to
assist us in putting our cables under the street in a sewer
pipe. The Croatian engineer who came to put our five PCM
coaxial cables through the sewer pipe decided the ends were
too large (the connecting hocks). To our horror, he had
chopped them off to accommodate them to the pipe. No one
had ever spliced a PCM cable before—there was no
technical instruction on how to do it, because the PCM cable
carried an electrical charge. There was too much margin for
error. Two of our other outstanding warrant officers, CW2
Lori Bobzien and CW2 Ken Dempster, met the challenge.
After a tedious day of trial and error, they got the cables to
work, providing much needed additional service to the
IFOR HQs. We had already installed a single Tacsat link on
the U.N. compound to the IFOR HQs, but until these PCM
cables were installed, the link was not networked through
our main switching center on the Croatian compound. Now
there were multiple communications routes, giving us a
significantly improved reliability of service. The brigade
headquarters was also busily preparing for a Christmas
party and a possible visit from President Bill Clinton, both
of which we would miss.
We took off early the next morning amid a light snowfall.
The maps we had were very small scale and barely
adequate. CW2 Banner and I were the only ones who had
been along this route before but that was in the middle of the
night. We still managed to find our way through the rugged
terrain and burnt-out villages. We arrived in Split around
2300 amid a cacophony of celebratory fire. Now we had to
find the railhead and Captain Doug Muller’s unit. Working
the map the best we could along with some reconnaissance
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techniques, we found the railhead and Captain Muller,
along with Major Vince Speece, the brigade S4, who had
flown down a couple of days earlier to work billeting and
parking contracts for the unit and its equipment. Major
Speece quickly got us billeted for the night as well, but not
before we had a brief visit out to Lieutenant Kelly, of TF
72nd, and his communications element, which was
providing support to the British National Support Element
(NSE) located about eight miles north of the city. Major
Speece got us billeted in a former luxury hotel on the
southern side of Split, right on the water’s edge. However, it
was in absolutely terrible shape. It had been housing war
refugees for the last 3 1/2 years. The night was filled with
the sounds of automatic fire and the light of tracers shooting
out over the bay.
Christmas 1995 dawned early with lots of work to do.
Captain Muller and his soldiers had not been fully briefed
yet on all the details of the plan, and all the equipment had
to be checked out, shelters remounted on vehicles (for rail
load they are downloaded and transported separately),
convoy topped off with fuel and inspected, and everyone
briefed for safety. The soldiers were anxious too, because
they were to be the first unit convoy to come into Sarajevo
since the TOA.
We set out early on December 26. Our route took us down
the Dalmation coast along a coastal road, offering beautiful
vistas, and then north from Ploce to Mostar and through the
mountains to Sarajevo. I was primarily concerned about the
road between Mostar and Sarajevo. It runs along the
Nevertva River, a swift river flowing through jagged
mountain passes. All the bridges were blown, the shorter
ones having been replaced with snap-link bridges. But two
longer ones required long bypass roads/trails around
tributary rivers. One in particular was very treacherous, a
mud-like logging trail only about a lane and a half wide in its
best locations. CW2 Banner and I witnessed a vehicle
narrowly miss going over the side on our earlier trip coming
back from Sarajevo with the Germans. There had been no
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improvement in the road. The warring factions had tried to
destroy the tunnels as well. All were without lights; several
had deep ditches where the road surface had been blown
away in an effort to render them impassable. It was a long,
laborious road march. We arrived in Sarajevo about 2200
that night, very tired. As we got to Zetra, we were told that
there was no room to billet us there. Furthermore, no one
was even allowed in, according to the orders of Brigadier
General Raper, the ARRC Signal Officer and Commander of
the 1st Signal Brigade, the unit that provided the
communications support for the ARRC. I quickly got on the
phone with the General; he allowed us to stay one night. OK,
one step at a time, at least we got a foot in the door. Captain
Alexander and his troops were delighted to see us,
especially since we had brought lumber for their floors to get
them off the water—now ice—because of the cold
temperatures. It was now snowing through the remnants of
the destroyed roof. Then we heard some accounts of our
soldiers being sniped at while on duty at their signal vans
outside the stadium on the soccer field adjacent to the Lion’s
cemetery. As with so many of these events that would take
place over the next couple months, no full explanation was
found. But I took comfort in the knowledge that our soldiers
took the proper actions and were safe.
While in Zetra, we coordinated with the Danes for use of
their crane and planned our installation the next day.
Living conditions in Zetra had improved; several toilets
worked. Hot water was promised for showers within a day or
so. Compared to a week prior, it was like the Holiday Inn. I
thanked the HQs Commandant for his diligence. The next
day when we arrived at the Residency, the IFOR Army
colonel looked as though he had seen a ghost. He reluctantly
gave his OK; then we started work on the roof. But he also
said in the same breath that he had no place for our soldiers
to stay. No room at the inn, we were not welcome for another
night at Zetra, and we were not welcome at the Residency
either. Providing service sometimes is not easy. Captain
Muller worked hard; he was not going to take no for an
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answer. He quickly made himself and his soldiers
indispensable to the IFOR staff, so they had to find room for
some of them. Meanwhile Brigadier General Raper faced an
unpleasant situation as Lieutenant General Walker, the
CG of the ARRC, saw Zetra and said that he would not
accept it under any circumstances as his headquarters. He
would wait in Kiseljak (approximately 15 miles outside of
Sarajevo) until the Hotel complex in Iliadza (Serb section of
Sarajevo) was completed for his command post (CP). Now all
the communications at Zetra were not fulfilling any
functional role except as a signal node. He needed U.S.
communications service in Kiseljak. I was the only potential
provider, with two separate Tacsat links that were in the
process of being installed on the Residency roof. Well, he
must have gotten to Colonel Rodakowski, because the
colonel called me just a few minutes later and directed a
change of plans to put one of the links in Kiseljak until the
ARRC moved to Iliadza, planned for mid-January. I
WILCOed his request and directly called Brigadier General
Raper, telling him I could get him communications the next
day so long as my soldiers had a reasonable place to live and
park our equipment. Desperation makes the best of friends.
We made an agreement.
The roof installation of the first system was progressing
nicely; communications came in well within the pre-set
deadline. We planned to travel to Kiseljak the next day to
install the other system. Morning began with blizzard
conditions, which continued throughout the day. Traveling
was treacherous on the mountain roads. Again time was
critical, this time for the ARRC. After another harrowing
journey through the foothills around Sarajevo, we arrived in
Kiseljak in a blinding snowstorm. Again, we had to force our
way and find a place to set up—nothing was ever easy at the
outset. But with an expert team led by Staff Sergeant
Gomez, the Tacsat shot was in with communications run to
the headquarters within approximately 2 hours of our
arrival on site.
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This change of plans caused a delay in our departure
because now we had to wait for another 93B for the
Residency installation to be flown in by C17. The New Year
of 1996 came in with an unbelievable display of celebratory
fire coming from the Serbian-held hills around the
city—there was no question that the Serbs still had plenty of
weapons (more than small arms) and ammo. CW2 Banner
proved his indispensability again by solving a very complex
communications problem for the British, much to Brigadier
General Raper’s chagrin. He was convinced that it was a
problem with the U.S. communications. During these days
another of our comrades had a close call. He found a rocket
propelled grenade (RPG) round sticking out of the fender
cowling of his HMMWV after driving down Sniper’s Alley to
the airport to pick up a passenger who just flew in. For one of
those very lucky and blessed reasons, the RPG did not
detonate. But he was not the only one with a close call.
Captain Dave Alexander took me on a site survey for the
Tacsat installation at Iliadza. British sappers had already
cleared the ground of mines. Yet during a thaw on the
following day, two British soldiers installing concertina
over the same ground Dave and I had walked stepped on a
mine. It was a small anti-personnel mine known as a
kneepopper, about the size of a cigarette lighter, designed to
injure and disable an enemy, rather than kill him. The two
British soldiers suffered multiple shrapnel wounds in their
backs and legs; one soldier lost a testicle. And while I prayed
for their recovery, I also thanked the good Lord for His
protection.
Finally the second 93B arrived. The immediate
installation was completed, and we returned to Zagreb on
January 4, 1996. During these initial days of providing
service to the IFOR staff and Admiral Smith, we realized
the shortcoming of not having a major switch in Sarajevo.
Captain Doug Muller really wanted his switchboard to have
the flexibility to provide a full measure of signal support to
the admiral. It would also provide an extra measure of
redundancy that we presently lacked from terminating the
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Tacsat systems with two independent remote multiplexers.
After long discussion of pros and cons with Colonel Welch,
my Brigade Commander, and Colonel Rodakowski, we
agreed to put a large switch into Sarajevo. So plans were
made to redeploy back down to Split and convoy the
switchboard and crew to Sarajevo. Captain Muller was to
prepare a site for it at the Residency—no easy task, with
space at such a premium. After just 3 days in Zagreb, long
enough to receive full SITREPs on the battalion and the
many remote signal sites, we were on the road again to Split.
This journey went much smoother. Roads were already
being improved. Within a week, we were back again in
Zagreb.
With the initial installations completed, it was time to
settle in and resume our normal battalion administrative,
logistics, maintenance, and training systems. Although I
felt guilty that I had neglected the battalion headquarters, I
had focused my efforts where they were most needed. The
signal part of the mission was being accomplished superbly
through the expert planning of the CJCCC under the
leadership of Colonels Rodakowski and Dempsey,
supported by outstanding execution by professional
communicators. The first month was over. The next weeks
would bring many changes both in the network and in our
living conditions. Sites were added in Doboj and Iliadza; so I
visited the soldiers out there again just a few short weeks
later. For reasons of force protection, the entire brigade in
Zagreb was moved out of the Hotel Holiday just weeks after
a contract was secured, to be billeted at Camp Pleso in
field-type conditions. The staff of the IFOR Support HQs
moved into the Hotel Holiday in our place. For some reason,
they were not subject to the same force protection rules. But
then again, plenty of things did not make sense on this
mission.
The greatest challenge for the soldiers was yet to
come—the looming boredom once the initial work was over.
But the first hectic month was over. Now we were in for the
long haul.
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CONCLUSION
Our arrival in Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)
really brought a lot of relief to the leadership and the
soldiers. It was a lot like being on the kickoff team waiting
for the whistle to blow. Then the game would begin, and we
could execute our gameplan. After a time, those great
planning ideas that all the Major Command (MACOM)
staffs were thinking up were really beginning to detract
from the job ahead. It was time to just do it, and do it we did.
The resulting communications network has been described
as the most complex and successful ever. The keys to the
success were the signal and interoperability exercises in
Mannheim, Germany, and the decision of NACOSA to
reconfigure the NATO 4B satellite. But most of all, the
outstanding signal leaders and soldiers really made it
happen!
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CHAPTER 3
THE BLUE FALCONS IN BOSNIA

Lieutenant Colonel Curtis M. Scaparrotti
PREFACE
This personal experience monograph is an account of the
3-325 Airborne Battalion Combat Team’s (ABCT)
participation in JOINT ENDEAVOR. I commanded the
3-325 ABCT from June 1994 to April 1996, which included
the ABCT’s participation in JOINT ENDEAVOR. My
battalion was the first U.S. combat unit to enter
Bosnia-Herzegovina for JOINT ENDEAVOR. It secured
Tuzla Airbase, enforced the Dayton Accord Agreement in
the Russian Brigade Sector prior to the Russian Brigade’s
arrival in theater, and executed designated security
missions in the Task Force EAGLE area of operation (AOR)
between December 18, 1995, and February 19, 1996.
The 3-325 ABCT, the “Blue Falcons,” is a unique,
combined arms, rapid reaction force normally stationed in
Vicenza, Italy. The Blue Falcons provide the European
Command (EUCOM) with a forced entry capability that is
deployable in 18 hours. The ABCT is also the American
contingent of NATO’s Allied Mobile Force (AMF).
It is a subordinate command of the Southern European
Task Force (SETAF). The ABCT’s parent is the LION
Brigade, which was commanded by Colonel James
McDonough during this period. Although the LION Brigade
did not deploy for JOINT ENDEAVOR, I must note its
critical role in the ABCT’s training, preparation,
deployment, and redeployment. Also, a significant slice of
the brigade—e.g., engineers, military police and civil
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affairs, military intelligence, medical, communications,
maintenance, logistics, and other support personnel—
deployed to Bosnia-Herzegovina as an element of TF 3-325.
Therefore, my reference to the “Blue Falcons” or TF 3-325
includes the fine augmentation soldiers from the LION
Brigade.
The 3-325 ABCT is the only unit of its type in the U.S.
Army. Its base organization consists of the following:

•

Headquarters and Headquarters Company. This
company included the Scout Platoon and 81mm
Mortar Platoon.

•

Three airborne rifle companies.

•

The Heavy Weapons Company, E Co. This company
included five weapons platoons. Each platoon had
four armored HMMWVs that could mount a TOW, 50
cal machine gun, or M60 machine gun. Each platoon
had four TOW systems, two 50 cal machine guns, and
two M60 machine guns.

•

D Battery, 319th Field Artillery. This battery had six
M119 105mm howitzers and an organic fire direction
center.

The 3-325 ABCT, augmented by elements from the
LION Brigade mentioned earlier, was organized into Task
Force 3-325, especially tailored to participate in JOINT
ENDEAVOR.
This monograph was written from memory and the
hasty journal notes that I kept during the operation. I
believe the dates and events to be correct. However, any
errors in the monograph are mine. My purpose is to provide
a personal account of the Blue Falcons’ participation in
JOINT ENDEAVOR. It is not a complete account by any
measure. For example, the coverage of the exceptional
contributions of the Task Force’s combat service support
elements is very brief and is worthy of a separate
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monograph. My omission of such elements or other events
does not imply their insignificance. I simply chose to cover
the major missions in the time I allotted to write this
monograph.
Finally, this is a salute the soldiers of TF 3-325. Because
of their professionalism and service, the Blue Falcons
accomplished every mission.
INTRODUCTION
On the evening of December 18, 1995, soldiers of Task
Force 3-325 stepped off the ramp of a C130 aircraft into the
cold, snowy night at Tuzla Airbase, Bosnia. The first U.S.
combat unit to enter Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Blue Falcons
would play a key role in JOINT ENDEAVOR. The purpose
of this monograph is to provide a personal account of the
Blue Falcon’s participation in JOINT ENDEAVOR.
The monograph is organized in chronological order. The
Blue Falcons’ preparation, deployment, operations, and
redeployment follows, covering a time span of midNovember 1995 to March 1996. The final section of the
monograph, presenting lessons learned, is focused on
company-level leaders preparing for deployment to Bosnia.
However, many of these lessons are applicable to leadership
in any peace enforcement operation.
BACKGROUND
As the rapid reaction force for EUCOM, the Blue Falcons
had been focused on the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina for
more than 2 years prior to their deployment. For at least a
year prior to my assumption of command in June 1994, the
battalion combat team’s staff tracked the conflict in Bosnia
and maintained a CONPLAN for their most likely
employment if the United States intervened. Also, the
commander and staff briefed and wargamed the CONPLAN
with the 1st Armored Division in Germany. The battalion
combat team S-2 shop maintained a large wall map of the
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region that displayed the current unit locations of warring
factions. In short, the potential employment in Bosnia was a
constant in the life of the battalion.
The battalion combat team’s frequent deployments to
Grafenwoehr and to the Combat Maneuver Training Center
(CMTC) in Hohenfels, Germany, focused on the battalion’s
essential tasks for a combat or a peace enforcement mission
in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Our first CMTC rotation in
September 1994 was designed around our core Mission
Essential Task List (METL) of deliberate attack, movement
to contact, and defend. The CMTC rotation coupled with a
follow-on training phase at Grafenwoehr provided the
battalion 45 days of near continuous training in our
fundamental warfighting tasks. After additional home
station training in Italy and a break over the Christmas–
New Year holidays, the Blue Falcons deployed to Germany
in February 1995 for another CMTC rotation.
The second CMTC rotation and the follow-on
Grafenwoehr training phase focused upon the battalion
combat team’s unique mission essential tasks: conduct a
parachute assault, conduct air assault, and conduct
non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO). We also
integrated supporting small-unit collective tasks common
to peace enforcement missions, such as establish a
checkpoint.
The Blue Falcons had executed two intensive training
cycles, each over 40 days in length, that trained all of the
battalion’s Mission Essential Tasks to standard in less than
7 months. However, when the Blue Falcons returned to
Italy in late March 1995, we did not realize that our training
pace was about to gain greater momentum.
In June 1995 the battalion combat team was alerted to
conduct an extraction of encircled U.N. forces in Srebrenica
or Gorazde. The United Nations Protection Forces
(UNPROFOR) established these “safe havens” within
Bosnia-Herzegovina to protect surrounded Muslim
populations. However, the Serb forces continued to press
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their advance around the safe havens, threatening the
safety of both the populace and the UNPROFOR. In order to
prepare for the extraction mission the battalion combat
team deployed to the Grafenwoehr training center with its
habitual higher headquarters, the LION Brigade and
SETAF.
The plan to extract the UNPROFOR from the
endangered safe havens was very complex. The operation
included a night time helicopter insertion and extraction
with a 2-hour flight each way across the Adriatic Sea and
over hostile Bosnian airspace. At the peak period, 98
aircraft were in flight along several flight corridors. Over
the next 3 weeks the battalion combat team, as the ground
combat element of TF LION (SETAF headquarters and the
Lion Brigade), conducted four complete rehearsals, 2 day
and 2 night rehearsals, of the extraction of UNPROFOR
from the Srebrenica enclave. These rehearsals were
controlled and evaluated by Headquarters, V Corps, and
subordinate units. They included live-fire exercises and
were executed employing realistic flight times by placing
refuel points and objectives areas in distant locations within
Germany (Kitzingen, Grafenwoehr, and Hohenfels). The
night live-fire iterations included Apache, AC-130, and Air
Force close air support. By the end of this rehearsal phase
the units at the point of the bayonet—the company teams of
the Blue Falcons—had executed the air insertion, actions on
the objective area, and the extraction 24 times. Following
the night certification exercises, we were ready to execute
the mission. Initially, our movement to an Intermediate
Staging Base (ISB) was considered, but we redeployed to
Vicenza to await an execute order.
The situation in Bosnia continued to deteriorate, and the
battalion was alerted again in late August to extract the
UNPROFOR. Once again, we deployed to Germany and
conducted refresher training to ensure proficiency in our
essential tasks and then redeployed to Italy. Again, the
execution order did not come.
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This near continuous series of intensive training events,
all fully resourced and externally evaluated, placed the
battalion combat team at peak readiness in the fall of 1995.
Additionally, leader turnover had been carefully managed
and the key leaders, both officer and NCO that experienced
this intensive training, would lead the battalion combat
team during JOINT ENDEAVOR. I doubt that many
battalion commanders, other than the Ranger battalion
commanders, experience such an ideal training
environment. As a result, the 3-325 Airborne Battalion
Combat Team was a confident, cohesive, and ready team
when it got the call to lead U.S. forces into Bosnia.
PLANNING AND PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING
The Blue Falcons received the initial notification to
participate in peace enforcement operations in former
Yugoslavia on October 10, 1995. The original plan called for
an initial entry force, TF LION commanded by Major
General Nix, the SETAF Commander, to secure Tuzla
Airbase and to conduct operations in the U.S. sector until
relieved by TF EAGLE (1st Armored Division/IFOR)
scheduled to enter Bosnia across the Sava River. However,
as the organization of TF EAGLE evolved, leaders realized
that the logistical and communications support for two task
forces would be difficult to resource and would create
unnecessary complexity. By late October, it was clear that
the battalion combat team would enter Bosnia as an
attached unit of TF EAGLE rather than TF LION, its
habitual headquarters.
Insight and guidance concerning our mission were
gained from a series of phone conversations between
SETAF and the 1st Armored Division leaders and
operations officers. I do not recall a single written document
prior to late November 1995. This is not a criticism of TF
EAGLE. The TF EAGLE staff was trying to determine their
organization and requirements at a time when the Dayton
Accord’s outcome was unknown. Nor do I think that this was
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unusual. In today’s environment, a commander and staff
must be comfortable with using their judgment and
available information to develop a plan. I found this to be
the case in our planning for Operation SUPPORT HOPE
(humanitarian relief mission in Rwanda and Zaire)
executed prior to JOINT ENDEAVOR as well as my
experience during Operation ASSURED RESPONSE (the
NEO in Liberia) executed directly after JOINT
ENDEAVOR.
Despite the uncertainty, the Blue Falcon staff initiated
the mission analysis and course of action development on
our most probable mission. This early planning was
valuable—and fortunate. On November 10, 1995, and with
short notice, we were required to brief General William
Crouch, the USAREUR Commander, on our concept for
entry into and security of Tuzla Airbase. The concept brief,
favorably received by General Crouch, provided an azimuth
check on our concept, an opportunity to gain his insights on
how the initial phase of the operation was expected to
unfold, and an unexpected but welcome question on what
items of equipment we most needed. Our response, armored
High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs)
for E Company (Heavy Weapons), led to the delivery of 20
new armored HMMWVs prior to our deployment to Bosnia.
The planning increased in intensity and pace throughout November. The Dayton Accord Agreement was
announced on November 21. That evening I received a call
from the 1st Armored Division G3. Major General William
L. Nash, the Division Commander, wanted me to attend the
mission planning conference at their division headquarters
the day after Thanksgiving. I learned that the full Airborne
Combat Team, which included many brigade slice assets,
would be employed. The G-3 requested that we be prepared
to brief the CG on our plan to enter and secure Tuzla
Airbase.
On November 24, my S3, Major Skip Davis, and I
attended coordination meetings with the 1AD staff and
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briefed Brigadier General Cherrie, the Assistant Division
Commander, on our concept of operations. Brigadier
General Cherrie approved our plan and provided the
following guidance:

•

3-325 ABCT is the fighting headquarters at Tuzla
Airbase.

•

Commander, 3-325 ABCT, is responsible for the
security of Tuzla Airbase and the tactics employed,
including the security patrols in the Tuzla area.

•

3-325 ABCT will have the Air Force Security Police
element and two Military Police platoons from 1AD
under its Operational Control (OPCON).

•

3-325 ABCT was responsible for the security of 1AD
Headquarters (Forward). He added that he did not
want a palace guard.

The Secretary of Defense visited Bad Kreuznach and
spoke to the TF EAGLE leadership on this day also. I
recorded what he believed were the compelling reasons to go
to Bosnia:

•

The United States had vital interests in the stability
of Europe. The conflict in Bosnia was likely to spread
if not checked and was too great a risk to ignore any
longer.

•

This was an opportunity for peace and redefinition
that NATO must seize.

•

This peace was not possible without U.S. involvement.

He assured the leaders that TF EAGLE would be a
robust force with full authority to move anywhere in Bosnia
and to use deadly force. Also, he stated that if deadly force
were used, our soldiers would have the support of their
commanders, his support, and President Clinton’s support.
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He also provided his timeline for JOINT ENDEAVOR.
He expected deployment to commence in mid-December
with the force build-up phase lasting approximately 2
months. Reduction of the force and redeployment was
envisioned to begin at about 9 months into the operation.
Also, he stated that the administration would do all that it
could to prevent mission creep.
Major General Nash, TF EAGLE Commander, also
addressed the leaders. I recorded his “four main points”:

•

TF EAGLE will implement the military tasks
required by the Dayton Peace Accord.

•

We will make the multi-national division work.

•

We will assist in the humanitarian aid and civil
affairs as much as possible.

•

We will protect the force.

Major General Nash stated that our primary threats
were the winter, the mines, and the rogue elements. His
keys to success were discipline, informed soldiers, a
common view of the situation among commanders at all
levels, the judgment of leaders, and professionalism.
On November 25-26, we continued the detailed
coordination with the TF EAGLE planners and the U.S. Air
Force liaison officers. In particular we planned the initial
airflow from Aviano Airbase, Italy, into Tuzla Airbase. We
agreed on 21 C-130 sorties per day for the first 4 days to
insert the battalion combat team.
Additionally, we met Major Angelosante, the
commander of the Air Force Special Police element that
would be OPCON to the battalion combat team. We
discussed their security responsibilities. Essentially, they
would be responsible for the security of the tower area, the
ramp area, and the aircraft on the ground. The battalion
combat team would conduct all the perimeter security
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responsibilities. This first meeting was very positive and
reflected the effective working relationship that developed
during the operation.
On the November 26, I met an Air Force Officer from
AFSOUTH who had recently visited the Tuzla Airfield.
Colonel Steve Bryan had a wealth of information concerning
the physical layout of the airfield, the condition of the
perimeter fence, as well as the daily environment. In
particular, he stated that the locals entered and departed
the base through gaps in the perimeter fence, and that theft
was the biggest problem at the base. He told us that large
generators had been pulled through the perimeter fence at
night without alerting the U.N. security force at the base.
His insights refined our plan and helped guide my personal
reconnaissance of the airfield later in November.
LEADERS’ RECONNAISSANCE
I was one of the ten leaders from TF EAGLE who
conducted a reconnaissance of the Tuzla Airbase and the
U.S. sector between November 28-December 3, 1995.
Colonel Brown, the 1st Armored Division Chief of Staff, led
the party. This was an exceptional experience that paid
significant dividends throughout the deployment in Bosnia.
The means of entry and the route we took to and from
Tuzla were nearly as important as the opportunity to
reconnoiter the airbase. We departed Ramstein Airfield in a
C-21 aircraft on November 28 enroute to Split, Croatia.
Departing Split in U.N. 4-wheel drive vehicles, we drove
along the Adriatic coast to Ploce and then turned north
through Mostar and Konjic, arriving at Kiseljak just prior to
midnight (Figure 1). We stayed overnight at the U.N.
compound in Kiseljak. Early the next morning, we loaded
Swedish APCs for the second and more dangerous leg of our
journey to Tuzla. Recently, U.N. vehicles had been
ambushed. In fact, a U.N. captain was slain and his vehicle
stolen near Tuzla the day prior to our departure. Therefore,
our escort was a Swedish mechanized platoon.
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Within about an hour I was reminded of why in my
career I had not sought mechanized infantry assignments.
Realizing that this trip was going to take about 10 hours , I
tapped the gunner on the leg and asked if I could take his
place. I remained in the gunner’s hatch for the entire
journey except during the entry to Tuzla Airbase. The
gunner was happy to be out of the cold and asleep on the
deck of the APC, and I was equally happy to be breathing
fresh air. Most important, I gained an appreciation for the
terrain and the environment during the trip that played a
significant role in my decisions during our later
deployment.
Our route from Kiseljak traversed poor, narrow,
snow-covered roads through mountainous terrain. Sheer,
long drops on one side of the road were common, and several

Figure 1. Route To and From Tuzla Airbase.
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tunnels were encountered which were barely large enough
for the APC to pass. The route was from Kiseljak through
Visoko, Vares, Ribenica, and Zivinice. The roads steadily
improved as we approached Tuzla. Along the way we passed
relatively frequent “checkpoints” established by local
factions demanding a toll for passage. Many cargo trucks
were lined up at the checkpoints while their drivers
attempted to negotiate passage. The U.N. soldiers
explained that the truck drivers usually had to release some
of their cargo to gain passage. However, the U.N. security
force’s negotiations were direct and effective. We lost little
time at the checkpoints.
We arrived at Tuzla Airbase at about noon on November
29. After a short meeting to coordinate our reconnaissance
plans, the UNPROFOR provided vehicles and security for
my reconnaissance of the area surrounding the airfield. In
particular, I conducted a reconnaissance of the two airfields
in close vicinity to the airbase, known as Tuzla West and
Tuzla East. These were short, single airstrips connected to
the airbase by roads that also served as connecting
taxiways. Both airstrips were being considered as possible
camp locations. Tuzla East was a potential location for TF
3-325’s artillery battery and counter-battery radars.
During the morning of November 30, I conducted a
reconnaissance of the open area south of the airfield
perimeter. I was interested in the trafficability of the
terrain and whether the artillery battery could be sited in a
field just outside the perimeter fence. The area was
extremely muddy and was not cleared of mines except for
the dirt road that ran south of the southern perimeter fence.
In fact, we mired one of the Swedish APCs in the mud on this
trail.
I spent the remainder of this day walking the entire
airbase, including most of the perimeter. The airbase had
been heavily mined over the years, but there were no mine
records. Therefore, my reconnaissance was limited to the
paths that the UNPROFOR patrols used along the perim-
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eter. Even along these paths, I had to be alert. The
UNPROFOR patrols warned us that they had found mines
along their “cleared” routes on several occasions.
At one point along the northern perimeter fence, a little
girl about 6 years old yelled “boom, boom,” and shook her
head no. She then pointed to turn back, that the area was
mined. I would later learn that a young girl had recently lost
a leg due to a mine strike in the same area.
During the next 2 days I was able to meet the
UNPROFOR leaders on the airbase, coordinate for our
future transfer of responsibility for security, and view all
the buildings on the airbase. This coordination included the
commander of the UNPROFOR security force, the Danish
tank company commander who provided the reaction force,
and the U.N. administrators who managed the facilities.
These meetings provided significant information about the
daily operation of the base and the security vulnerabilities.
The security officer told me that the most significant
problem was theft. Penetration of the perimeter fence and
theft of the U.N.’s fuel and supplies were common. My belief
was that the U.N. security force soldiers were disciplined
and competent, but there were far too few soldiers to secure
the 9-kilometer perimeter. Also, I learned that 320 U.N.
vehicles had been stolen in the past 10 months, and that the
“Black Wolves,” a Muslim special forces unit, used an
undetected penetration of the airbase as a final training
standard for their new soldiers.
Additionally, I realized that most of the base was not
cleared of mines. Unexploded ordnance was visible while we
walked around the base. The only safe place at Tuzla
Airbase was on pavement or concrete. Therefore, clearing
operations would be required to establish effective security
patrol routes and to establish firing points for the battery
and the associated counter-battery radars. Finally, the U.N.
forces had pointed out that the high water table and clay soil
precluded dug-in fighting positions. All our security
positions would have to be built up from the surface.
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Two significant coordination meetings were held the day
prior to our departure. I met with the Danish Deputy
Battalion Commander and planned the relief of his security
force at Tuzla Airbase. Although this was our only meeting
prior to our link up with his forces on the night of December
18, the relief operation was executed with minimal friction.
Also, I visited the Norwegian field hospital and coordinated
medevac and treatment for our soldiers. At the end of the
day, I refined our security plan for the airbase and briefed
the 1st Armored Division Chief of Staff. Tuzla Airbase is a
relatively small base, and the allocation of limited real
estate would be difficult. I wanted to determine early the
use of buildings and the location of key elements such as the
battalion CP, maintenance platoon, medical platoon,
artillery battery, mortar platoon and counter-fire radars.
Colonel Brown agreed to about 90 percent of my plan for
siting ABCT elements on the airbase. Some of the locations
would not be resolved until we arrived on the base.
On December 2, the reconnaissance party departed
Tuzla Airbase and began the journey back to Split. We
returned on a different route: Zivinice, Ribenica, Zavidovici,
Zenica, Travnik, Bugojno, Livno, and Split.
I will never forget driving through one valley at
approximately midnight. For over 30 miles we did not see a
living creature. The APCs’ spotlights, directed right and left
of the road to spot an ambush, highlighted barren villages
with bullet-riddled homes. Many of the houses had two or
three gravesites in the front yard, and the spotlight beams
reflected off the headstones and crosses as we passed.
We arrived in Split early on the morning of December 3,
got some sleep, and then caught a C-21 back to Ramstein. I
transferred to a C-12 and flew back to Dom Lin airfield in
Vicenza. The reconnaissance was short and intense, but it
was critical to refining our security plan and properly
preparing the force for their mission in Bosnia.
While I was in Germany and Bosnia, the battalion
conducted sustainment training and prepared equipment
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for deployment. The pre-deployment training, coordinated
and resourced by the LION Brigade, was excellent. It
included a comprehensive mine awareness training
program that was developed by the Army Engineer School
at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. Every soldier in the Task
Force went through this training program.
The effectiveness of this mine awareness training was
demonstrated in Bosnia. Despite daily operations in heavily
mined areas, the Blue Falcons experienced no mine strikes
while deployed. There were many examples of mines
discovered—the right way. For example, one squad,
applying the proper techniques, discovered booby traps in a
house they were clearing near the Zone of Separation (ZOS).
Each of the doorways had been rigged to trip handgrenades.
Also, platoon Situational Training Exercise (STX) lanes
were executed in late November and early December. These
training exercises placed the platoons, and particularly
their leaders, in a series of situations they were likely to
experience in Bosnia. This training also proved to be
beneficial to platoon-level leaders. The situational training
exercises were:
1. Dismounted STX Vignettes.

•

Mine Strike (evacuate casualty; extract from
minefield; mark and report a minefield);

•

React to Sniper (evacuate casualty);

•

Apply Rules of Engagement (encounter armed
former warring factions (FWF) element that
restricts freedom of movement);

•

Apply Rules of Engagement (FWF element leader
threatens use of force); and,

•

React to Indirect Fire (evacuate casualty).

2. Mounted Vignettes.
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•

Encounter Roadblock/Checkpoint (apply Rules of
Engagement; understand basic Serbo-Croat);

•

Apply Rules of Engagement (react to hostile force);

•

Mine Strike (apply Rules of Engagement; evacuate
casualty from minefield; react to contact); and

•

React to Sniper/Built-up Area (react to sniper;
evacuate casualty).

The TF staff, led by the Deputy Commander, Major Rich
Hooker, continued to work on a comprehensive and detailed
plan that included deployment plus relief and security
operations in Bosnia. The Operations Order was briefed to
the TF leaders on December 6, and company commanders
provided brief-backs on the same day. The next day, the
Operations Order (OPORD) 96-4 (IRON ENDEAVOR) was
published. The TF 3-325 Mission was “On order, 3-325
ABCT inserts by air to secure TUZLA Air Base in support of
TF EAGLE peace enforcement operations.”
The Commander’s Intent was expressed as follows:
I intend to insert the ABCT by air early on G-Day to quickly
secure TUZLA Air Base with sufficient combat power to
overwhelm or deter any resistance to our presence. Follow-on
forces will reinforce security of the airfield and expand our
ability to conduct patrols in the immediate vicinity. Keys to our
success are force protection, soldier discipline, strict
impartiality, freedom of movement, and the ability to dominate
any situation. Desired end state is complete security in and
around the airfield and the ABCT postured for link-up with 1
AD.

The following day I flew back to Bad Kreuznach for the
TF EAGLE OPORD and Rock Drill. These were held on
December 8 and 11, respectively. Meanwhile, the battalion
combat team purchased and palletized Class IV supplies,
loaded vehicles and ISU-90 containers, and conducted
equipment inspections. On the December 12, we conducted
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a rehearsal for leaders, using a very detailed scale model of
Tuzla Airbase. After this rehearsal, I was confident that the
Blue Falcons were loaded, trained, and ready to deploy for
JOINT ENDEAVOR.
DEPLOYMENT AND INITIAL OPERATIONS
Our Aerial Port of Embarkation (APOE) was Aviano
Airbase, approximately 2 1/2 hours north of Vicenza. At
0630, December 13, the first vehicle convoy departed
Vicenza en route to Aviano Airbase. We dispatched vehicles
and ISU-90 containers in deployment order to Aviano
throughout the next several days. The Vicenza garrison
command and the LION Brigade established the Departure
Airfield Control Group, executed the staging and inspection
of vehicles, and assisted our S-4 at the ammo issue point at
Aviano.
A heavy snow began to fall at approximately 1400, and
we decided to stop the flow of vehicles to Aviano after the
first day’s chalks had departed. Additionally, we delayed
the departure of troop buses until the afternoon of
December 14. Such a snowfall was rare in the Vicenza area;
this was the first snow of any significance in the Vicenza
region for the past 5 years.
I received a call from Major General Nash at my quarters
that evening. He stated that he was sending Mr. Kirk
Spitzer, a print journalist, to travel with me into Bosnia. We
discussed my comments to the media who would surely be
awaiting our arrival at Tuzla Airbase, as well as a few
tactical matters. I appreciated this guidance and the fact
that he took the time to personally call me prior to our
departure.
The execute order, citing G-Day as December 15, was
received on December 14, and TF 3-325 began movement of
the troops to Aviano Airbase that afternoon. Most of the
family members were there to see us depart. Also, many of
the major news services were present to film the departure.
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The presence of the media was a constant for the
remainder of this mission. Journalists were covering the
battalion’s preparation for the week prior to our departure,
and three embedded reporters would travel with me as the
combat team flew into Bosnia. As a result, I requested a
public affairs officer (PAO) for the battalion. We received a
reserve public affairs officer who had served in the same
capacity during Operation DESERT STORM. I also
assigned one of the ABCT’s senior artillery officers as a
PAO. This team of two officers was fully employed on a daily
basis throughout our deployment. On one day in Bosnia
there were 35 media personnel covering some element of the
Blue Falcons.
A proactive public affairs plan ensured that the media
could get the story without interfering in our operations. In
fact, we allowed an experienced film crew equipped with
night vision cameras to accompany a platoon on a night
patrol. The green-filtered footage was shown on the six
o’clock news across the United States that week. Because of
a good working relationship with media, the battalion
received frequent and positive press.
The deployment plan called for the entire ABCT to
deploy into Tuzla Airbase by C-130 aircraft over a 4-day
period. C-17s would transport the heavy engineer platoon’s
equipment and the Bradley platoon. The sustainment and
ammo pallets for the battalion would take several
additional days of airflow.
The general concept for the insertion of the Blue Falcons
was to flow sufficient combat power on the first evening to
begin the relief of the UNPROFOR security forces and to
secure the airbase in the case of hostilities. Due to the size of
the airbase and the airflow constraints on the first evening,
we planned to deploy the following combined arms force:

•

Two rifle company teams (C Company followed by B
Company);

•

Battalion assault command post;
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•

Heavy weapons platoon from E Company (HMMWVs
with TOW anti-tank weapons, M-19 grenade
launchers, and .50 caliber machine guns);

•

Three 105mm howitzers from D Battery with two
TPQ-36 counter-battery radars;

•

Scout sniper teams; and

•

Advanced Trauma Life Support Team (ATLS) led by
the battalion surgeon.

This package, coupled with the available close air
support, provided the essential combat power to ensure the
security of Tuzla Airbase. However, I would not be
comfortable with the security until the third rifle company
and the remainder of the heavy weapons company arrived
in Tuzla. The planned airflow to insert the remainder of the
ABCT was:

•

Day 2: A Company (-), three heavy weapons platoons
from E Company, a TPQ-36 and a TPQ-37 radar
section, and the TF Tactical Operations Center;

•

Day 3: Remainder of E Company (Heavy Weapons), A
Company (-), D Battery (-), and Combat Service
Support elements; and

•

Day 4: Combat Service Support Elements, and supply
and ammo pallets.

The planned deployment on December 15 was not
executed due to adverse weather in Bosnia. The snow, fog,
and limited instrumentation at Tuzla Airbase prevented
C-130s from landing for 3 days. During this waiting period,
the Blue Falcons conducted rehearsals and squad training,
and rested in the hangers at Aviano Airbase. We were ready
to go, and this delay was frustrating for all of us.
The Transfer of Authority (TOA) between TF EAGLE
and the UNPROFOR was to occur on December 20—in less
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than 5 days. The weather delay was causing concern about
TF EAGLE’s ability to get into Bosnia with sufficient
command, control, and combat power to execute the TOA as
planned. During the delay, we were asked to consider
options for entry into Bosnia. Earlier in the year, the ABCT
had developed a CONPLAN that inserted the ABCT into
Bosnia by vehicle road march. The route from Italy would
take the Task Force no more than 3 days travel from Aviano,
Italy. Two courses of action were considered. One option was
to road march the TF through Croatia to Tuzla, similar to
the reconnaissance route that I had taken earlier in the
month. The other course of action included a route through
Zagreb to the bridges between western Serbia and eastern
Bosnia. Of course, either option was a significant change in
the plan and required coordination, including country
clearances. The TF staff refined these COAs until we
received word on the night of December 17 that only the TF
EAGLE TOC would go in by ground if the weather
continued to delay air insertion. This was an interesting
planning exercise. These options were feasible, but probably
not acceptable politically.
The weather cleared on December 18, and the airflow
was initiated. However, the number of available aircraft
was impacted by the delay, and the Blue Falcons learned
that our planned sorties would be cut by approximately 50
percent each day. This meant that the closure of the TF
would now take approximately 8 days.
Finally, five C-130s departed Aviano at 1600 en route to
Tuzla. It was a good feeling to be on our way. During the
flight I noted that our aircraft, the lead C-130, had released
chaff and I asked the load masters about it. I was told that
our C-130 was painted by an air defense radar system as we
crossed Bosnia, just a reminder that this was not a training
exercise. Otherwise, the flight was uneventful; on our
second approach attempt, we made a successful landing in
the snow and fog at Tuzla Airbase. It was 1807, December
18, 1995.
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The Blue Falcons exited the aircraft as soon as the ramp
hit the tarmac, and they fanned out to their pre-planned
link-up points with U.S. Special Forces soldiers from 1st
Battalion, 10th Special Forces. The SF guides were added
late in the planning process, but I favored the change. I was
confident that they would ensure a smooth link-up of our
force with the UNPROFOR security force. The 1st
Battalion, 10th SF soldiers were well known by our leaders;
we had worked with them frequently during the extraction
rehearsals during the past year. This habitual relationship
enabled us to conduct link-up and movement with minimal
confusion despite the fact that we had coordinated their
assistance telephonically. Our leaders were familiar with
one another, and our soldiers were familiar with each
other’s standard operating procedures.
While the rifle platoons moved to link up with the
UNPROFOR security forces and to establish their security
positions, I provided a brief statement to the media pool
waiting just beyond the runway. Then I moved to the
Special Forces TOC and received a situation update from
their intelligence NCO. Afterward I located the
UNPROFOR Security Force Commander, Captain Martel,
and visited the U.N. Base Commander, Colonel Botten.
The meeting with Colonel Botten was a bit surprising.
Although we had met and discussed my plan during the
reconnaissance earlier in the month, he stated that my
soldiers were not to occupy any security positions along the
perimeter and that he expected my soldiers to stack arms
until the official TOA on December 20. I explained to
Colonel Botten that the TF EAGLE commander expected
me to secure the base with U.S. forces, and I intended to do
so. I reminded him that our plan called for joint patrols and
security at the entrance gates until TOA. Colonel Botten
was polite, but insisted that he was in command and that I
would follow his orders. At that point, I told Colonel Botten
that I took my orders from Brigadier General Cherrie, the
TF EAGLE Deputy Commander, and that I intended to
drive on with my plan. I saluted and departed his office. I did
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not see Colonel Botten again. The transition between the
UNPROFOR security forces and our force proceeded
smoothly.
This was the only friction between the UNPROFOR and
TF EAGLE that I witnessed. If one considers the sacrifice
and work of the U.N. in Bosnia prior to our entry, his
reaction, as the U.N. Base Commander, could perhaps be
understood. Nonetheless, it was an unexpected challenge
during my first in Bosnia.
My guidance to the company commanders was to jointly
occupy the UNPROFOR security outposts and to ease into
patrols along the base perimeter. Arriving during limited
visibility, I wanted to ensure that our soldiers became
familiar with the area and that we did not experience a mine
strike due to haste. Any patrols would be with UNPROFOR
patrols in the lead to learn their cleared routes, to become
familiar with their assigned security areas, and to ensure
joint coordination of UNPROFOR and TF activities. As
additional Blue Falcons arrived and our engineers checked
areas for mines, we would expand the perimeter and patrol
routes around the airbase.
It was extremely cold, and a heavy snow fell throughout
the first night. This would be the first of many snowy, cold
nights on a checkpoint or patrol in Bosnia for the Blue
Falcons. The soldiers worked through the night to improve
their positions. C Company, responsible for the main gate
entrance to Tuzla Airbase, made a noticeable difference in
the security posture at the front gate. Over the next 24
hours, the Blue Falcons built hasco bastion barriers to
prevent a forced entry at the gates and established
sandbagged security bunkers around the perimeter. In
accordance with Brigadier General Cherrie’s instructions, it
was clear that there was a new sheriff in town.
The leaders and soldiers of the 10th Company, Swedish
Army, provided excellent coordination and assistance
throughout the relief operation. Although we continued to
work together, the Blue Falcons assumed greater
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responsibility for the base security as time progressed.
At 0300, December 20, the relief of the Swedish security
force at the base gates was initiated, and at 0600 the Blue
Falcons assumed full responsibility for the security of Tuzla
Airbase.
At the time of the relief, the Blue Falcons had 352
soldiers on the ground, including a heavy weapons platoon,
an artillery section, and a counter-battery radar section.
The Blue Falcon TOC set up in a warehouse near the TF
EAGLE TOC, and our Aid Station was established in what
had been the base commander’s quarters. The company
commanders established platoon living areas in interior
base buildings or in the aircraft bunkers in the vicinity of
their security positions. This was done to increase the
protection of our force. The airbase had been shelled in the
past year and was directly below the Serb positions on
Mount Vis. Also, I recalled the bombing of the troop
barracks in Lebanon and wanted to disperse our soldiers.
Despite our best efforts, approximately one-third of the
battalion had to be billeted in tents. We sandbagged these
sleeping areas, but I was never comfortable with the tent
city. Lined up in one of the parking lots, the tents were an
inviting target.
The first few days in Tuzla were hard for the soldiers.
They established their positions and executed their first
security patrols. Until all the ground forces closed, each
platoon pulled extended security periods and an increased
number of patrols. When not on their security positions, the
rifle platoons were filling sandbags. The Blue Falcons used
over 80,000 sandbags during their deployment in Bosnia.
As we became more familiar with the base and the
surrounding areas, we began to adjust our security plans.
The B Company Commander, Captain Scott McCulloch,
uncomfortable with the distance and broken visibility
between Combat Outpost (COP) November at the West
Gate and A Company’s COP Falcon at the Main Gate,
established COP Bravo along the western perimeter. Also,
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increased civilian activity and limited visibility at the
eastern end of the runway where the C-17s were off-loaded
required us to establish a COP at the southeast and
southwest ends of the base perimeter. Alpha Company
would occupy these positions and patrol the southern
perimeter of the base.
All of these positions had to be cleared of mines before
occupation and before trails could be established to expedite
supplies. As a result, the battalion’s two engineer platoons
were among the busiest soldiers in the TF. Their job was
dangerous, but essential. Any place where there was a need
to move off the roads on the airbase, our engineers were
called to clear the area first.
The heavy engineer platoon was in constant demand,
particularly during the initial weeks prior to 1AD’s crossing
of the Sava River. They repaired the existing roads, and
built new roads to expedite traffic past the TF EAGLE HQ
and to route traffic around the airfield ramps and runway.
They also repaired drainage culverts, performed essential
facility maintenance, and prepared the foundations for the
military bridges. Each morning we reviewed the priority of
work for each of the engineer platoons. I wanted to ensure
they were doing the right jobs among the many requested,
and that they were rested enough to do the work safely.
One of the difficult problems we faced early in the
deployment was locating a mine-free site for D Battery’s six
M-119 howitzers. We initially planned to build a firebase in
a field just south of and connected to the base perimeter
fence. However, the time required to clear this field and the
deep mud in the area required that we look elsewhere.
Given the need to place the full battery into action as soon as
possible, the D Battery Commander recommended a novel
solution. Captain Robert Pierce recommended that we place
the battery in a tactical formation on the parking lot in the
center of the base. This would require cutting a ring through
the blacktop to allow them to swing the tube in a full 360
degree arc. The gun sites, ammo points, and FDC would be
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sandbagged for force protection. That is what we did. D
Battery remained in this location until the lot was required
for a tent city to accommodate the growing number of
soldiers at Tuzla Airbase. After a week of searching for
another acceptable position, D Battery displaced their tubes
in a linear formation just to the south and parallel to the
runway. It was their fate to labor in the mud along the
runway until their redeployment.
On December 22, a coincidence occurred that electrified
both the Blue Falcon and TF EAGLE TOCs. The
counter-battery radar crews reported three mortar round
acquisitions and the call “Red leg!” pulsed across the
command nets. “Red leg” was the code word that a counterfire mission was in progress. Just as this occurred, several
distinct, loud blasts reverberated along the southern
portion of the airfield. At the time I was moving in my
HWMMV on the southwestern end of the perimeter and
believed that the explosions were artillery rounds
impacting someplace south of the airbase. In about two
minutes D Battery reported that the tubes were laid and
ready to execute the counterfire mission. Brigadier General
Cherrie and I talked briefly on the command net. No one had
seen the impact of the rounds, and he wisely directed a
checkfire until we had more information. In a short time,
the TF EAGLE HQ received a radio call from the Danish
Battalion to inform them that their tank company was
firing on an expedient gunnery range south of the airfield.
Most leaders in the TF EAGLE or the Blue Falcon TOC, or
those listening on the command net, remember this
incident. It was the first target acquisition, and it was
reinforced by what sounded like artillery fire in close
proximity to the base. Also, this occurred at a time when
both factions remained armed and their reaction to our
presence was still uncertain.
By Christmas Eve 1995, the majority of the battalion
combat team was in Bosnia. For most of the Blue Falcons,
this would be a Christmas Eve to remember. The press was
extremely active at Tuzla Airbase. We had been in Bosnia
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less than a week. It was Christmas Eve. What a great
newscast! The battalion TOC was filmed giving the familiar
“Good Morning, America!” greeting. Many reporters interviewed soldiers for the evening news, and several news
crews spent the night with our soldiers in their bunkers or
on their combat outposts.
Christmas Eve was busy in other respects too. The
amount of stray gunfire along the perimeter was greater
than the norm. This was celebratory fire—“shlivovitz
fire”—and was not directed at our positions. However, two
incidents did get our attention on this evening. At both
COPs Alpha and Lima, the northern and northeastern
airbase gates, a car full of men accelerated toward the
barriers and came to a screeching stop just prior to reaching
the gate. In both cases, one individual was firing a pistol into
the air. The security force at both locations prepared to open
fire on the vehicle, but did not do so. The squad leader in
each case demonstrated exceptional calm and discipline. We
could not have blamed them had they decided that the car
was not likely to stop and had given the command to fire.
We did not have another incident such as this during the
remainder of our deployment. However, we did experience
attempts to breach the perimeter. In each of these cases, we
usually fired an M203 illumination round just above the
individuals. This was sufficient threat to cause them to run.
Also on Christmas Eve, a UH-60 carrying NATO and
IFOR officials was forced to land due to transmission
failure. The Blue Falcon Quick Reaction Force (QRF) was
alerted and flew to the site near Banja Luka to secure the
aircraft, crew, and passengers. The QRF, led by the A
Company Commander, Captain Bill Burleson, was briefed
and ready to launch via UH-60s in less than an hour. The
downed aircraft landed in a field just forward of one of the
faction’s lines. Captain Burleson secured the crew and
passengers, established a perimeter around the aircraft,
and made contact with the warring factions in the area.
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Weather continued to deteriorate over the next 2 days,
and extraction of the downed helicopter and the QRF was
not possible. The Bosnians in the area offered their homes to
allow the soldiers an opportunity to briefly escape the harsh
weather. Also, the battalion sent a convoy to resupply the
QRF. After 3 days, their extraction was executed, and they
returned to Tuzla Airbase.
December 24 was also the date of our first foot patrol into
Dubravnic, the town just outside the airbase. From this date
until our redeployment, the Blue Falcons executed foot
patrols and vehicular patrols in the areas surrounding
Tuzla Airbase. Often the patrols would pass through the
factions’ camps in order to exercise the IFOR’s right to move
anywhere in Bosnia and to allow the collection of detailed
intelligence on the layout and personnel in the camps.
Each of these patrols consisted of a combined arms team
with fire support officers, tactical air liaisons, and medical
support. A complete patrol plan including fire support was
coordinated with the battalion staff, and the entire patrol
was debriefed by the S2 afterwards. The TF EAGLE G-2
frequently lauded the intelligence gained by these patrols.
The performance of the platoon leaders and squad leaders in
executing these patrols was exemplary. I was always
impressed with the attention to detail these leaders
demonstrated. When the Blue Falcons departed Bosnia, we
had executed over 1,400 reconnaissance and surveillance
patrols.
On December 25, E Company (Heavy Weapons),
commanded by Captain John Lightner, secured the first
Joint Military Commission (JMC) meeting held by the TF
EAGLE Commander with the warring factions’ leaders.
Also, at about 1100 on the same day, E Company linked up
with elements of 1st Battalion, 1st Cavalry, the first
elements to cross the Sava River.
Throughout the remainder of the deployment, the Blue
Falcons ensured the security and support of TF Eagle
elements at Tuzla Airbase. The service provided by the Task
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Force’s Supply and Transportation Platoon, Medical
Platoon, Maintenance Platoon, and Mess Section was
exceptional. These elements supported all the Army and Air
Force personnel at Tuzla Airbase until the 1st Armored
Division’s combat service support units relieved them. In
some cases the relief did not occur for approximately 4
weeks.
For example, the TF Mess Section established and
operated the TF EAGLE Dining Facility and served
between 1,500 and 2,500 breakfast and dinner meals daily.
The TF Medical Platoon, led by our Battalion Surgeon,
incorporated the Air Force’s and 1st AD’s medical personnel
and established the TF EAGLE medical facility on the
airbase. Our Headquarters Company’s Arrival Airfield
Control Group (AACG) executed the coordination and
control of personnel and supplies moving through Tuzla
Airbase. Also, the Supply Section established and operated
the break-bulk point, while the battalion ammo personnel
established and operated the TF EAGLE ammo storage site.
The Blue Falcon Maintenance Platoon provided equipment
repair and service to all the TF EAGLE elements. The
robust MTOE of the ABCT and the excellent officer and
NCO leadership in these elements made this level of
support possible. I was constantly surprised by their
ingenuity and ability to do so much with so few resources.
The contribution of these CSS elements to arming, fueling,
fixing, and feeding TF EAGLE elements in the initial weeks
of JOINT ENDEAVOR was enormous.
OPERATIONS IN THE RUSSIAN BRIGADE
SECTOR
On January 1, 1996, the Blue Falcons received an
unexpected mission. During the TF EAGLE evening staff
update, Major General Nash stated that the Russian
Airborne Brigade would not arrive in Bosnia until early
February. He directed TF 3-325 to assume responsibility for
the Russian Brigade Sector and to ensure the factions met
the D+30 requirements. Also, he directed that we open the
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east-west roads crossing the Zone of Separation (ZOS) as
soon as possible.
As the staff began planning the operations in the
Russian Brigade Sector, I made a reconnaissance of the ZOS
along Route Georgia. Route Georgia had been cratered at
the ZOS, and both factions claimed they did the job. It was
extremely well done! The cratering charges had been placed
so that the hillside was cut out both above and below the
road. Our engineers and a bridge company from 1st
Armored Division would bridge this crater on January 13,
opening the road for the first time since the war began.
The S3 and I briefed Brigadier General Cherrie on our
operations plan for the Russian Brigade Sector on January
4. The plan was relatively simple. First, we would meet the
senior leaders of both former warring factions in the brigade
sector to coordinate the separation of their forces and to gain
their assistance in clearing the major roads in the sector.
Our intent was to ensure compliance with the Dayton
Accords and to advance freedom of movement in the sector.
The D+30 requirements stipulated that the former warring
factions would evacuate the ZOS, declare all heavy
weapons, and consolidate the weapons at designated sites
no later than January 19.
Our priority would be to first clear Routes Georgia and
Kansas between Simin Han and Lopare and Priboj; then
Route Kansas between Lopare and Brcko, and Route
Georgia between Priboj and Zvornik. (See Figure 2.) In
clearing these roads and the surrounding areas, we would
require the former warring factions to detect and clear all
mines. Our forces would provide security for the clearance
operations and ensure that both factions adhered to the
Dayton agreements.
Brigadier General Cherrie approved our plan, and I
departed on the same day for Lopare. The force consisted of
my Alternate Command Post (ACP), the Tactical Air
Control Party (TACP), an Advanced Trauma Life Support
Team (ATLS), an engineer element, and a reinforced heavy
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weapons platoon. Also, Mr. Rick Atkinson, a Washington
Post reporter, traveled with me.
Because of the mined roads, we had to go by Route Hawk
to Zvornik, north along Route Alabama to Bijeljina, and
then along Route Georgia through Ugljevik to Lopare. This
was approximately an 8-hour trip. We arrived in Lopare in
the early evening and coordinated with the Serbian 3d
Mijerka Brigade Commander, Colonel Garic. His
headquarters was also in Lopare. We established the Task
Force Assault Command Post (ACP) on the second floor of
an empty department store in Lopare.
The next morning we met with Colonel Garic’s executive

Figure 2. Route Clearance in the Russian Brigade
Sector.
officer to discuss our plans for the day and the assistance we
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needed from his forces. This coordination meeting was
typical of those with other Serb commanders. They did not
like to get directly to business. Usually they would offer
coffee and talk for about 20 minutes. Often the discussions
would involve their perspective of the war and why the
American press had it wrong. They would sometimes ask for
our personal views or our opinion of the Croat-Muslim
forces. During this first visit to Lopare, the brigade XO said
something that I’ve always remembered: “If the U.S. stayed
in Bosnia for 100 years, there will be peace for 100 years.”
He did not have to tell me what would happen if the United
States left Bosnia.
After the small talk, we would get out a map and chart
our plans for the day, explaining where we needed their
soldiers and what type of capability was required. They
always had an officer writing down what was said in each
meeting. The Serb commanders were frank about their
concerns and stated any preconditions. However, they met
their agreements every time. Their subordinate leaders
were always knowledgeable of their requirements and of
our intentions. This indicated an effective, professional
chain of command. They always provided a liaison officer to
travel with us.
The experience was not similar with the Croat-Muslim
commanders. They tended to be harder to establish a
meeting with and more formal once the meeting was
underway. They went directly to the business at hand,
agreed with everything, and then met about 50 percent of
their agreements. We generally had to ask for a liaison
officer. I never figured out if their failure to have leaders and
soldiers at the appointed time and place with the right
equipment was deliberate or if it was due to a less
professional chain of command. I suspected that it was
actually the latter.
Our operation to clear each of these major routes and the
surrounding ZOS followed a common model. I would make
prior coordination with the senior commanders, usually
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brigade commanders, of the warring factions on each side of
the ZOS. At an agreed date and time, one of our security
forces, usually a heavy weapons platoon, would link up with
the company or battalion commander of one faction and
provide security as his engineer force cleared the road of
mines and debris. They would clear the road to the center
point in the ZOS. Meanwhile the opposing faction
commander would clear the road from the opposite direction
with security provided by another of our security elements.
Usually the Deputy Commander, the S3, or I led one
security element and the E Company Commander led the
other element. When the forces met at the mid-point in the
ZOS, I usually invited the commanders to walk the road
with me. If they showed any hesitation, I required them to
clear the road again. In any event, we walked the road
before our vehicle convoy traversed it.
In most cases we left a security element to patrol these
road nets to ensure that they stayed clear and to encourage
the locals to use the road. Most of these roads had not been
used during the 4 years of the war. Clearing them was not a
simple task.
Our operations in the Russian Brigade Sector took place
throughout January. Clearance operations as described
above were executed January 4-6 and 10-13. The clearance
operation to open Route Carolina was a little more
precarious. The areas near Sapna and Priboj were hotly
contested during the war and heavily mined. However, we
opened the road networks, and the former warring factions
began to pull out of the ZOS just prior to the deadline of
January 19.
On January 13, the engineer platoon and a 1st Armored
Division Engineer Company emplaced a medium girder
bridge across the crater on Route Georgia. This opened a
direct route between Lopare and Tuzla, simplifying our
reconnaissance and security patrols into the Russian
Brigade Sector. In order to secure the medium girder bridge,
we established COP Shark on key terrain above the bridge.
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This COP was manned by a reinforced rifle platoon from A
Company from January 14 until relieved by a Russian
airborne unit on February 1. To ensure responsive fire
support, we coordinated with the 1st Brigade, 1st Armored
Division and, when required, displaced a two-gun section of
our D Battery to Simin Han. On January 18, E Company
established another COP—COP Metal—along Route
Kansas in the ZOS.
The Blue Falcons executed ZOS enforcement missions in
the Russian Brigade Sector during January 18-21 and
23–30. Most often the Deputy Commander or the S3 led a
reinforced security element to check compliance with the
D+30 requirements in specific areas in the ZOS. We
coordinated the ground movement with air reconnaissance
craft whenever the weather allowed. Beginning on January
18, I flew the ZOS once a day to check for heavy weapons or
troops in the ZOS. We experienced only a few violations of
the Dayton Accords during these missions. The DCO
confiscated several heavy machine guns. Also, our
engineers disabled a Serbian T-54 tank with thermite
grenades. The policy was to destroy heavy weapons that had
not been moved out of the ZOS in accordance with the
Dayton agreements.
During January 18-21, the Blue Falcons were stretched
pretty thin. The rifle companies continued to secure Tuzla
Airbase, provide an airmobile QRF, and occupy COP Shark
on Route Georgia. E Company also manned COP Metal
along Route Kansas, provided heavy weapons platoons for
the ZOS enforcement missions, and provided escort for our
logpacks and the mobile QRF to TF EAGLE. The average
odometer reading on E Company’s new armored HMMWVs
was 2,200 miles at the end of January, a good indicator of E
Company’s OPTEMPO.
On January 18, I informed Major General Nash that we
could not provide the mobile QRF, support the operations in
the Russian Brigade Sector, and meet the need to maintain
and rest one heavy weapons platoon a day. I was concerned
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about the increased security risk we were assuming by
decreasing security elements at Tuzla Airbase. He directed
that we continue our mission in the Russian Brigade Sector.
He also directed the G-3 to task a tank platoon to serve as a
mobile QRF for Tuzla in the interim.
The mission in the Russian Brigade Sector was
challenging and extremely interesting. It provided an
insight to the former warring factions, the people, and the
war’s impact that was not as clear at Tuzla Airbase. The
destruction in the towns near the ZOS was sobering. Entire
villages were destroyed, standing as ghost towns. We
learned to identify the signs of ethnic cleansing. We watched
Serb families leave their homes on New Year’s Eve because
the Dayton Accords turned their land over to the control of
Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation forces.
Also, we watched the Serb families celebrate their first
peaceful Christmas with their families in 4 years. Many
pigs were slaughtered in the few days prior to the holiday, as
each family gathered in their yard to roast a pig and
celebrate.
Another memorable event happened during one
operation in the Russian Brigade Sector. While clearing the
road to Celic, one of the Bosnia-Herzegovina soldiers
recognized that the Serb company commander had been his
professor in high school. He shouted “Professore!” and asked
to go meet him. Despite having been enemies, they were
soon exchanging information about the students they both
knew. They wanted to know who had been killed or
wounded in the war. The soldier went back to his lines and
returned with several other soldiers who had also been this
commander’s students. They shared a cigarette and talked
for quite some time.
On January 15, I visited the Russian Airborne Brigade
Commander at his headquarters in Ugljevik to provide a
relief-in-place briefing. This was an event that I would not
have believed possible 10 years ago. A U.S. airborne
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battalion commander was executing a relief with a Russian
airborne brigade commander.
The meeting was not what I had hoped it would be. The
Russian commander was brash, stating that he was too
busy and then leaving the room. Therefore, the S-3 and I
provided the information to his executive officer, who
impressed me. The XO was attentive and asked perceptive
questions. It was a good exchange. However, before we had
finished, the commander returned and told us that he
needed the conference room. Our exchange was over.
Fortunately, however, our junior leaders and soldiers
did develop a better working relationship with the
Russians. We continued to execute ZOS enforcement
missions within the Russian Brigade Sector throughout
January. We executed a formal relief-in-place of COPs
Shark and Metal on January 1-2, 1996, respectively. The
exchange of positions with the Russian Brigade drew
extensive press coverage and was a good way for the Blue
Falcons to close their operations in the Russian Brigade
Sector.
RELIEF AND REDEPLOYMENT
Redeployment of the Blue Falcons was a subject of
extensive discussion throughout our deployment. The 3-325
ABCT and the Marine contingent in the Sixth Fleet were
EUCOM’s rapid reaction forces. In order to free the Blue
Falcons for potential contingency missions, our involvement in Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR was intended to be
approximately 30 days in length. The initial planning called
for our relief by a battalion of the 82d Airborne Division. The
4th Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment was
designated, and their staff visited us in Vicenza prior to our
deployment. We continued to coordinate with the 4-325 AIR
after our deployment to Tuzla.
Another aspect of our redeployment was an agreement
between Major General Jack P. Nix, Jr., and Major General
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Nash that we would redeploy elements of TF 3-325 when
their capability could be replaced by 1st Armored Division
elements. The size of TF 3-325 increased during the initial
deployment to a high of approximately 920 soldiers on
December 27, 1995, and then decreased steadily until the
redeployment of the main body. This manning policy
affected primarily the following elements of TF 3-325:

•

The LION Brigade Forward Support Company (-)
assisted in operations of the Arrival Airfield Control
Group, materiel handling equipment services,
maintenance services, and medical services.

•

The 3-325 ABCT Mess Section operated the TF
EAGLE Dining Facility.

•

D Battery, 319th Field Artillery Regiment provided
fire support.

•

The Heavy Engineer Platoon provided road repair
and limited construction capability.

These elements redeployed, sometimes in groups of two
or three soldiers, directly from Tuzla Airbase to Aviano
Airbase on the C-130s that made resupply runs several
times a week. D Battery and the Heavy Engineer Platoon
redeployed as units.
By the end of January 1996, the 1st Armored Division
Artillery and sufficient engineer assets were deployed in
Bosnia to provide complete coverage in the TF EAGLE
sector. Therefore, D Battery prepared for redeployment
during the last week of January and departed Tuzla on
C-130s on January 31. The Heavy Engineer Platoon
redeployed to Aviano on February 7.
The troopers of D Battery and the Heavy Engineer
Platoon had endured the snow, rain, and knee-deep mud in
order to do their job. Throughout the operation, D Battery
was always ready to provide responsive and accurate fires,
and the engineers demonstrated perseverance and
66

creativity in accomplishing every assigned task. Their
contribution to JOINT ENDEAVOR, when they were the
only show south of the Sava, was critical in those early,
uncertain days.
Although the remainder of the Blue Falcons had little
idle time, the million-dollar question as I visited the combat
outposts was, “What is the latest on redeployment?” I
always believed, and told the soldiers and their families
from the first, that we would return when the job was done,
most likely in about 60 days.
In early February the momentum of the redeployment
planning picked up. EUCOM wanted the 3-325 ABCT to
prepare for possible contingency missions. Trouble was
brewing in Algeria, Central Africa, and Liberia, and the JCS
contingency planning for an Initial Force in the Golan
Heights included 3-325 ABCT.
On February 3, we received a USAREUR FRAGO,
through TF EAGLE, that directed our redeployment.
During this week the staff worked both the redeployment
planning with the TF EAGLE staff and future training
plans with the LION Brigade staff.
On February 10, we learned that 4-325 AIR was not
going to replace us in Tuzla. Although 4-325 AIR was
trained and completely packed for deployment, their
deployment was canceled. This presented the problem of a
replacement, and the TF EAGLE staff began work on the
options. On or about February 11, the decision was made to
form a composite unit under 5-3 Air Defense Artillery
Regiment to assume responsibility for Tuzla Airbase. This
unit was called TF Striker, consisting (to the best of my
memory) of the following elements:

•

3d Battalion, 5th Air Defense Artillery Regiment,

•

C Company, 1st Battalion, 1st Cavalry,

•

212th MP Company.
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Our combined staffs went to work immediately to
determine the best method for the relief-in-place at Tuzla.
This was not a simple problem since the units were not even
remotely similar. We also initiated a training program for
their NCOs and soldiers that focused on the predominantly
infantry-related tasks required by the mission.
The relief operation took 4 days to execute. Basically, TF
Striker’s key leaders conducted a reconnaissance of their
positions and patrol routes 1 day prior to the assumption of
responsibility for the COP. We conducted the relief of the
southern portion of the perimeter first. The major phases of
the relief were:

•

February 14: TF Striker Commander, Lieutenant
Colonel Dave Wolfe, and I walked the entire
perimeter.

•

February 16: Key leaders reconnoitered COPs Oscar,
Romeo, and Delta. Joint, day, and night patrols were
executed.

•

February 17: TF Striker occupied COPs Oscar,
Romeo, and Delta. 3d Battalion, 4th Cavalry relieved
platoon on Hill 425. Key leaders reconnoitered COPs
Alpha and Lima and Observation Posts 1 and 3. Joint,
day, and night patrols were executed.

•

February 18: TF Striker assumed responsibility for
Tuzla Airbase security. TF 3-325 ACP co-located with
TF Striker TOC. TF Striker occupied COPs Alpha and
Lima and OPs 1 and 3. Key leaders reconnoitered
COPs Bravo and November. Joint, day, and night
patrols were executed.

•

February 19: TF Striker occupied COPs Bravo and
November. Relief-in-Place was completed.

TF 3-325 units deployed to the Intermediate Staging
Base (ISB) in Taszar, Hungary, as they were relieved.
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On February 11, TF 3-325 began coordination with 21st
TAACOM at the ISB in Hungary. Their mission was to
receive, refit, and redeploy the Task Force to Italy. On
February 14 we issued the TF Redeployment Order, and
flew the Deputy Command Post (DCP) and Advance Party
to Taszar on February 16. Under the command of the
Deputy Commander, Major Bob Avalle, this advance party
coordinated the reception, refit, and redeployment of the
Task Force in detail.
TF 3-325 departed Tuzla Airbase in three ways: convoy
to the ISB, airmobile to the ISB, and direct flight to Aviano
Airbase, Italy. The TF convoys departed Tuzla on February
17 and 19 at 0730. I was pleased that all the vehicles
completed the road march to Hungary without a
maintenance problem. The airmobile operations were
executed with “Big Windy," the CH-47 company, on
February 17, 19, and 20. Finally, the TF Executive Officer,
Major Greg Muilenburg, stayed behind at Tuzla and
supervised the redeployment of our oversized vehicles and
ISU-90 containers directly to Aviano Airbase on C-17 and
C-130 aircraft.
In the ISB at Taszar, the Task Force turned in their
ammo; inspected, repaired, and replaced our equipment as
necessary; and rested. We also planned and executed the
redeployment by rail and C-130 to Aviano, Italy. On
February 23-24, the Task Force loaded 50 rail cars, while
soldiers departed the ISB aboard 13 C-130s between
February 23 and 25.
On February 26, the direct airflow from Tuzla Airbase
was initiated. This airflow entailed approximately one C-17
and 12 C-130s, ending on March 4, 1996.
The redeployment of the Blue Falcons required the
movement of 77 vehicles, 23 trailers, 43 ISU-90 containers,
22 pallets, and 657 soldiers. The deliberate and smooth
execution of an element of this size by multiple means over a
2-week period was impressive.
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CONCLUSION
Although the Blue Falcons’ participation in Operation
JOINT ENDEAVOR spanned only a 2 1/2-month period, its
contributions to the operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina were
uniquely significant. TF 3-325, a light task force, was
structured and trained to ensure a rapid, secure entry into
the theater and to complement the mechanized forces of TF
EAGLE. In addition to the base security mission, the Blue
Falcons provided responsive service support elements and a
flexible combat force for contingency missions. The day
before TF 3-325 departed Bosnia, Major General Nash
noted the Blue Falcons’ service during the evening staff
update. He stated that at first he did not know what he
would do with an airborne battalion combat team, but now
he did not know what he would do without it.
LESSONS LEARNED
Shortly after the Blue Falcons’ redeployment from
JOINT ENDEAVOR, I was assigned as the G3, 10th
Mountain Division (Light Infantry). While the G3, I used
the following slide presentation in a 3-hour block of
orientation with company-level leaders that were preparing
to deploy to Bosnia. It was based on my experience in
Bosnia, aimed at the company commander and first
sergeant. Due to positive feedback after the first
presentation, company-level officers and senior noncommissioned officers attended the subsequent
presentations.
My intent was to provide a picture of what they would
experience, emphasizing the fundamentals. I do not believe
that there is anything “new” in the lessons learned. In fact,
the major thread throughout the presentation is that our
Army has excellent doctrine and standard operating
procedures and that soldiers must be disciplined in
adhering to them. Also, I wanted to impress upon leaders
that Bosnia was a dangerous environment. The lack of open
conflict must not influence them and their soldiers to relax
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their security. Hence, the title emphasizing “combat”
leadership.
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CHAPTER 4
THE “IRON DUKES” SUPPORTING
OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR

Lieutenant Colonel Michael D. Jones
At about 0900, December 13, 1995, I received a phone
call from Colonel Greg Fontenot, the Commander of the 1st
Brigade, 1st Armored Division. He told me the
Commanding General, Major General William L. Nash,
wanted me go to the division Headquarters in Bad
Kreuznach, Germany. He said I would help run the
division’s Deployment Operations Center for the impending
deployment to Bosnia. When I asked starting when and for
how long, he said if I could make it, by noon (it’s about an
hour and a half drive), and “for a long time.” At the time, I
was the Commander of the 2nd Battalion, 67th Armor, the
“Iron Dukes,” in Friedberg, Germany. After talking to
Colonel Fontenot, I gave Major Jim Henderson, my
executive officer, the order to take over the battalion, and
gave a warning order to Major Dick Tracy, my S-3, to be
prepared to bring some staff personnel to help me beginning
that afternoon. Then I went home to pack a week’s worth of
clothes. This event seems in retrospect to be abrupt,
surprising, and chaotic, but it was reflective of the lives of
most of the soldiers and family members in the First
Armored Division during the fall of 1995 through December
of 1996. This monograph is the story of my involvement in
Bosnia as a Battalion Commander, Deployment Operations
Center Commander, and Rear Detachment Commander in
the First Armored Division. It is the story, to some degree, of
the forgotten soldiers, those who were left behind.
My involvement in Bosnia began indirectly almost
immediately after I assumed command in June 1994. I

83

deployed with the battalion to the Combined Arms
Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) 6 days after assuming
command. For the first 7 days we performed the normal set
of high-intensity tasks of deliberate attack, movement to
contact, and defense. Then we transitioned to a peacekeeping phase for 3 days, where we established a zone of
separation between belligerents, established checkpoints,
escorted convoys, and performed a host of other peacekeeping tasks. The First Armored Division had
incorporated these tasks into its training in anticipation of
deploying to Bosnia.
For the next 14 months my battalion, along with the rest
of the division, continued to train on peacekeeping as well as
conventional warfighting tasks. There was always talk of
the division deploying to Bosnia if a peace settlement should
ever be reached. In fact, the division staff was furiously
working on plan after plan on how it would accomplish
possible missions it was told to be prepared to do.
Fortunately, because of the foresight, discipline, and
wisdom of Major General Carter, the division Commander,
and subsequently Major General Nash, as well as
commanders of the 1st Brigade (Colonels Steve Robinette
and his successor Greg Fontenot), the “what if” drills were
kept above the battalions. We were able to concentrate on
training our units.
We established a semi-annual training event for 2-67
Armor, called either Spring Break or Fall Harvest
depending on the season, which trained Bosnian-type tasks
at home station. The concept was to take the entire
battalion to the field at Friedberg Training Area and
practice some of our combat skills, while also training on
peace operations tasks. The scenario we used was that the
battalion had been deployed to Bosnia to enforce a peace
plan. We were in an assembly area as the division reserve
and were preparing for combat operations while refining
our skills with some last-minute training. Inherent to that
was protecting ourselves with normal security measures
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and dealing with some of the other troublesome issues we
would likely face on an actual deployment.
Fortunately, there was a road that ran through
Friedberg Training Area that the local Germans liked to use
as a shortcut between several towns. I decided to use two
checkpoints along this road to control access and give our
soldiers the practice of running a checkpoint with real
civilians who unwittingly became our training aids. Since
many soldiers did not speak German, we had to develop
ways to explain to the civilians that we were training in the
area and wanted to caution them to drive carefully and
watch for maneuvering tanks. The soldiers had to deal with
sometimes belligerent or ill-tempered Germans who were in
a hurry, while remaining polite but firm. Sometimes they
had to hold up civilian traffic while a military convoy used
the road, again having to keep the civilians calm, but firmly
insisting they wait until they had permission to move. The
S-2 produced preprinted slips of paper with a caution in
German that the soldiers handed out. We also incorporated
role players that represented everything from factions to
terrorists to news media personnel. We performed
patrolling, convoy escort missions, tank crew gunnery skills
tests, tank crew proficiency courses, and other training, all
while commanding and controlling the events from the
Tactical Operations Center and sustaining ourselves in the
field. What we were doing turned out to be more realistic
than I could ever have dreamed.
It was during Fall Harvest in early September 1995 that
things really began to heat up. Major General Nash had
assumed command of the division that summer, and he was
flying in one day to visit our training. The United States had
recently participated in bombing missions in Bosnia, and it
looked like there might be some positive prospects from a
conference that was to be held in Dayton, Ohio, to try to
come up with a peace agreement.
I briefed Major General Nash on our training plan and
showed him some of the training we were doing. We stopped
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at a confrontation going on at a checkpoint between a faction
(my mortar platoon) and the platoon manning the
checkpoint, which was under orders not to allow a faction
with weapons through. Staff Sergeant Campbell, one of my
mortar section leaders, should have been nominated for an
Oscar for the performance he put on as the factional convoy
commander. He was a very belligerent, tough, realistic role
player. The perplexed platoon leader was getting some
excellent training. After eating lunch, a Meals Ready to Eat
(MRE), with Captain Kevin Dunlop, my A Company
Commander, Major General Nash told me to get my XO and
S-3 and a Bosnian map. Also, he had me see if I could get the
brigade S-3 to join us.
After lunch, Major General Nash drew a few lines on the
Bosnian map, telling us that if the peace process in Dayton
worked out and the division was deployed, this was the area
the 1st AD would be assigned. He then explained a concept
to operate out of base camps, establish a zone of separation,
set up checkpoints, conduct patrols, etc. He showed us the
1st Brigade sector, which included a key area called the
Possivina Corridor, an area near Brcko that was the only
link between Serb areas in the east and west. As he laid out
the task organization, he showed 2-67 Armor going, but
leaving two tank companies at home and bringing two
infantry companies.
As Major General Nash departed, I realized things were
really serious, and there was more likelihood than ever that
we would be deploying to Bosnia. We could not share this
information with the rest of the battalion, but we knew we
had to be serious about taking advantage of every bit of our
training time, making sure we were ready to deploy and
take on the Bosnian winter, ready to enforce the peace,
ready to fight if necessary.
Speaking of the Bosnian winter, another event during
that period had an impact on me later. Soon after Fall
Harvest, we conducted what we called a “TENTEX.” I had
been working for over a year to correct a deficiency I had
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discovered very soon after taking command at our first
CMTC rotation. Our tentage and heating stoves were in bad
condition. We did not have anywhere near what was needed,
and what we did have was often not working. This was a
result of a general lack of funds to buy anything but the
necessities for training during the prior years and the fact
that the battalion seldom needed tentage. At Grafenwoehr
and Hohenfels, the troops lived in hard buildings most of the
time. Because we did not know when base camps would be
built, I thought it was important we ensure we could house
the battalion in the tentage we carried with us. Major Jim
Henderson hit on the idea of the TENTEX. We set up every
tent and stove in the battalion at the same time on a football
field. Leaders were present as I walked through, checking
the tents for serviceability and stoves for completeness and
functionality. It was actually quite a sight to see a whole
battalion’s worth of gear set up. We were still short some
equipment, and a little was still unserviceable, but I was
very proud of what I saw, knowing our status just a year
before. It just happened that we were having a command
post exercise (CPX) at that time, and the brigade Tactical
Operations Center (TOC) was set up near the TENTEX. The
Brigade Commander, Colonel Fontenot, saw this
magnificent sight as well, which would later cause me a
problem.
An incident during another training event a few weeks
later in the Czech Republic also indicated that things were
very serious. The battalion participated in Cooperative
Challenge, a Partnership for Peace exercise practicing
peace operations. We provided a response cell, role playing a
battalion that was part of a multinational brigade, led by 1st
Brigade, 1AD. General William W. Crouch, the commanderin-chief of U.S. Army Europe, visited the exercise. When we
were walking from one place to another, he stopped, looked
me in the eye, and asked if the battalion was ready to go to
Bosnia. I told him we were not ready yet, but would be with a
couple more weeks of training. Although that is all he said, I
could tell from the way he asked and by his expression that
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he was deadly serious. I was convinced at that point that
what was happening at Dayton was going to cause the
division to deploy.
A few days later I got one of the biggest shocks of my
career. At the end of the exercise, Colonel Fontenot asked
me to sit down in his office and told me that if the division
deployed, he had to leave one of the battalions in the brigade
at home. He had decided it would be 2-67. He explained that
his rationale was two fold. First, he needed a strong rear
detachment commander for the brigade and for all the units
who would not deploy. That rang a little hollow with me at
the time. Secondly, I was going to change command next
June, which was halfway through the deployment, and he
wanted to keep the same battalion commanders the whole
way through. So 4-67 Armor would deploy and 2-67 would
stay at home.
My first reaction was supportive, since I could see that
he was having a very hard time telling me. I told him I
understood, was not happy about the decision, but would do
the best job I could and he could count on the battalion to do
what was necessary to support the brigade. Later, after
having thought about it, I went up to Colonel Fontenot’s
office and asked to revisit the issue. I told him that I thought
the battalion was the best, most ready outfit to deploy for
this mission, and the fact I was leaving would not change
that. The fact that I would be replaced was significant, but
Dave Neidringhaus, the incoming commander, was a good
man and would be as good as me in running the battalion. As
I expected, it did not change his decision.
One question I had at the time was whether my wife had
an impact on the decision of which battalion would deploy.
My wife is a professional woman who has been very
successful in her own right as a computer systems analyst.
It was no secret she was not particularly happy at having to
give up her career for 2 years so I could command the
battalion in Germany. She certainly did not fit into the
stereotypical “commander’s wife” role, that is, someone who
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volunteers with alacrity and gets tremendous personal
rewards in supporting her husband’s unit and career. I
would later find out there were really few commanders’
wives who did fit into the mold, but that is another story.
Regardless, I had told Colonel Fontenot recently that my
wife, Pat, was thinking about leaving Germany to go back to
the United States to Kansas City to take a job in the spring,
a little before my change of command. He had been pretty
neutral in his reaction, basically saying he understood and
that it was totally our decision. He mentioned I would have
to get someone else to pick up the slack in leading the family
support group. However, I had an uncomfortable feeling he
was displeased and wondered whether Pat’s lack of
commitment had influenced his decision to leave my
battalion behind. I have never directly asked Colonel
Fontenot whether that was the case.
Very soon after returning from the Czech Republic, we
deployed to Grafenwoehr for our normally scheduled tank
gunnery rotation. However, things had developed at
Dayton, and it was looking like there would be an
agreement. It also was clear that the division was well on
the way to deploying. The task organization had changed
again, and it looked like I would deploy only one tank
company, which would be attached to 3-5 Cav, the brigade’s
infantry battalion. I would keep three behind, along with
the battalion headquarters. 4-67 Armor would deploy its
battalion headquarters but leave two tank companies
behind. I never did figure out why 4-67 just did not deploy
three companies, leaving my battalion intact, and I never
met anyone on the division or brigade staff who had any
insight as to why the division task organized that way.
I chose A Company to deploy because the commander
and 1SG were my most experienced pair, and the leadership
within the company seemed to be most able to perform
independently. I had the same difficulty with the other
commanders that Colonel Fontenot had with me in explaining why they would not deploy.
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As I reflected on the emotions I was feeling—disappointment, sadness, bitterness, guilt, and so forth—I realized I
needed to figure out why and determine how to deal with
them. Otherwise I would not be effective as a commander or
be able to deal effectively with the trauma that the rest of
the battalion was beginning to go through.
On the surface, not having to deploy to a miserable, cold,
wet, disease-ridden country to perform a difficult mission
under oppressive strain and with questionable objectives
and uncertain political leadership would seem like a good
deal. However, I felt genuine disappointment in not
deploying. I attributed it to several factors. First, we are
taught from an early age that we are part of a team. We
become tightly bonded with the team—with the other
commanders and units in the organization. Therefore, when
you are broken away from the team, excluded to some
degree, it hurts your feelings. Although, to his credit,
Colonel Fontenot recognized this and went to great trouble
not to exclude the Dukes from the brigade’s efforts, it was
clear that in the minds of some we had immediately gone
from being team members to outsiders. It is something that
just happens naturally when there are some who do not
share the hardships and risks of the others. The second
factor was that we are taught that leaders never send their
people to do things they are not willing to do themselves. We
share the hardships and risks with our men. But here I was,
sending some of my soldiers off to God knows what while I
would be comfortably at home with my family. Although
hard to admit, I was also feeling some embarrassment at not
being chosen for something. In the movie “Patton,” George
C. Scott, portraying General George S. Patton, delivers a
speech about when, after the war 30 years from now, when
your grandchild on your knee asks what you did in the great
WWII, “at least you won’t have to say . . . well . . . I shoveled
sh—in Louisiana.” Somehow, being the Rear Detachment
Commander did not seem much better than being the head
shovel man. All of these factors made it difficult to deal with
having to stay behind. This recognition of why I was feeling
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as I was did not make the feelings go away, but it did make it
possible to deal with my feelings, continue to command, and
begin to take actions to deal with the feelings that my
officers and men were experiencing.
The two hardest issues to deal with while we were at
Grafenwoehr were remaining calm while being treated like
second class citizens and maintaining the morale of the
battalion.
Although I do not believe there was an intentional snub
of the battalion, as soon as it was clear we would not be going
to Bosnia, the battalion lost priority for everything,
including interest and information. While it was easy to
understand why the priorities for ranges would naturally go
to deploying units, the lack of information was less
understandable and more frustrating. The range
availability issue caused a major deterioration in the
battalion’s training. We were delayed several times and
ended up canceling on some ranges. We practically
eliminated maneuver training and modified our platoon
gunnery qualification. I decided to redeploy the battalion to
Friedberg rather than remaining at Grafenwoehr to
complete the training to standard. This was because of the
uncertainty of resources, and the fact that the deployment
to Grafenwoehr was continuing to stretch out with little
gain. The lack of information was not deliberate, but the
battalion staff found access to the brigade staff dried
up—phone calls were taken less often, few calls returned,
and meetings occurred where the battalion was not invited
to send representatives.
I got some insight into some of the factors causing the
problems when Colonel Fontenot had a death in the family
and I became the acting Brigade Commander for about a
week. During the period I was in command, the brigade staff
was working on the real plan for Bosnia, a plan for deploying
to Hohenfels, the tactical plan for the CMTC rotation, the
redeployment back to home station, and a major fire
coordination exercise (FCX). In fact, the FCX was executed
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three times. The first time some key leaders were called
away (although the training went just fine without them),
the second time the Air Force was not able to participate,
and the third time was OK, but we had fired most of our key
ammunition in the first two exercises. Needless to say, the
pressure on the brigade staff was enormous. Simultaneously, we were conducting an accelerated fielding of
SINCGARS radios. It was obvious the brigade TOC was not
as well organized as it needed to be, but given the conditions
I decided not to interfere and just try to help them get
through the immediate problems.
An interesting event occurred during that week that had
an impact on my future in a different way. Major General
Nash called me up and asked me to come to the division
Command Post (CP) and spend some time with him. I
watched activities in the CP for a while, then watched a
training Joint Military Commission that Major General
Nash conducted, and then went back into the CP to talk
some more. The major impression I had was how
disorganized the CP seemed to be—far too many tasks for
the people on hand and not organized functionally. Major
General Nash had a van that had a large round table in it
that was his “thinking area.” But it also had a videoteleconference (VTC) terminal in it and was on a major
route between vans in the command post. A vivid
remembrance I have was the stern, rather caustic chewing
out Major General Nash gave the G-3 over there being no
one monitoring and taking notes on a VTC the Corps was
conducting. The relationship between the two was obviously
not very close or warm. The other vivid remembrance I have
is how exhausted everyone was in the CP. They were all
obviously working their hearts out.
I watched a Battle Update Briefing (BUB) where Major
General Nash received an update on the situation. Rather
than using a mapboard, most of the briefing was done
presenting a series of Powerpoint slides on a large monitor. I
remember a long line of staff officers coming into a very
crowded van, stumbling over each other getting in and out,
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not knowing the answers to the dozens of questions Major
General Nash kept firing, and then asking for a staff officer
who was not in the van (“G-2!!!, get the G-2 in here . . .,”
followed by a long wait getting the G-2 back in the van . . .
then a question, and the G-2 having to reply, “I do not know
sir, I’ll find out”). I’m not sure who was more frustrated,
Major General Nash over the staff’s inability to anticipate
and know the answers to his questions or the staff’s
frustration with a CG who never seemed to be satisfied. It
seemed to me the staff was whipped. Later toward the end of
the day, Major General Nash asked me what I thought of the
CP and what they should do there. I made two comments
that I can recall. One was it seemed the Command Post
needed to be reorganized along the functional lines
necessary for this kind of mission. The other was that I
thought the staff needed a little rest more than anything
else.
I do not know if it had anything to do with what I said,
but the next weekend the division sent most of the staff
home for a weekend off. By the time they traveled there and
back, there was not much rest, but it was well-intentioned.
I have concluded since then that what was really
happening that day was that I was being interviewed for my
next job. Later in the week, Major General Nash sat down
with me and told me he was not making an offer, but if he
asked, what would I think of becoming the division G-3. I
said I was very flattered, and that if he had to have an
answer right then I would give him one, but knowing the
implications, I would prefer to talk to my wife first. He said
that was a good idea. I’m not sure if he really thought it was
or not, but eventually I would wind up being the G-3 after I
changed command.
My greatest lesson from this period was how traumatic it
is for those who must stay behind when you split up a unit
and deploy part of it. The emotions and trauma are very
difficult, demanding positive self-help to mitigate them.
Such self-help is very hard to accomplish, given the
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pressure, intensity, and rigor of activities and issues that
have to be dealt with while you prepare for deployment.
My approach within the battalion was to try to keep
things calm. Further, I planned to deal with what would be a
major disappointment when it became clear which units
would not deploy. Finally, I determined to make the most of
the opportunities to develop the unit and our people.
As the Dayton process ended, the battalion was
returning to Friedberg. It became clear, despite a lack of
actual orders, the division would be deploying, and it looked
like the latest plan (excluding most of the battalion) would
hold. What I had to tell the troops was (1) the division had no
orders to deploy yet; (2) we were obviously planning for the
division to deploy if and when we did receive orders; (3) right
now, the plan was for only one company in the battalion and
two companies in 4-67 to deploy in the package; and (4) the
plan had changed so many times before, do not bet on
anything. More or fewer units and people could deploy
based on a changing situation, and the best thing we could
do was to avoid speculation, do our duty, and be prepared if
called.
Simultaneously, I discussed with Majors Jim Henderson
and Dick Tracy (my XO and S-3) the need to analyze and be
ready to accomplish the tasks we would have to perform to
support the deployment of the other units and assume
command of the rear detachment. The work they did in the
next several weeks was admirable. They developed plans for
assisting the upload and deployment of the brigade,
assuming control of the rear detachments of deploying
units, securing the brigade’s installations, and running the
brigade-level Rear Detachment Headquarters. We decided
to establish the Rear Detachment Brigade Headquarters in
our Battalion Headquarters building. This was with
considerable opposition. Mrs. Fontenot was opposed to us
not occupying the brigade Headquarters building at
Kirchgoens. However, I felt strongly that this needed to be a
battalion mission. The sense of purpose, pride, and

94

teamwork I felt we could generate by retaining the identity
of the battalion was more important than the convenience
and symbolism of relocating to the brigade Headquarters.
Also, I anticipated that in the long term, we needed to
remain a combat battalion, continuing to train and
maintain, and not take on the identity (and image) of a rear
operations type unit. Colonel Fontenot allowed me to make
the call.
About this time, the really difficult problems began for
the battalion. As I stated before, we had made a great effort
to get our tentage and stoves squared away. We began to be
levied for this and other equipment to fill the shortages of
deploying units. We also had to begin reassigning some of
our people to deploying units. We had cross-leveled
personnel to A Company to fill their shortages, and that had
created second and third order effects in the other
companies. Now we began to get levies for low-density
specialties and other special needs. We had to give up our
mortar platoon leader and about half of the already short
platoon, and we had to create a Brigade S-5 section. These
and other personnel changes created domino effects
throughout the battalion.
All these changes left me with essentially a new team of
new teams. Although most of my key leaders stayed in
place, most of their units and sections underwent extensive
changes in personnel and roles. Our battalion’s mission had
changed, and we modified our organization to take on the
role of deploying the brigade and running the rear
detachment.
Given the situation, I felt I needed to do some significant
team development and decided a method I could use would
be assigning missions and tasks to allow my company
commanders and staffs to rebuild their teams. Therefore,
we gave each company a railhead to run, upload site to
conduct, installation to secure, or some other important
mission, thus exercising troop leading procedures and
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gaining the sense of teamwork and satisfaction that comes
with accomplishing something to a high standard.
One issue created some controversy with my Base
Support Battalion and Area Support Group. I decided to
secure the installations at Friedberg and Kirchgoens with
guards, and to secure the railheads with guards in combat
field gear and with weapons. I had several reasons for that
decision. First, during the deployment, I wanted the
installations and railheads to remain secure. I had no
information that a terrorist threat had developed, but I
believed it made sense to mitigate the risk.
More likely, however, was the possibility of criminal
activity. At the Friedberg Training Area, there is an old
Hawk air defense artillery site. The Hawk battery was
inactivated or redeployed long ago, and I remembered the
first time I saw it. It looked from a distance like a great
facility—nice buildings and maintenance areas. On closer
inspection, I noticed parts of roofs missing, windows broken
or missing, and most things of value, down to electrical
fixtures and outlets, stripped. I learned that local Germans
had stripped the facility of all usable items after the battery
departed. I was concerned that with a practically deserted
post at Kirchgoens and portions deserted at Friedberg, we
would see similar problems if we maintained open posts.
Finally, there is a significant refugee problem in Germany,
and I was concerned that homeless people would be tempted
to try to occupy vacated barracks if the opportunity
presented itself.
The Base Support Battalion Commander felt securing
the installations was unnecessary and would cause more
anxiety in the community. There was also a turf battle of
sorts. Technically, the BSB is in charge of installation
security. However, I found the security plans nonexistent.
The security manager for Friedberg was a disabled civilian
employee who apparently had no supervision and little
purpose. Also, the BSB had no assets to secure the
installations. Therefore, in the absence of anything better, I
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gave the mission to two company commanders and let them
conduct assessments and develop plans. We created a
problem for the BSB by securing the installations. Although
it was a requirement for civilian employees to have
identification cards, the practice had not been enforced in
several years. Therefore, we began requiring civilians
without the proper documentation to be signed in until
cards could be created. This caused some friction between
the BSB and the battalion, but ultimately the procedures for
security were revitalized throughout the Area Support
Group and on other installations in Europe. Ironically, they
adopted procedures similar to the ones we created.
Another issue with the BSB was control of the railheads.
According to the plan, the BSBs were in charge of railheads.
However, BSBs do not have any soldiers to speak of to
perform such tasks. All the expertise on how to rail-load
rests in the units who do it all the time, not the BSB who
never does it. So it made no sense for the BSB to run the
railheads with all the labor provided by non-deploying
units. Fortunately, the company commanders I assigned to
run railheads and the captains whom the BSB assigned to
be in charge worked out arrangements on the ground to
break out responsibilities. Basically, the company
commanders took charge of the unit-related activities and
things they had resources for: marshaling, uploading,
medical support, security, etc. The BSB leaders were
responsible for the transportation-related activities: liaison
with the movement coordination teams, scheduling, train
inspections, manifesting, etc.
As we continued to work, there were other issues that
began to surface that made it clear the concept of “force
tailoring” had not been completely thought through. The
Army in Europe had not prepared for deploying units to
leave behind portions of their organizations. A good
example was maintenance. With the brigade’s Forward
Support Battalion and the division’s Main Support
Battalion deploying, we did not know who would provide
maintenance support to the battalion, the two companies
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from 4-67, and now three tank platoons from 1-1 Cavalry,
which were not deploying. The solution seemed to be to
piggyback on a maintenance unit in Hanau. That seemed a
reasonable solution until we talked to the maintenance
warrant officer there. He said they could help us with small
arms, but he did not have the capability to give us any
vehicle maintenance support. This was one of our first
indicators of how unsynchronized the overall rear
detachment plan was. It would take 2 months before an
agreement would be reached that 3d Infantry Division
would provide our backup maintenance and parts support.
By December 13, when I received the call to report to Bad
Kreuznach, the Dayton Accords had been completed, and we
knew deployment was imminent. We were only waiting on
the final signing in Paris and the orders to be issued.
Although I was unhappy with the situation, I was satisfied
we were making the best of it. We were prepared to deploy
the brigade rapidly and safely, had started developing
necessary relationships with the rear detachment
commanders of the other battalions, established contact
with family support group leaders, and in general were
ready for the challenge that awaited us. It was at that point
I received the phone call from Colonel Fontenot telling me to
report to Division Headquarters. That created even more
significant challenges.
My driver and I moved quickly to Bad Kreuznach, and
upon arrival I reported to the Chief of Staff, Colonel John
Brown. Colonel Brown told me that the Deployment
Operations Center (DOC) needed some help. He expected
the division to get the order to deploy soon, and enabling
forces were already moving. He told me to go see Gary
Addison, the division G-4, and get a tour of the DOC, which
was located across from the Division Transportation
Officer’s (DTO) office and make an assessment of when I
could assume control. I went down to Gary’s office, but he
was not in, so I went down to look at the DOC myself. After
looking for a long time, I finally discovered that the DOC did
not exist, and that there had not been enough time both to
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get ready to deploy and to create a deployment operations
center. I went back to see Colonel Brown, told him the DOC
required a lot of work, and that I needed to get some more
folks from the battalion down to help me, and needed more
phones and computers immediately. He said to get
whatever I needed, and to bring down whomever I thought
was necessary. So I set out to create something I had never
even seen before.
I called Major Henderson and told him to get Major
Tracy, 1st Lieutenant Chris Hsu (my S-3 Air), and some
other staff officers down that afternoon. I talked to the DTO,
Major Jay Warren, and immediately determined he did not
have the assets in the DTO’s office to run the deployment.
He was overwhelmed with solving immediate crises and did
not have a clear picture of the entire situation. I saw a G-3
planner and found out the G-3 was not really controlling the
deployment process either. I tried to piece together what the
deployment process was, and was surprised that there was
no one in the headquarters that knew more than I did.
That evening, I went to my first “real” Battle Update
Briefing (BUB). The Division had set up a command post in
the recreation center on post. The CP had been significantly
revamped since I had seen it at Grafenwoehr. It had a large
map board with the division sector in Bosnia on it, and a
couple of large monitors where information was displayed.
In principle, the area around the map board was an
expanded version of what I had seen in the CP at
Grafenwoehr, with the addition of a VTC capability and
additional monitors. The big difference, however, was
behind the Commanding General’s (CG) seat. The division
staff was seated at tables tiered behind the CG in a
semicircle that looked like a bandstand. Each staff officer
had a computer that was hooked into the classified local
area network, a telephone, and a small work area. I would
later become very involved in this setup, but for now the
only thing I could think of was how noisy this place must be
in a crisis.
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Although the setup had changed in the CP, and it
appeared to be organized more on functional lines, some
things had not changed in the last month. The long line of
briefers paraded in front of the CG were asked very tough
questions; many did not know the answers. The very
evident frustration was not much different from what I had
seen in November. Again, the staff was whipped, except now
the deployment was a matter of being a few days away.
That night Major Tracy and I worked well past
midnight, trying to determine the best way to organize the
DOC. There was the basic housekeeping task of getting the
assigned rooms organized to become a command and control
center. Then there was the issue of creating tracking charts,
phone rosters of key points of contact, and determining
what elements of information we needed to track and how
information flow would occur. We determined we would
need more personnel to help us run the operation. We also
decided we needed primarily to track trains. Eventually, we
learned we also needed to track aircraft, buses, and convoys.
The next day, in anticipation that we would get a
deployment order immediately after the signing of the
Dayton Accords (officially the General Framework
Agreement for Peace), we continued to deploy the “enabling
forces.” These were units that would set up deployment
nodes along the way. These forces would assist units deploy
into the Area of Responsibility (AOR) as soon as we received
the deployment order.
On December 14 we continued to learn more about how
the deployment system was supposed to work. The more we
learned, the more we realized how convoluted the system
was. I saw a fascinating chart about this time.
The Battle Command Training Program had sent a team
from Fort Leavenworth to observe the division and give us
some assistance. General (Retired) Lindsey, the head of the
team, visited the embryonic Deployment Operations Center
about this time. He showed me a chart the team had created
which graphically described the deployment process. There
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were boxes, circles, and lines all over the page. So many, in
fact, it seemed as if the system had been designed to be so
complex and disjointed that it could not possibly succeed. It
was apparent why there seemed to be no one in the
headquarters that understood exactly how things were
supposed to work. There was a comment in red ink, which I
later learned was what Major General Nash used. It only
said “Wow!”
I have seen numerous articles and speeches in which
people have lauded the deployment to Bosnia as a great
success. I would categorize it as more of a triumph of the
human spirit over an insane system, one that only narrowly
averted catastrophe.
The deployment system had changed three times in the
preceding month. The one we were operating with on
December 14 was extremely complex. The division had
determined the priorities for deployment and recorded them
on an Excel spreadsheet. This became known as “the flow”: a
listing by day and unit for each train or aircraft load. This
was adjusted by the division as priorities changed, but more
often (practically daily), it was adjusted to account for poor
execution of the plan. Some reasons, such as aircraft being
delayed because of weather, were unavoidable. Others, such
as unavailable trains, were clearly avoidable.
In the early stages of planning, I was told by 21st
TAACOM representatives that a planning figure of 10
trains per day had been given to Division and corps
planners. Although we loaded trains from 23 locations, the
limitation to 10 trains per day was based on several factors:
number of rail lines in countries we would transit, download
sites available in Hungary and Croatia, and rail cars on
hand. Despite this advice, planners insisted on scheduling
20 trains per day (no one could ever tell me who specifically
was driving this). As a result, many trains were delayed due
to lack of cars or lack of rail and download capacity, causing
the constant modification of “the flow.” Incidentally, when
we counted in mid-January, we had achieved precisely 9.7

101

trains per day to that point, thus vindicating the original
planning figure given us.
Ideally, the way the system should have worked is for the
division planners to have told someone (presumably 21st
TAACOM, since much of the V Corps staff was deploying to
assume the role of USAREUR Forward in Hungary) what
the required delivery dates (RDDs) for each unit were. Then
the deployment headquarters, again presumably 21st
TAACOM, would develop and issue a deployment plan
which included transportation mode, load, and pull dates to
achieve those RDDs. Unit TC-ACCS data would be used to
determine transportation requirements, and all necessary
STANAGs and other documents would be produced by the
deploying headquarters (again, 21st TAACOM).
Instead, the division collaboratively developed “the flow”
with 21st TAACOM and V Corps. Company-level units
manually filled out STANAGs (TC-ACCS data could not be
converted into JOPES or other usable automated data) and
other documents. I am not aware of any headquarters that
issued a complete deployment plan. It certainly was not
readily available or used extensively, if it was, in fact,
issued.
The command and control of deployment was equally
confusing, which is why I believe Major General Nash gave
us the mission to create the Deployment Operations Center
using 2-67 Armor’s staff. Movement Control Teams were
under the control of 21st TAACOM and were notified of the
scheduled trains and units for the various railheads. Often,
the MCTs would notify the company-level unit directly.
Additionally, Area Support Groups were notified of trains,
who notified Base Support Battalions, who notified units,
often at battalion or brigade level. Sometimes, units were
issued copies of the “flow” from the division headquarters.
Often, because of the number of changes taking place,
particular units received conflicting instructions. This led to
a lot of confusion.
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The process for air movement was different, because we
were using both theater and strategic aircraft, and a
movement control board was initiated to regulate the
priority and flow of units. Still another system was used for
busses, and yet another for ground convoys. With this many
different systems, and the number of changes occurring as
weather delayed aircraft, incapacity delayed trains, and
these delays in turn forced convoys and busses to be
rescheduled to match train and air flow, it is no wonder
confusion reigned. Centralizing command and control for
TFE units’ deployment in the newly created Division
Deployment Operations Center (DOC) solved some
problems. However, the fundamental flaws of the system
created a situation whereby no level of effort could have
made it a smooth process.
There were a few other issues that we confronted as we
tried to run the DOC. The automated systems did not
support the combination of theater and strategic
transportation assets. JOPES was used for aircraft, but not
for convoys or trains. An automated system that was
available, but not adequately used, was STACCS, a
European theater command and control system.
Early on, I went to Kaiserslautern to visit the operations
center 21st TAACOM had established there and to meet
some of their key players. As I wandered around the very
busy headquarters, I pulled out my list of the trains we had
loading that day and their status, obtained about an hour
before by my folks telephoning units who were loading. I
decided to do a quick check of the system, so I went to the
“train control” cell. I asked for whom I could talk to about
today’s trains, and was told a soldier on the other side of the
cell. So I asked him if he could tell me what trains were
running that day. What he showed me was a copy of “the
flow,” which 1 AD had produced. I knew it had been modified
and asked if that was actually what was on the ground that
day. I was told no, if I wanted to know that, I would have to
talk to another soldier, so I went to see him. He showed me a
list on a butcher paper chart. Again, I asked this other
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soldier why there were differences between his list
(different from the flow but still not like mine) and mine. He
explained that his was the list of what was actually ordered
for the day (as opposed to the flow, which is what was
planned for the day, and reality, which is what actually
showed up). So I asked how do I know what actually showed
up for the day. He told me that to find out, I would have to go
see another soldier. So I did. This new person showed me his
status on STACCS, the automated command and control
system. This was remotely accessed by MCTs to update
information, with different coding available to sound
alarms based on certain parameters. For instance, if a train
were late in pulling, the train symbol would flash. This
system looked great. Although its capability for planes,
busses, and convoys was not being utilized, I thought it was
a wonderful way to get information that the DOC was
manually calling around for now. Then I asked the soldier
whom he notified when one of the symbols started flashing,
indicating some task had not been achieved on time (either a
train not spotting, not being loaded, or not pulling out on
time). I was shocked when he said “nobody, no one cares.”
As a result of this visit, I got a STACCS terminal
installed in the DOC in Bad Kreuznach. Unfortunately, I
found the information on the STACCS was not being
updated enough to remain current, and that our manually
acquired information was always more accurate by a large
degree. This was less true for data on aircraft, but probably
close to half the time, manually acquired data was more
current than STACCS. So STACCS was pretty useless,
other than as a good classified e-mail system, in controlling
the deployment.
The plan for oversized cargo was weak. Although the
French rail strike did not help matters in this area, there
was an overall shortage of deep well cars. These are the
kinds of cars needed for oversized cargo, and they often did
not arrive with the train for which they were needed. This
resulted in what we called “frustrated cargo.” We did not
have a plan for frustrated cargo initially, and we never
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anticipated the amount we would have. As a result, we had
to develop a plan to move a significant number of built-up
trucks and other oversized vehicles to Bosnia by other
means.
One method was to move frustrated cargo by road
convoy. Captain Dave Korty and his company, C Company,
2-67 Armor were real heroes in this respect. We developed a
plan with the staff of 21st TAACOM to convoy most of this
cargo. However, the unexpected road march of most of this
equipment concerned us. We anticipated having numerous
vehicles that would have a difficult time making the trip.
There was a convoy center at Mannheim we decided to
satellite on. However, the increased number of vehicles
would overwhelm the element there running the Movement
Control Center (MCC). At a meeting at 21st TAACOM, I
agreed the 1st Armored Division would provide an
additional MCC at Mannheim to handle frustrated cargo.
I called Dave Korty, gave him a warning order, and told
him to come see me en route to Mannheim. When we met
that night, I gave him the mission to develop an MCC at
Mannheim that would be functional within 3 days. His
specified tasks were to receive frustrated cargo, marshal it
for convoys, check vehicles for maintenance deficiencies and
correct them, house and feed the soldiers accompanying the
vehicles (in coordination with the installation staff),
prepare them for movement, and supervise departure of the
convoys. I instructed him to coordinate with the DOC and
also the MCC already there for the details on how we would
establish the composition and timing of the convoys. I told
him he had his company to draw from for resources, and to
let me know if he needed anything else. That was all the
guidance I gave him. With this, Captain Korty set up an
MCC and supervised the movement of all the frustrated
cargo for TF Eagle to Bosnia. This illustrates, more than
anything else we did, the value of junior leaders who are
capable of executing mission orders. He and his company
did a superb job.
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One piece of frustrated cargo defined the term. The
Armor Launched Vehicle Bridges were too large to get to
Bosnia by rail. Although Brigadier General James P.
O’Neal, the ADC-S, had suggested months before that we
send such cargo by barge, that idea had been dismissed by
someone up the chain outside the division. Instead, there
was insistence we send everything by rail. The bottom line
was that the bridges could not be shipped there in time for
use during the river crossing. We argued with several
people at corps and 21st TAACOM about disassembling the
bridges for shipment. We insisted we could not do it and get
them reassembled in time to meet the requirements. We
ended up shipping six bridges, I believe, by C-17 cargo
aircraft.
Another difficult issue we had to deal with almost
immediately was determining priority for movement of
cargo and units by air from Ramstein Air Base. There was a
board process for determining priority for air. However,
there was a difference between USAREUR movement board
decisions and priorities on the airfield. The Division G-3,
Lieutenant Colonel Ed Kane, sent Major Tom Muir, the G-3
Air, to Ramstein to represent the Task Force and to ensure
our priorities were executed. It was a constant struggle.
Part of the problem was the requirement that everything be
done on JOPES; however, the lowest-level JOPES terminal
was in Heidelberg at corps Headquarters. The primary
JOPES operator, Mr. Oliphant, was almost a one-man
show. Moreover, units were responsible for filling out
JOPES worksheets so that he could input information from
them into the computer. As movements changed, it required
a stream of officers going to Heidelberg to sit down with Mr.
Oliphant to update JOPES input. This was very disruptive
for units trying to deploy. The next problem was what was
happening on the ground at Ramstein. Sometimes, Air
Force personnel would load lower-priority pallets before the
higher-priority pallets. Muir’s efforts were invaluable as he
helped get critical items flown to Tuzla in the early days.
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The deployment was an unbelievable operation. The
conflict between headquarters, the resentment built up
based on conflicts, and the personal turmoil affecting
soldiers and families were significant and to some degree
avoidable. Although the mission was accomplished, it was
not nearly as “successful” or pretty as those who write hyped
articles for various publications attest.
Most of the problems for the deployment were induced by
several key factors. First, despite the fact that the Dayton
meeting was concluded in November, the military was not
given authority to mobilize reservists or begin deployment
of “enabling forces” to ensure a smooth deployment of the
forces who would perform the mission until the last minute.
Secondly, in establishment of the transfer of authority
(TOA) date, the time required to deploy was apparently not
considered. TOA was established as December 2, 1995, and
we were not given permission to deploy until December 15.
No single deployment headquarters was established for the
deployment. Possibly this was because 21st TAACOM is
primarily a reserve organization, and authorization to
activate personnel was received late.
There were some self-inflicted wounds as well. TFE was
not able to plan adequately because of simultaneous
training and deployment requirements. I remember one day
at Grafenwoehr when the brigade staff was planning the
real Bosnian mission—planning deployment, participating
in a fire coordination exercise, planning the movement of
units from Grafenwoehr to Hohenfels, planning the exercise
mission at Hohenfels, and installing a new communications
system in all their vehicles. This was all in the same day,
with a staff so sparsely manned that it had a difficult time
planning a future operation while executing a current one.
The result was considerable risk of mission success. Had
the Bosnian factions not been cooperative, I believe it would
have been very difficult for us to enforce compliance in
accordance with the timeline established at Dayton. The
other result was the immeasurable suffering by numerous
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soldiers who deployed into an area with inadequate
facilities for coping with the Bosnian winter. Although the
American soldier triumphed, it did not have to be this
difficult.
There were some major success stories in the deployment. The C-17 aircraft that deployed essential forces to
Tuzla for employment in the early days was an unexpected
success. The movement control board eventually developed
into a functional and reliable entity. The communication
system that allowed us to talk to Task Force Eagle in Tuzla
and USAREUR Forward in Hungary was excellent. The
rapid development of the division Deployment Operations
Center (with three successive reinforcements by the
battalion) was a marvelous thing to watch. Lieutenants and
sergeants, never trained in deployment systems, used their
basic troop leading procedures, initiative, and versatility to
develop and manage systems to control the deployment.
Finally, the indefatigable will of the task force soldiers to
overcome all obstacles in achieving the mission is a
testament to a great Army, even though the deployment
command and control were not.
It took about 10 days for the DOC to develop satisfactory
systems for controlling all methods of deployment.
Eventually, four systems were developed, one each for
trains, air, busses, and convoys. We were able to accurately
track preparation and execution of movement of all four
modes and to solve the problems that surfaced along the
way. Interface with 21st TAACOM and USAREUR Forward
improved, and by Christmas there were well established
procedures and trained personnel in place. The first days
had been extremely hectic. I was working about 20 hours a
day for the first 10 days or so. By Christmas, I was able to cut
down to about 16-18 hours a day. I remember for Christmas,
Pat came down with some treats for the troops. I remember
a green plastic cookie plate shaped like a tree was pinned to
the wall as our Christmas tree for that year. We got to share
a couple hours together before I got so tired, I fell asleep. By
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January 1, I was working a more reasonable routine of 14-16
hours a day.
By mid-January things had settled down and became
routine for the rest of the deployment. On February 6, I
returned to Friedberg, giving Major Tracy control of the
DOC. He would finish deploying the last few units and hand
over the DOC to division rear detachment personnel who
would run it until it was time to redeploy the division.
When I returned to Friedberg, the battalion and the
brigade Rear Detachment were in great shape. Major Jim
Henderson had done great work: continuing to organize the
rear detachments of the deploying battalions, deploying the
units, securing the installations, and setting up a structure
which would function for the next year.
We organized with the battalion, assuming control of the
two companies in 4-67 Armor and three tank platoons from
1-1 Cavalry that did not deploy. I was dual-hatted, as the
battalion commander and also as the brigade rear
detachment commander. My battalion functioned as both
the battalion and brigade headquarters. Likewise, the
commander of one of the 4-67 companies was dual-hatted as
the rear detachment commander for the 4-67 Armor. Each
of the other battalions that deployed (2-3d Field Artillery,
23d Engineers, 501st Support Battalion, and the brigade
Headquarters Company) had a rear detachment
commander and first sergeant. They were in the unenviable
position of working for me as the rear detachment
commander and also their battalion commanders who were
deployed. It was not a clean command relationship, but we
worked it out.
Maintenance support was still a debacle when I returned
to Friedberg. We had not sorted out who would or could
provide us maintenance support. Fortunately, Lieutenant
Colonel Tony Young had left me a very strong Maintenance
Support Team (MST) from the 501st Support Battalion, but
there were numerous issues about who would provide
higher-level maintenance, parts supply, and special tool
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support. After several false starts, the 3d Infantry Division
(soon to become the 1st Infantry Division) was designated to
support us. They did a magnificent job. Their DISCOM
commander and shop officer were wonderful, treating us as
their own, and often with more responsiveness and effort
than we were used to from our own DISCOM.
One issue arose immediately when I returned. 2-3 FA
had numerous Heavy Expanded-Mobility Tactical Trucks
(HEMETTs) which had not been turned in after they had
been replaced with newer vehicles. They were in various
states of readiness, and it was immediately obvious that my
maintenance personnel could not get them prepared for
turn in. Additionally, my maintenance personnel could not
even maintain the vehicles I had under my control. I had
lost 14 tanks and all of the mechanics that would normally
work on them when A Company deployed. However, I
gained 45 tanks with the rear detachments that came to me.
Additionally, in order to fill their shortages, the deploying
units had stripped the mechanics and crews for those tanks.
In fact, we had more tanks in the brigade rear detachment
than the brigade which had deployed to Bosnia, but with a
much smaller portion of maintenance assets. So
maintenance of this equipment became a major issue.
Despite a lot of resistance from TF VICTORY (the Corps
rear detachment) and the maintenance community in
general, we managed to push through the idea of contract
maintenance. We hired some contract personnel who
performed organizational and direct support maintenance
on the non-battalion equipment left behind. It was really
the only way that we could have kept the equipment
maintained, and I believe the concept was very successful.
In fact, the equipment was probably in better condition
when the units returned than when they departed. They
even managed to get the 2-3 FA HEMETTs to standard so
they could be turned in, which was no small feat.
Although maintenance was a significant issue when I
returned from Bad Kreuznach, the biggest issues were
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family-support related. I found an unintended consequence
of the battalion staff’s and my departure and execution of
the DOC mission was the signal it sent the family support
group (FSG) leaders. Some felt that it minimized their
importance and the importance of the rear detachment in
general. There was resentment that the rear detachments
and families were not first priority. While undoubtedly it
was the right thing to do to keep deployment as the first
priority, in retrospect we should have communicated better
with the FSG leaders.
In one of the first meetings I attended with the Base
Support Battalion, Family Support Group Leaders, and
Rear Detachment leaders, I saw the major problem with the
relationship among the three. That is, roles and responsibilities were not well defined, and, in my opinion, the Army‘s
community side had not taken responsibility for family
support as they should.
The particular instance I remember was a briefing by
one of the people from the community on Family Assistance
Centers (FACs). She talked about their role, describing the
Family Support Groups as the first line of defense, with the
rear detachment reinforcing the FSG, and the FAC as the
last line of defense. I was very upset at this line of reasoning
and felt I had to speak up. In my mind, the Family
Assistance Center was the first line of defense, not the last.
It is at the FAC where the paid professionals exist whose job
it is to support families. It is not, in my mind, the primary
job of the unit rear detachment, nor the Family Support
Group. My feeling was that the rear detachment supports
the deployed unit first, then the soldiers who are not
deployed, and then serves the families as a conduit of
information. The Family Support Group role, in my opinion,
was one of emotional support to each other. That is, any
support group’s purpose seems to me to be emotional
support. Parents Without Partners, Lupus Support Groups,
Alcoholics Anonymous, and others do not provide
community assistance. They provide emotional support to
individuals. I felt it was unfair to saddle Family Support
111

Group leaders, who were not paid professionals, with the
responsibility of providing community support. This would
remain an issue between the Base Support Battalion and
me as long as I was in command.
This all goes to what I think is a major problem with the
Army’s thinking on family support. My observations of
family support leaders and interaction with them both in
the brigade and throughout Europe has led me to become
very concerned. I believe the Army has always had family
support groups. They were spouses (wives, primary,
throughout history) who got to know one another and relied
on each other for emotional support. That resulted in coffee
groups, or just close friendships among wives. There were
no designated leaders, although there was deference to
wives based on the rank of their husbands.
However, after the Gulf War, regulations were
developed which made the family support group the
responsibility of commanders. Spouses were automatically
included in membership (whether they wanted to be or not).
At the same time commanders were being given this
responsibility, the Army was drawing down, and resources
were decreasing. Personnel shortages have become
increasingly acute. Resources for other community support
functions have decreased, causing an increased number of
troop diversions. As a result, the well-intentioned but
mistaken trend in family support resulted in some very
negative second order consequences.
By putting family support on the forefront and
emphasizing how serious the Army is about it, but then
failing to fund or provide manning to family support
functions, the Army displays a difference between what it
says and what it does. It says to family members, “We’ll tell
you you’re important, but deep down we don’t really mean
it.” The Army implies we will take care of all needs, creating
an unrealistic expectation by some of what we can and will
do for them. It is hard to find a family support group leader
who has not gotten a call asking for someone to baby-sit
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children so a wife can run some errand, or asking for a ride
to the commissary because the car is broken. The espoused
philosophy is that anyone can be the family support group
leader, but by default it almost always falls to the
commander’s wife. The senior leadership of the Army will
tell you the commander’s spouse has no required role, but
the pressure on commanders’ wives to volunteer and lead
the FSG is palpable. The informal system is sexually biased
and reinforces sexual stereotypes. It is an unwritten rule
that even if your spouse works, she is still expected to fulfill
her obligations as a volunteer and spouse. However, if the
commander’s spouse is in the military, that rule does not
apply. Likewise, husbands who are commanders’ spouses
are not expected to play the role that wives are.
The family support system has raised some significant
issues and problems, unintended, but significant none the
less. First, there is tremendous pressure on commanders’
wives. This has led to significant emotional stress. The
reliance of commanders’ wives on Prozac is a joke among
many of them, but it is a symptom of a serious problem.
Junior officers’ wives are seeing the stress that
commanders’ wives are going through and are dreading
their husbands being selected for command. But most
importantly, there seems to be a breach of faith with them
by the Army. The difference between what the Army says
and what it does is eroding trust between families and the
institution.
This is a dangerous trend. As an institution, we need
either to resource family support and designate specific
responsibility to agencies (that is, make it an Army program
and do not rely on volunteers), or be up front about families
being on their own when we deploy. The logic of making
commanders responsible for a nonmilitary organization,
which serves its primary function when they are deployed,
seems flawed. It certainly should be a community
responsibility. Regardless, if it is not going to be resourced,
it should not exist as an official program.
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Another lesson I learned was the very different ways
that wives and military people look at things. Just one
example was an incident that took place early on in the time
I was back at Friedberg. I received a call from my Brigade
Family Support Group leader who had a complaint about
one of the battalion rear detachment commanders.
Apparently, a FSG leader in the battalion in question had
raised an issue with the rear detachment commander, and
he had “blown her off.” So I promised to investigate. I called
him and asked him if he was aware Mrs. so-and-so had a
problem. He said yes, and that he had solved it. He
explained that she had called with the problem, he had told
her he would take care of it, and then he had. The problem
had been solved. I thought that would be an easy answer,
but it was not. When I called my Brigade FSG leader back
and explained that the problem was solved, she obviously
was not satisfied and still quite irritated with the rear
detachment commander. In discussing why, she said, “He
never called me back!” I admitted my surprise at why she
would expect a call back if he had promised to take care of
the problem. She said, “If your boss told you to do something,
wouldn’t you tell him when you got it done?” That is when
the light bulb came on for me. I said, “No, the only time I tell
my boss is either if he asks me specifically to inform him
when something is completed or if we can not get it done.”
This seemed insane to her. She just could not understand
how we could operate that way. I finally recognized how
important feedback was for her and the other FSG leaders.
There is a book by John Gray called Men Are from Mars,
Women Are from Venus (HarperCollins, 1992) that
discusses differences in views between men and women.
While I hate to generalize about attitudes of either gender,
and I am sure there are many exceptions, I found in my
dealings with military wives that the book was surprisingly
accurate. I would make it required reading for rear
detachment commanders if I had it to do again.
Besides family support, the other big issue that
confronted us was replacement operations. The division had
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not been given a “stop loss” authorization, so we had to
rotate soldiers to replace normal losses. The new
replacements had to be equipped and trained prior to
deployment. Because of the limited number of training
allocations per unit and shortages of some items of issue, it
was a constant battle to get soldiers prepared for
deployment. We were also trying to take a reasonable
approach, and let new soldiers at least get their families
settled into quarters, as we were encouraging them to bring
their families when they moved to Germany. This was
because of the negative impact that fewer and fewer
families would have on the communities of deployed units.
As a result of the difficulties, individual replacements
were managed at an unbelievably high level. The corps rear
detachment (called Task Force VICTORY) was managing
down to individual level. We were sending reports to them
on the particular shoe sizes individuals needed. This is
exactly opposite to the mission order approach Captain
Dave Korty had so successfully executed in creating the
frustrated cargo movement control center. We wasted a lot
of human energy because of this different approach. It
worked, but I believe a more mission-oriented method
would have worked better.
By March, rear detachment operations were smoothing
out, and we began concentrating on putting units back
together again. We could not approach it with a businessas-usual attitude. Units had rear detachment-associated
missions, such as guarding installations, that prevented us
from having a normal training program.
However, we started incorporating training events into
these missions. One example I recall was moving some
tanks to Kirchgoens during a guard operation so that the
unit could conduct Tank Crew Gunnery Skills Tests while
guarding the installation. The company commanders were
very creative in developing training plans to take advantage
of available time.
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We also developed a rotational gunnery schedule. This
was the only way we could maintain qualified crews. We
took the crews who were most ready (in platoon groups) to
shoot, while two companies remained at home station to
perform rear detachment functions. The first gunnery
rotation was essential to maintaining morale within the
battalion. We conducted two successive rotations after I
changed command, and I was very proud of the fact the
battalion conducted a Combined Arms Maneuver Training
Center (CMTC) rotation at Hohenfels in the fall of 1996.
This commitment to continued training was an important
signal to the soldiers of the rear detachment that they were
still very highly valued combat soldiers, even though they
were not currently deployed with the division. I also made it
clear that I believed if 1AD were deployed for a contingency,
we would go with them as a powerful combat force.
On May 20, 1996, I changed command, turning over the
reigns to Lieutenant Colonel Dave Neidringhaus. I
deployed to Bosnia at the end of the month to take over the
job of Division G-3 for Task Force Eagle. I was very sad to
say goodbye to the battalion, although I was fortunate to be
given the opportunity to be the division G-3. The experience
of not deploying the battalion had been a bitter one.
However, I count it as one of the most intense learning
periods of my career.
There were some key lessons I drew from this
experience. First, trying to form, train, plan for, and execute
a deployment and employment on a mission simultaneously
is practically impossible. We were lucky we did not have to
fight our way in. A unit cannot deploy itself. There must be a
command and control headquarters that, based only on
required delivery dates provided by the deploying unit, gets
them there. Also, I learned the USAREUR deployment
system was broken. To do missions of this magnitude, you
must have and use an automated system. The plan for what
to do with non-deploying units and personnel is an essential
component of the overall plan and needs some deep thought
during the planning process. Our approach to family
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support is causing some problems based on unintended
consequences and needs to be relooked. Force tailoring is a
great concept, but we are not well structured for those who
will stay behind. As new structures have less redundancy
and more centralized support, this will become more of a
problem. We need to address it as part of our force redesign.
Finally, the most important lesson I learned was that
General Patton was right. Mission orders are the way to do
business. Whenever possible, never tell anyone how to do a
mission. Tell them what you want, and let them amaze you
with their creativity. Time and time again, soldiers in 2-67
Armor impressed me with how great they were in executing
missions with minimal direction when I gave them clear
guidance.
This monograph could have been about my experience
with forces in Bosnia. I could have discussed the
enforcement of the GFAP, the reshaping of the force, the
relief in place, or numerous incidents in country. Instead,
because I believe there will be many who will write about
those events, I wanted to write about some unsung heroes.
The Dick Tracys, Jim Hendersons, Chris Hsus, and
countless others I have not mentioned, both in the battalion
and throughout Europe, were key to the success of the
mission. Those soldiers and spouses who supported the
deployed Task Force were an inspiration to me, and I hope
in some way I have helped to tell their story.
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CHAPTER 5
COMMANDING A FIELD ARTILLERY
BATTALION IN A PEACE ENFORCEMENT
ENVIRONMENT—OPERATION JOINT
ENDEAVOR

Lieutenant Colonel Jeffery W. Hammond
INTRODUCTION
Sir, We did a pretty good job in Bosnia. Guess it’s because those
hardheaded soldiers really listened to us. About time someone
listened to the noncommissioned officers.
SFC “Smoke” Peterson/4-29 FA

The purpose of this Personal Experience Monograph is
to share the experience of Field Artillery battalion
command in a peace enforcement environment. To this end,
I will address predeployment, deployment, operations, and
redeployment activities of the 4th Battalion, 29th Field
Artillery Regiment in support of Operation JOINT
ENDEAVOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
This monograph is organized into two sections. In
section one, I present a historical summary of the battalion’s
actions leading up to and in support of the mission in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. My intent is to “tell the story” focusing
on the battalion both in Bosnia and at home station in
Germany. Section two identifies lessons learned for future
commanders when faced with a similar mission and/or
operational environment.
The reader must understand this perspective is mine
alone and thus extremely opinionated. This monograph
tells the story of how I did things in command—right or
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wrong. In this regard, the deployment provided an excellent
opportunity to examine equipment, doctrine, and people
over 11 months in support of a unique operation. My troops
were family; we lived, ate, and slept together 24 hours daily.
Thus, the lessons learned are numerous and based on
practical experience. However, one must recognize the
unique circumstances surrounding Operation JOINT
ENDEAVOR. Any insight gained from this paper must
receive full consideration in the context of its impact on
Field Artillery and Combined Arms Operations doctrine.
BACKGROUND
Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR was initiated in
December 1995 as a NATO-led peace enforcement operation
in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. U.S. forces from the
1st Armored Division served as the peace implementation
force (IFOR) in accordance with the General Agreement for
Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina concluded at Dayton, Ohio, in
December 1995.
The 4th Battalion, 29th Field Artillery (4-29 FA) was an
organic unit of the 1st Armored Division, V Corps, and
United States Army Europe (USAREUR). It deployed in
support of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR from December
17, 1995, through November 30, 1996. The battalion no
longer exists as an active unit, as it was redesignated the
4th Battalion, 27th Field Artillery in February 1997.
4-29 FA was a M109A2 equipped, 3x8 155mm cannon
unit based in Baumholder, Germany, and assigned a direct
support mission to the 2nd Brigade of the 1st Armored
Division. The unit was organized as a standard selfpropelled Field Artillery battalion consisting of five
batteries: three cannon, one service, and one headquarters.
The battalion was reorganized for Operation JOINT
ENDEAVOR as a Field Artillery Task Force (TF) with the
addition of a Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS)
Platoon from Baumholder, Germany, and a Firefinder
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Target Acquisition Battery (B/25 FA TAB) from the 3rd
Infantry Division (Bamburg, Germany).
Ultimately the Field Artillery TF community comprised
seven full-up batteries, consisting of over 9,000 soldiers and
1,800 family members residing in Baumholder and
Bamburg, Germany. The battalion TF deployed to Bosnia
and maintained 81 tracked and 219 wheeled vehicles, plus
all authorized equipment throughout the duration of the
peace enforcement operation.
Initial elements of the battalion entered the Bosnia
theater of operations as part of the 1st Armored Division
advanced party via C-17 Aircraft on December 17, 1995. The
battalion’s soldiers and 18 Palletized Load System (PLS)
Trucks redeployed to Baumholder, completing the mission
on November 30, 1996.
SECTION ONE: THE STORY
Predeployment.
Starting early the summer of 1992, the entire 1st
Armored Division had been training in preparation for the
anticipated Bosnia mission. Prior to my departure from the
Pentagon to assume battalion command in the summer of
1995, I was fully aware of the likelihood of the deployment.
Serving on the Joint Staff, I had worked as the J-1
representative to General John M. Shalikashvili’s Bosnia
planning team and prepared numerous deployment orders
placing individuals in theater for an eventual peace
enforcement operation. In fact, one of the last items I
reviewed prior to departing the Pentagon was the 1st
Armored Division troop list to ensure my battalion was
earmarked for the Bosnia mission. In my mind, if U.S. Army
Europe (USAREUR) was going to Bosnia, I wanted to be a
part.
Upon arrival in Germany for the battalion change of
command in July 1995, I discovered few of the troops who
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had been in USAREUR over the years actually believed a
deployment would ever occur. Too often the units had been
alerted to conduct intensive and consuming command and
control exercises, only to stand down and resume business
as usual. My take on things was that battalion level leaders
considered any deployment to Bosnia along the lines of the
story, “The Boy Who Cried Wolf.” My predecessor in
battalion command had warned me that much of my time
would be spent answering “wolf calls” for Bosnia, and “it
would never go down.” Coming from Washington, DC, and
having personally witnessed the process already in action, I
knew better. My last words to my wife, Diane, prior to the
battalion change of command were, “Be prepared, we are
moving out sooner rather than later.”
Following the change of command, the battalion
deployed to Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels, Germany, in
mid-October 1995 to conduct annual gunnery training. The
original intent of this training deployment was to conduct
battalion-level gunnery qualification, satisfying part of our
Mission Essential Tasks. Following 2 weeks of artillery
gunnery at Grafenwoehr, we were scheduled to “rotate” to
the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) at
Hohenfels to train on our combined arms fire support tasks.
The battalion successfully met gunnery training
objectives at Grafenwoehr. However, it was clear from the
start that the focus for training at the CMTC would be upon
low-intensity rather than high-intensity operations. There
was a clear hint of an impending alert for deployment to
Bosnia. I attended at least two division-level sand table
discussions with the brigade commander where the focus
was on how we would conduct business in the event of an
alert for Bosnia. During both these sessions, I was amazed
at the amount of intelligence and information sharing
between American and British military personnel. We also
had the pleasure of listening to Mr. Rick Atkinson, a noted
Washington Post reporter, discuss military and media
relations.
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Rather than the anticipated three weeks of highintensity training, we quickly shifted our main effort to
accommodate a compressed 2-week schedule of non-stop
and relentless peace enforcement training. All this was no
surprise to me, however, for all the “old guys” in the
battalion suspected that Bosnia might, in fact, become a
reality.
In hindsight, these 2 weeks at the CMTC proved to be the
most realistic mission essential training I had experienced
in almost 20 years service. The CMTC did everything within
its power to prepare the force for Bosnia. The CMTC
Observer/Controllers worked overtime to ensure we
practiced under stress in all the likely peace enforcement
tasks in Bosnia.
My soldiers had difficulties in understanding fire base
operations and thus received constant “harassment” from
the Observer/Controllers to “get it right.” At one point, the
Senior Observer/Controller informed me that if the Field
Artillery troops did not start to catch on and meet
established standards, we risked failing to earn
certification for the deployment. This caused me to pressure
leaders to get more personally involved and hands-on in
what we were trying to accomplish. I expected sergeants to
personally dig 4-foot fighting positions if they were unable
to persuade their troops into achieving the standards by
normal mentoring. Needless to say, one of the main lessons
we captured from the CMTC experience was direct
involvement in the business of the troops. Sergeants had to
do more than bark orders. Instead they had to supervise and
involve themselves in what had in the past been considered
mundane tasks (e.g., constructing fighting positions,
patrolling, guard mount).
One point worth mentioning is that when we returned
from Bosnia, I wrote a memorandum to the Field Artillery
Observer/Controllers expressing my appreciation for their
efforts during the pre-deployment train-up. Their efforts
more than replicated Bosnia, and, in my opinion, they
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deserve a great degree of credit for the success of the IFOR.
In my opinion, the training environment at the CMTC was
in many ways more challenging than that actually
encountered in Bosnia.
As the unit returned from Grafenwoehr and the CMTC
to home station at Baumholder, we continued to train
specific skills necessary for success in Bosnia. These
included the basics of mine awareness, patrolling, squad
level forward observer activities, cold weather survival, and
Rules of Engagement. It was finally clear to most of the
battalion that Bosnia loomed in the near future—the
question was simply how soon. I made clear to the battalion
the urgent need to prepare immediately for future
contingency operations (See memorandum shown in Figure
3). We could not waste time; the clock was working against
us. Officials were meeting in Dayton, Ohio, and it was only a
matter of time before we would deploy.
The news of our deployment actually came down via
CNN. We were aware Armed Forces Network (AFN) had
scheduled a special program from Washington, DC,
regarding the results of the Dayton Peace Accords. As I
remember, it was a Monday evening somewhere around
1830 hours, and many of the troops, having already been
released from work detail, were hanging around to see the
news. Many of my leaders were positioned in front of the
television in the battalion dining facility when the official
announcement was delivered. Many of the soldiers were
despondent because of the news, and I simply told them to
go home, and there would be more news to follow. However,
that night we must have received more than 25 telephone
calls from concerned wives inquiring when we were leaving,
etc. My standard answer was, “Yes, we were likely to deploy
but any other information has yet to be released.” The fun
was just starting.
Once alerted for deployment, the battalion progressed in
an orderly manner to meet all predeployment requirements
and activities. The soldiers accepted the mission without
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 4TH BATTALION, 29TH FIELD ARTILLERY
APO AE 09034
AETV-THT-P

8 NOV 95

MEMORANDUM FOR BATTERY COMMANDERS
SUBJECT: Commander’s Intent for Training
1. As we return from our training deployment to Grafenwoehr and
Hohenfels, I do not want to waste any time or lose momentum in
accomplishing a series of tasks critical to our near and long-term future. In
this regard, my goals for this battalion between now and the end of
November 1995 are as follows:
a. Conduct the most thorough, intensive, and complete
AORP we have ever done in our professional lives. This means full
equipment inspections and “putting away” our combat equipment
for immediate use as required.
b. Synchronize training and predeployment activities
preparation through the end of the year.
c. Accomplish the following by the end of November 1995:
(1) SINCGARS installation and training. The S-3 will publish
plan under separate cover.
(2) Complete SRP (15-17 NOV).
(3) Develop logistics and operations SOP for stability operations.
Short, concise, to the point. XO and S-3 accomplish this.
(4) Update Family Support Group and rosters. This includes a
battalion-commander-led Family Support Group AAR.
(5) Identify and place on orders a rear detachment OIC/NCOIC to
include a supporting structure.
(6) Conduct in-depth and accountable cold weather training. This
is serious business which I will personally manage. Commanders take note
and think “outside the box” on this one. Battery First Sergeants owe me their
plan by 15 NOV 95.
(7) Mine Awareness make-up training for those who did not
participate in the CMTC-led training conducted at Grafenwoehr. 40th EN
will help on this one.
(8) Weapons qualification. Focus here is on both small arms and
crew-served weapons. S-3 has lead.
(9) All soldiers will participate in a reasonable but aggressive PT
program. All must pass the APRT.
(continued)
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(10) TA-50 must be cleaned, inspected, and replaced, and
additional cold weather items issued to each soldier. This is sergeants
business. CSM lead. Also, until further notice, soldiers can no longer wear
jungle boots. Too much of a cold-weather risk.
(11) All individual soldier equipment must be inspected and
packed (A+B bags). Packing lists complete, bags labelled. Again, sergeants
business.
(12) Class IV UBL ordered, procured, and combat loaded. S-4
work with battery commanders.
(13) Inspect all tents, cots, and heaters. Order what we need.
Soldiers will no longer sleep in vehicles.
2.We must conduct measured, planned, and deliberate training and
preparation for a possible cold weather deployment—DO NOT WASTE
TIME.
3. Take care of our soldiers and their families by taking this approach as
serious business. Failure could result in the loss of life. Work normal duty
hours with weekends off; however, this may not be possible for all in view of
SINCGARS fielding and other events. Schedule 13 and 20 November 1995 as
training holidays and do the best you can to ensure quality of life “time off.”
4. In closing, don’t let up. Look at the little things and enforce
lieutenants and sergeants to be accountable for their people. I will not
tolerate any more “half-stepping” by our junior leaders. Every man counts—
every family is critically important. Remember to think 360° while
continuing to operate on a 6400-mil spectrum.
o

JEFFERY W. HAMMOND
LTC, FA
Commanding

Figure 3. Commander’s Instructions.
complaint. My leaders in particular were true professionals
who wanted to be successful and thus were more than
willing to do whatever was asked. The toughest task was
convincing family members the merits of a 12-month
deployment. Diane and I personally spoke to every battery
contingent and their family members at least twice prior to
deployment and regularly communicated between Bosnia
and Baumholder on a daily basis. I felt as if I were running a
public relations campaign to convince family members of
the merits of the deployment. The general attitude was that
we had no business being in Bosnia and certainly no
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business taking their husbands away for 12 months. I could
not argue their points—they did not want to listen anyway.
It was all very frustrating, especially when it was obvious so
many soldiers had failed to properly prepare their families
for any type of operational deployment, much less Bosnia for
12 months.
From the start, the Family Support Groups (FSG)
formed a strong and cohesive team to provide requisite care
for family members. Foremost was educating people on
where we were going, why we were going, and how long we
would be there. FSG events occurred on a weekly basis
starting prior to the deployment and included such
activities as monthly newsletters, videos, fund raisers, and
a series of social and educational events to interest families
and maintain morale.
My greatest frustration was the initial reluctance of
many families to join the FSG circle. Some opted to go home
to the United States rather than wait out the deployment in
Germany. I opposed such an approach in that it would
remove the family from the information loop. Additionally,
once the deployment was complete and the soldiers
returned home to Baumholder, the United States
Government was not going to transport family members
back to Germany. Most families understood; however, at
least six families ignored my pleas and left for the United
States and home. In time, most of the families softened and
entered into the FSG circle as they discovered in hard times
a renewed need for each other.
Much to my chagrin, the battalion provided the cover
story for the December 25, 1995, issue of Army Times,
focusing on the family aspect of the Bosnia mission. My
friends from the Army Times visited at the height of our
deployment and, to my surprise, told an accurate story. I
was initially concerned they would tell the wrong story and
make things worse than they actually were. However, they
published an accurate portrayal of a major operational
deployment and the impact on families. The writers
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indicated that the families would be fine in our absence;
however, most of the wives were opposed to the whole
ordeal, thus making it tougher than necessary on their
deploying husbands. In my opinion, that was the story
unfolding as we prepared to deploy.
In sum, the family support endeavor worked, starting
with the predeployment. That it was important to
everybody was not a debatable issue. However, the wives of
my senior leaders, particularly battery commanders’ wives,
paid a price in damage to their respective egos. Everyone
seemed to need something at one time or another. But, it
seemed that no matter how much effort the commanders’
wives placed on meeting the needs of others, it was never
enough to please all. A few of my battery commanders’ wives
probably did not really care about the people in their units. I
relieved them of their volunteer responsibilities. Other
commanders’ wives were young, inexperienced, and
learning on a daily basis. When these young ladies married
their officer husbands, they never dreamed that someday
they would be responsible for the family members of their
husbands’ commands. Most of my battery commanders’
wives had their own careers, had little or no prior military
familiarity, and had been married less than 3 years at the
time of our deployment to Bosnia. Nevertheless, most of the
commanders’ and senior noncommissioned officers’ wives
were great, no matter what the demands on their time and
energy.
In this regard, it is interesting to note how times have
changed since I first entered the Army almost 20 years ago.
Back in 1979, family support groups simply did not exist. As
a battery commander in Schweinfurt, Germany, I concentrated solely on training for war and left the business of
family care to the individual soldier. In the event of a war in
Europe, families would evacuate to a safe haven via
execution of the Non-Combatant Evacuation program.
Wives were very dependent on their husbands for many of
the routine tasks encountered in a foreign country (i.e.,
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transportation, shopping, and personal property maintenance).
Nothing really changed until the end of the Gulf War in
1991. When my battalion was alerted to deploy to the
Persian Gulf in 1990, we did not have a family group
structure. It was nothing more than a “telephone tree” in the
event someone needed assistance. As a result, when the unit
deployed, the field grade officers’ wives struggled with
“taking care of people.” The battery commanders’ wives
either did not get involved or moved home. More often than
not, few problems were resolved, and struggling family
members moved home to live with relatives throughout the
duration of the war.
Unfortunately, in today’s Army we have institutionalized a family support group system that asks volunteer
wives to perform quasi-military duties for which they are
generally unprepared and unrewarded. The wives of unit
leaders are expected to participate, and, more or less, lead a
family support group program that is inherently unfair to
them. It bothers me that so much is expected, and so little
reward is rendered to those wives who lead our family
support groups during a unit deployment.
My wife was prepared for all this, for we had gone
through the Gulf War deployment together (I was a
battalion S-3 in the 24th Infantry Division). Thus, she was
able to mentor the younger wives. In fact, she discovered
that many of our most supportive and innovative wives
came from the junior enlisted corps who were more than
willing to contribute in any fashion. We discovered an
incredible source of talent in the wives of our junior soldiers.
These ladies, more than any other group, proved to be
invaluable in supporting the cause and assisting without
gripe in time of need. Unlike some of the battery
commanders’ wives, the junior enlisted wives were not
trying to impress anybody and expected nothing in return
for their efforts. My wife, to this day, is indebted to the
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enlisted wives for their honesty, care, and support under all
conditions.
In addition to the family support endeavor, I often felt
overcome by all the changing deployment requirements
coming down from USAREUR, V Corps, and the 1st
Armored Division. It seemed like not a day passed in which
a new idea failed to filter down, requiring the expenditure of
more time and effort. Often I would receive a direct
telephone call from V Corps with some new requirement,
which had yet to work through the 1st Armored Division
chain. I could not believe the involvement of USAREUR and
V Corps. On any given day, I would receive telephone calls
from all three levels of command (USAREUR, V Corps, and
1AD) regarding some deployment requirement. I did not
have time to answer what appeared at times to be ridiculous
questions regarding my unit status, etc. Needless to say, we
had all the help and more than we ever needed from all
levels of command.
In order to manage all mission requirements and
expedite deployment activities, we devised a spreadsheet
which was used daily in command and staff meetings at all
levels (Figure 4). This spreadsheet worked well to keep the
leadership of the battalion focused on where we were and
where we needed to go. It also served as a contract between
the battery commanders and me, defining what we had to
accomplish in order to deploy. Many long nights were spent
around a table with the battery commanders and their
spreadsheets, addressing deployment activities and the
status of affairs. Without this spreadsheet, we would never
have been able to answer all the various questions from the
different headquarters.
To put the troops in the proper mindset, I established a
set of rules (similar to those established for soldiers
assigned to the 2nd Brigade) for all my troops to live by
(Figure 5). These rules were defined early in the deployment
and set the tone for how we would conduct business in
Bosnia. Easily understood and transmitted, all soldiers
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were required to carry these 12 rules along with the Rules of
Engagement at all times. I posted these rules in the
battalion headquarters for families to read and constantly
referred to the words throughout the deployment.
Task Force 4-29 Field Artillery
TWELVE RULES
1. WE TAKE CARE OF EACH OTHER—WRITE HOME.
2. THE SERGEANT IS IN CHARGE WITH IRON DISCIPLINE.
3. BUDDY SYSTEM—2-MAN CONTROL.
4. PMCS TO STANDARD EVERY DAY.
5. CLEAN WEAPONS DAILY.
6. DRINK PLENTY OF WATER.
7. NEVER ALLOW AN ATROCITY TO HAPPEN.
8. LIVE BY THE ROE.
9. WHEN IN DOUBT, DIG—USE THE DIRT.
10. VEHICLES MOVE IN 4s.
11. CHANGE AND CLEAN SOCKS DAILY.
12. FAMILIES MAKE THE DIFFERENCE—SUPPORT IS
ABSOLUTELY CRITICAL.

Figure 5. Troop Rules.
One of our major concerns in preparation for the
deployment was force protection. Because we planned to
employ howitzer platoons in a firebase configuration rather
than in an aggressive shoot, move, and communicate mode,
there was much concern for troop safety. My troops were not
trained to fight from a permanent static site. Mechanized
artillery seldom sits in one place for a long time. We worked
this painful issue at the CMTC and relearned numerous
valuable lessons often overlooked in mechanized warfare
(e.g., digging-in, self-security). My officers went “back to
school” and studied to see how the artillery conducted
business in Vietnam. They examined the current state of
134

training at the Joint Readiness Training Center. Once
again, a visit by the Army Times staff brought this issue to
light as part of the December 25, 1995, cover story. As a
battalion, we learned the key to our success, from a force
protection perspective, was situational awareness and an
aggressive approach to self-defense (e.g., fighting positions,
sand bags, crew-served weapons, etc.). This translated to
sergeants in charge, checking all the time, and understanding that failure to do so could result in the deaths of
soldiers.
DEPLOYMENT
The “Thunder Battalion,” as we were referred to, was
tasked by the 1st Armored Division Artillery Commander,
Colonel Alan Thrasher, to be the lead Field Artillery unit
into Bosnia. My top battery, 1/C/4-29, deployed via C-17
Globemaster within a week following implementation of the
Dayton Peace Accords. Its mission was to provide force
protection and heavy combat credibility on the ground in
Tuzla, Bosnia-Herzegovina. This was the first utilization of
the C-17 involving heavy combat equipment and thus
received major media coverage. The “NBC Today” show put
a reporter and camera crew on-board the aircraft with plans
to provide on-site television coverage to New York upon the
battery’s landing in Bosnia. I created a minor stir for NBC
television when I refused to allow the C-17 to depart on time
unless appropriate artillery ammunition was on board. I
was not going to allow the howitzers and crew members to
deploy into Bosnia without the capability to protect
themselves and others. NBC was up in arms because such a
delay would run counter to plans for live television coverage
back in the United States. The NBC crew failed to
understand that this was the real thing and not a show. I
was amazed at the attitudes of these people. Nice folks, but
they had a “show to do" and really did not appreciate the
need for ammunition. Eventually the ammunition arrived,
and the broadcasters back in New York had their on-thescene live coverage.
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The remaining combat elements of Charlie Battery
deployed as the lead elements out of Baumholder, Germany,
via rail to Zupanja, Croatia. The rail load process out of
Baumholder went smoothly without any problems. The
Base Support Battalion had rehearsed such an operation
over the years and, in my opinion, executed without flaw.
The only problem of any note was obtaining the appropriate
cold weather gear, which had been a major shortage
throughout USAREUR. Eventually that issue was resolved,
and the unit moved out without delay. On January 2, 1996,
2/C/4-29 completed its rail journey through former Eastern
Bloc countries and moved one track pad at a time as the first
Field Artillery unit to cross the Sava River. Charlie Battery
provided the initial fire support for 1st Armored Division
forces spearheading peace enforcement operations over the
Sava and into Tuzla.
One challenge complicating the Charlie Battery
deployment was communications with Baumholder. I was
concerned that the unit might experience several
difficulties during the rail move simply because we were
transiting countries where we had not been since World
War II. Many of the rail conditions were subpar, and I was
concerned whether the battery might confront some
problems which could be best resolved through my chain of
command. Other than the theft of some ammunition and
soldier gear, the unit encountered no real problems. The
battery commander maintained telephonic communications with me, using simple calling cards. Minor problems
were quickly resolved as I further communicated with the
1st Armored Division Headquarters, and family members
were kept apprised of the status of their husbands. In fact,
one of my junior officers spoke limited Serbo-Croatian and
thus was able to arrange for warm food and indoor sleeping
areas. The capability to communicate with the unit in
transit paid great dividends, as choke points were identified
and resolved for follow-on rail traffic.
While Charlie Battery was deploying, my target
acquisition battery (TAB) from the 3rd Infantry Division
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moved simultaneously via rail convoy from Bamburg,
Germany, and C-130 aircraft directly into Sarajevo. Part of
the TAB was to remain in Sarajevo, providing radar force
protection during the initial stages of the deployment. The
rest of the unit was to deploy initially into Tuzla and then
further south into the sector to protect the force.
During the TAB rail movement, one of the TAB soldiers
was nearly electrocuted when he departed his assigned
vehicle and climbed aboard another vehicle near a drooping
high power line to retrieve a personal item. The soldier
survived; however, the lesson learned early in the
deployment was that all soldiers must listen to their
sergeants and conduct all business with a heightened sense
of situational awareness. With the TAB headed to Bosnia,
the remainder of the battalion completed fielding of the
SINCGARS radio system and then deployed by rail to the
Intermediate Staging Base at Taszar, Hungary, as follows:

•

BN TOC, Rail, December 30-31; C 2 Battalion
Commander.

•

Alpha Battery, Rail, January 1-2; C 2 Battery
Commander.

•

Service Battery, Rail, January 1-2; C2 Battery
Commander.

•

Bravo Battery, Rail, January 11-12; C2 Executive
Officer.

The Command Sergeant Major, assisted by the
battalion Executive Officer, deployed last from Baumholder
to ensure control and ease of operations at home station.
These two most trusted agents played a key role in pushing
the battalion out the door in a timely and safe manner. They
also helped to soften the blow to family members. The
battalion closed in theater by late January, despite delays
encountered with weather and the rail system.
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As we departed Baumholder, I felt confident the
deployment was proceeding as planned, and the needs of
family members back home were being adequately met. To
this end, I retained one of my best captains, Grant
Goldsmith, as rear detachment commander to care for
family member affairs and those soldiers unable to deploy
for a variety of reasons. One of my charters to Captain
Goldsmith was to clean house while the battalion was
deployed. This involved the need to fix, repair, and improve
working and quality of life conditions for the soldiers. The
other charter was to take care of my families and solve
problems before they reached Bosnia. He proved more than
adequate for the task.
OPERATIONS
The battalion was tasked with providing fire support
coverage and radar force protection throughout the huge
2nd Brigade area of operations (AOR) in southeast Bosnia.
Colonel John Batiste, the 2nd Brigade Commander, made
no secret of the fact that he expected the Field Artillery to
provide a timely, accurate, and decisive blow—if necessary.
This was no easy mission due to the size of the sector, poor
road network, and terrain limitations. Colonel Batiste’s
mission for my battalion was as follows:

•

Deploy to AOR Tuzla via air and rail; expand in sector.

•

Provide direct support fire to 2nd Brigade Combat
Team.

•

Assist as required in peace enforcement operations.

•

Implement military provisions of the Peace Accord.

The 2nd Brigade Commander’s intent for fire support
dictated how cannon, radar, and supporting units were
emplaced throughout the depth of the sector. His intent was
clear and, in my mind, could be executed without any major
problems:
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•

Maximum centralized control; decentralized
execution.

•

Radar assets managed at TF 4-29 FA TOC.

•

Clearance of fires by voice on the Brigade Command
Net.

•

FA/Close Air Support and Attack Aviation assets
require positive visual identification and clearance in
accordance with 2nd Brigade Graduated Response
Decision Matrix (Figure 6).

This matrix, developed by Colonel Batiste and my
Brigade Fire Support Officer during the train-up at the
CMTC, provided a simple tool to arrive at a decision for the
employment of indirect fire assets. This tool was later
adopted as the standard for Task Force Eagle and
incorporated into the plans for follow-on units. By design,
the matrix made it fast but simple for commanders at any
level to reach a decision to execute indirect or air-to-ground
fires on a target.
To support the Brigade Commander’s intent throughout
an expansive sector marked by mountainous terrain, we
opted to assume position as FA platoons occupying
maneuver battalion lodgment areas. This accommodated
force protection needs and ensured maximum indirect fire
coverage synchronized with maneuver platoon and
company schemes of maneuver. Each cannon-firing battery
was virtually in direct support of a maneuver battalion;
however, in reality their positioning provided for mutually
supporting, indirect fires under the direct C2 of the direct
support Field Artillery Battalion. This relationship actually
enhanced combined operations because the FA role was an
active part of the maneuver battalion commander’s
estimate and decisionmaking process. My firing battery
commanders, along with the battalion fire support officers,
actively participated in all drills, hence ensuring the
planning and synchronization of fires. My battalion tactical
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operations center (TOC) was equally involved with the
brigade and battalion headquarters in planning fire support
for all operations.
I placed each FA cannon battery under operational
control of maneuver units for movement and Combat
Service Support. I had no choice. Given the limited road
network and terrain, I could not physically provide timely
and adequate logistic support to my force. Instead, I
retained C2 and integrated my logistics fleet with the
maneuver battalions to provide a complementary effort.
Throughout the brigade sector, logistics trains routinely
consisted of assets from each battalion supporting all units.
Equipment maintenance remained my responsibility
(nobody wanted to help me on this one), and my battalion
maintenance teams were on the road continuously for parts
or repair work.
TF 4-29 stationed units in the following maneuver
brigade/battalion lodgment areas (LA) located in the
southeastern sector of the 1st Armored Division AOR (see
map, Figure 7):

•

LA Alicia (1/1 CAV)—1/A/4-29 FA

•

Steel Castle (DIVARTY)—2/A/4-29 FA & 1xQ-36
Radar

•

LA Pat (4/12 IN)—1/C/4-29 FA

•

LA Demi (4/12 IN)—2/C/4-29 FA

•

LA Linda (2/68 AR)—1/B/4-29 FA & 1xQ-36/1xQ-37
Radar

•

LA Lisa (2nd Bde)—2/B/4-29 FA & 1xQ-36/1xQ-37
Radar

•

LA Lisa (2nd Bde)—4-29 TOC/Radar & C2/Metro/
MLRS Battery
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Figure 7. 1st Armored Division AOR.
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•

LA Angela (47th FSB)—Svc Battery/Battalion & Cbt
Trains.

Field Artillery combat configuration within a lodgment
area usually consisted of a platoon occupying a corner of the
base camp in a box formation with a 6,400 mil firing
capability. Each howitzer section was fortified with sand
bags and engineer barrier material for force protection. My
guidance was to provide sufficient force protection for troops
to remain out of sniper sight and hand grenade range from
any external site. Fighting positions were prepared to
standard, constantly improved upon, and occupied 24 hours
daily. Soldiers filled thousands of sandbags. At night,
movement in sector seldom occurred; however, firing
platoons maintained hot gun status at all times. Until living
conditions improved at the base camps (once Brown and
Root arrived in sector), troops lived in sandbag reinforced
tents within feet of their howitzers.
From these lodgment areas (or base camps, as they were
commonly referred to), the battalion focused on four major
tasks: artillery raids and demonstrations (force protection
and fire support); Former Warring Factions (FWF) weapons
storage site inspections; howitzer and small arms gunnery;
and support to the force.
By narrowing our efforts to these four mission-essential
tasks, we were able prevent ourselves from being piecemealed for “hey you” tasks. My unit remained engaged in
one or more missions at a time. For example, Cannon
Platoons and Radar Sections moved and repositioned on a
daily basis to support operations in sector. Our standard
rule within the brigade was that no maneuver unit would
operate outside radar or cannon range. This often meant
repositioning platoons in sector for extended periods of time,
as did response to changes in maneuver task organization
and closing of lodgment areas. Headquarters Battery
personnel were deeply involved in weapon site inspection.
Training and logistic support to the force never stopped,
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forcing Service Battery to expend an enormous amount of
effort.
From a distance, I watched the 1st Armored Division
Artillery Headquarters receive continuous taskings for
non-artillery related activities. I vowed to prevent this from
filtering down to my battalion. Thus we remained
steadfastly focused on our four main tasks at hand.
OPTEMPO—ARTILLERY “RAIDS”
AND DEMONSTRATIONS
The battalion conducted artillery “raids” and
demonstrations on a daily basis throughout the depth of the
2nd Brigade’s sector to signal NATO’s resolve and provide
force protection to maneuver forces. These raids or
demonstrations usually involved two or four howitzers with
accompanying fire direction center capability, Combat
Support, and Combat Service Support.
A typical raid would entail troop-leading procedures by
junior and senior battery level leaders, to include
pre-combat inspections, maintenance and weapons checks,
rehearsals, reconnaissance, and selection and occupation of
a position. The unit would move to a specified location and
set up in typical artillery fashion. From this location the
troops would prepare to fire in support of an ongoing
mission. The raid would not terminate until the maneuver
mission was complete. Often this meant more than 12 hours
in a single raid site.
Often we would task organize to include an MLRS or
radar section as part of a raid. Daily execution of raids and
demonstrations established one of the highest OPTEMPOs
in the Army—over 700,000 miles driven by Field
Artillery-tracked combat vehicles during the operational
deployment. This high OPTEMPO continuously kept my
soldiers engaged, and clearly signaled to the Former
Warring Factions the resolve of our force. No operational
missions (e.g., checkpoint operations, patrols, or Zone of
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Separation enforcement) were conducted in the 2nd Brigade
sector without force protection provided by the guns,
rockets, and radar of the supporting Field Artillery.
I recall one day when Colonel Batiste and I were meeting
at an old motel in the Serb sector (Vlacenicia) with the
Srpska Drina Corps Commander and his staff when an
issue came up regarding U.S. military professionalism and
resolve. It so happened we had planned an MLRS raid that
afternoon to occupy a position outside the motel in view of
the entire township. Timing being everything, we walked to
the balcony of the motel at the instant the MLRS Platoon
was arriving to occupy and prepare its systems for firing.
Needless to say, this artillery raid caught the attention of
the Drina Corps leadership and quickly put to rest any
discussion of U.S. military capability.
One contentious incident occurred involving a Field
Artillery raid on May 10, 1996, during which my junior
officer on the ground did everything right. One of my
platoons (A2/A/4-29 FA) was conducting a deliberate
platoon raid in support of a maneuver company operation
east in sector. During the raid, the platoon leader
(Lieutenant Phil Brooks) spotted seven personnel in
camouflage uniforms armed with automatic weapons
crossing a nearby major supply route (Route Sparrow). Soon
thereafter, automatic weapon fire was heard, and the seven
personnel entered the Field Artillery platoon raid site. The
personnel laid down their weapons and surrendered to my
platoon leader. The individuals claimed to be Muslim
soldiers attempting to egress to friendly lines when they
encountered enemy resistance.
The seven individuals had no identification tags or
documents. Senior U.S. and International Police Task Force
representatives arrived on scene to address the situation. In
time, a decision was rendered to release these individuals to
Republic of Srbska Police and transport them to the city of
Zvornik (in the Serb sector). When U.S. forces proceeded to
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Zvornik to regain control of the seven individuals for further
interrogation, they were met with armed resistance.
This early and apparently minor incident later
developed into a near national-level issue, with the
captured men being referred to as the “Zvornik Seven” (see
Appendix at the end of this chapter). The key point to take
from this incident is that soldiers at the lowest levels must
be prepared to deal with situations during a peace
enforcement operation that could have far-reaching
consequences. In peace operations, soldiers must understand the big picture and be able to perceive the potential
consequences of their actions. Unlike in a high-intensity
environment, seemingly trivial incidents become major
issues in a matter of minutes. The actions of a single soldier
can easily escalate into a major international contretemps.
RADAR FORCE PROTECTION
As previously stated, my TAB was a non-organic unit
that joined me upon arrival in Bosnia. I met the battery,
B/25 FA “Wolfpack,” initially at the CMTC prior to
deployment, but even then was uncertain if they would be a
part of my team in Bosnia. The battalion proved to be the
most talented and energetic unit I have ever served with in
over 19 years active duty. The radar force protection
mission was likely the most critical aspect of taking care of
the force, and the “Wolfpack” did it all day and night without
complaint.
B/25 conducted 24-hour radar operations from start to
mission completion and managed to maintain an incredible
97 percent operational readiness rate. Because a civilian
Logistics Assistance Representative was attached to the
battalion, hard-to-acquire radar repair parts were acquired
within days rather than weeks or months.
Despite the wear and tear on its equipment, my TAB had
over 5,000 radar acquisitions. These acquisitions were
typically Former Warring Factions (FWF) small arms
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celebratory fire and oftentimes unauthorized use of rotary
wing aircraft in violation of the Dayton Peace Accords. Even
though the radar systems did not actually acquire any
indirect fire (to our knowledge), they did maintain a
constant vigilance that was highly respected by FWFs.
More than once FWF military representatives remarked
that the presence of radar prevented anyone from
attempting to fire mortar shells or other indirect fire assets.
Anytime the 2nd Brigade faced a potential confrontation
with the FWFs, Colonel Batiste was quick to satisfy himself
concerning the coverage provided by our radar assets.
FWF WEAPONS STORAGE SITE INSPECTIONS
Early in the peace enforcement operation, the brigade
task force faced the challenge of locating, identifying, and
tracking FWF weapon systems. This proved to be a most
challenging task, as the factions seldom revealed weapon
site locations and did whatever they could to limit our
ability to find any such sites. More interesting, this
challenge expanded the role of the Field Artillery beyond
just providing fire support when needed.
Typically the FWFs were reluctant to cooperate with the
United States in any instance involving the location and
number of their medium-heavy military weapons. For
example, in May 1996, Colonel Batiste, the Division
Artillery Commander, and I, along with a team of military
police, attempted to enter what we believed to be an
intermediate-size weapons storage site. However, we were
detained and not allowed to proceed further without
consultation by senior leaders in the faction chain of
command. Colonel Batiste elected to proceed without
further delay, calling on the Air Force and Army aviation for
a show of force to demonstrate our authority and
determination. In minutes we were allowed to enter what
appeared to be a medium-size barn complex. As we opened
one barn door after another, we were quick to realize this
was one of the largest weapons storage sites in country,
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likely a key storage site for a mechanized corps consisting of
all types and large numbers of combined arms equipment.
We spent hours inventorying all this equipment. From then
on we used such techniques to track all heavy weapons in
sector.
Over time, the mission of conducting inspections of FWF
weapons sites was tasked to my battalion because we asked
for it, feeling we possessed the requisite expertise. Much of
the equipment and ammunition was related to artillery or
mortars, and my troops were well-suited to the job. In fact,
throughout the entire division, the Field Artillery was
tasked to assume this responsibility. For the 2nd brigade,
this meant bi-weekly inspections over a 9-month period of
more than 20 weapon storage sites. Oftentimes this resulted
in confiscation of undeclared weapons in the evenhanded
application of the Dayton Peace Accords.
For the battalion’s fire supporters, the weapon storage
site inspections resulted in the creation of target folders in
the event activities escalated into combat. For each weapon
storage site, we maintained a target folder consisting of
ground/air/J-stars photos, targeting coordinates (GPS
accuracy), and any relevant information to ensure accurate
targeting for indirect and air to ground fires. This initiative
expanded and further refined existing Fort Sill targeting
doctrine, becoming a key piece of evidence in the event
weapons declaration and accountability rules of the Dayton
Peace Accords were violated.
BOSNIA ELECTION SUPPORT
TF 4-29 FA performed a crucial role in support of Bosnia
elections in August 1996. The 2nd Brigade initiated the
process of reshaping the ground force, anticipating the
upcoming elections and a need to reduce the proportion of
heavy combat power. A military police battalion from the
United States was received, and the 2/68 Armor battalion
was redeployed to Baumholder. My battalion supplemented
the military police task organization with battalion and
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company fire support elements (to include forward
observers). Fire support personnel were internally
reassigned from redeploying tank companies headed back
to Baumholder. This nondoctrinal supplement allowed the
military police to execute their mission as a maneuver force
by conducting all patrols supported by fire support planning
and execution.
The 2nd Brigade Fire Support Officer also trained the
incoming military police (employing the GUARDFIST
Trainer) in the conduct of fire support operations in a peace
enforcement environment. For the most part, this meant
training in planning and executing indirect fires utilizing
the decision matrix. Additionally, we repositioned three
cannon platoons and a radar section to cover crucial election
“hot spots.”
My battalion was also assigned the mission of escorting
Belgian, Luxembourgian, German, and Austrian
representatives carrying completed refugee absentee
ballots from Visoko, Bosnia, to a Sarajevo warehouse, and
throughout the entire 2nd Brigade sector. My battery
commanders assumed this responsibility in four separate
groups of four vehicles each. They did the job without flaw,
spending long nights on the road under tough conditions.
The battalion also provided a Special Investigation Team to
examine allegations and reports of voting irregularities or
misconduct. During the crucial election period, the role of
the Field Artillery battalion expanded once again because
the brigade commander trusted the character and discipline
of the troops.
GUNNERY
Despite the high OPTEMPO within the AOR, the
battalion planned, organized and conducted eight live-fire
exercises to include two Joint Air Attack Team (JAAT)
exercises in theater. The 3rd United Kingdom Division
established the Glamoc artillery impact range in the
Multi-National Division (Southwest) sector early in the
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deployment. When offered the opportunity by the Division
Artillery Commander, I deployed each of my six cannon
platoons and radar sections over 300 miles by Heavy
Equipment Transport (HET) and wheeled vehicle convoy to
spend 1 week of tough and aggressive live-fire gunnery
training. When I did this, a battery from the 2-3 FA (Direct
Support to the 1st Brigade) moved into my sector to provide
adequate coverage. I provided the same exchange for 2/3 FA
when they rotated platoons to the Glamoc range.
This live-fire training was essential to maintaining
combat readiness and keeping the soldiers’ heads in the
game. My battalion operations officer executed tough and
challenging Field Artillery Table VII Gunnery and certified
firing platoons and radar sections as trained. The Glamoc
range was unique in that all artillery fires were shot into a
mountainside visible to the cannoneers. For the first time
ever, most of my cannon crews were able to actually see
artillery rounds impact. This training provided the troops a
break from the stress of guard duty, artillery raids, etc. It
also provided the opportunity for me to work with young
leaders and assess first hand gun line, forward observer,
and radar C2 skills.
The two JAAT exercises attracted visitors from NATO
countries to include military leaders of the FWFs. The
brigade commander used the live-fire opportunity to
demonstrate the firepower potential of the U.S. Army. I can
still recall the smile on Major General Nash’s face and
contrasting frown on the visiting Russian Brigade
Commanders when one of my copperhead rounds destroyed
a FWF T-62 tank during a JAAT exercise.
Two cannon platoons and radar sections also conducted
live-fire training at the Taborfalva Training Area
established by the 7th Army Training Command at
Taborfalva, Hungary. This range, unlike the one at Glamoc,
was designed for Bradley and Tank Gunnery with minimal
Field Artillery capability.
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U.S.-RUSSIAN FIELD ARTILLERY TRAINING
We worked hard when presented the opportunity by the
Division Artillery Commander to foster a working
relationship with the Russian 2S-9 Field Artillery Battalion
serving in support of the Russian Brigade. I like to tell the
story that we virtually laid to rest any remnants of the Cold
War by establishing a unique and enlightened partnership
with our Russian counterparts.
Unlike my battalion, the Russian unit was a selfpropelled airborne battalion, which looked good but, for the
most part, seldom ventured outside their barracks while in
Bosnia. In this regard, we took most of the initiative for
training exchanges, which included small arms
familiarization, combined fire support operations in the
Russian sector, positioning a cannon battery and radar
section in the Russian sector for combined operations,
officer and enlisted soldier exchanges, and holiday visits
(e.g., July 4 activities in the U.S. sector).
Interactions between the enlisted soldiers were
impressive. Language was no barrier, and the troops were
quick to exchange uniform items and stories of girls and
friends. Among officers, it was a bit different. The young
Russian lieutenants appeared distrustful of my officers and
almost incredulous when visiting living, morale, and
recreation facilities in the United States sector. As I recall,
when we escorted the Russian officers through the Steele
Castle Post Exchange (which was full of attractive items),
they simply appeared uninterested and wanted to move on.
However, hours later when left alone, the Russian officers
quickly ran to the PX and purchased stacks of goods to take
back to their unit. My impression was that the Russian
lieutenants simply did not trust my leaders, were
Communists at heart, and were standoffish by nature.
My counterpart, the Russian battalion commander, was
uniquely different from his lieutenants. Foremost, he was a
veteran of both the Afghanistan and Chechnya wars and
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was due to retire from the Russian Army in months. He was
very open and saddened by the contrast between his drab
life and the attractive opportunities afforded an American
citizen. More than once he told me the young Russian
officers “have it all wrong and are too hard—caught up in
the military fever.”
I was impressed with the professionalism of the Russian
Field Artillery Battalion, and the more time we spent
together, the more relaxed the young officers became. Their
attitudes improved; they looked like soldiers, and I was
impressed with the way they performed their role in Bosnia.
REDEPLOYMENT
Before I discuss redeployment to home station at
Baumholder, Germany, I will mention the official Rest and
Recuperation (R&R) Leave program made available to the
troops during the mid to latter stages of the deployment. All
soldiers were authorized under normal leave conditions the
opportunity to take 2 weeks R&R leave. This proved a great
morale booster. Fortunately, the number of soldiers failing
to return to theater following R&R leave was minimal. I had
only one absent without leave (AWOL) and, in his case, he
had a serious personal problem best addressed by “signing
in” at the United States military installation nearest to his
home.
Two R&R programs were in place. In one, the soldier
could fly back to Germany and remain there or within
Europe throughout the 2-week leave period. The other
program allowed him to fly, all expenses paid, to
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and depart from there for leave
in the United States. To manage the program, we had to
resort to an order-of-merit list based on time in theater.
Hence, those soldiers from C Battery who arrived the
earliest in Bosnia were afforded the opportunity to take
R&R leave first. Nevertheless, all eligible soldiers in the
battalion were provided the opportunity for R&R
leave—most took advantage of the program.
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Also available was a 4-day pass program to Budapest,
Hungary, for soldiers and, if possible, their spouses. The
spouse would have to fly from Frankfurt to Budapest and
link up with their husbands. Diane and I opted for this
program and met at the Budapest Hilton for a wonderful
3-day break. In short, the R&R leave program was a huge
success and had no noticeable negative impact on the
continuation of highly competent operations in theater.
Back to the redeployment. The battalion redeployed one
battery at a time in the same order the units arrived in
Bosnia. C Battery led the way back to Baumholder, and the
force on the ground in Bosnia gradually decreased in size
and structure.
It was important to my wife and me for the homecoming
phase of the redeployment to go like a charm, thus providing
a lifelong memorable event. We have, to this day, warm
memories of our DESERT STORM redeployment and the
class act put on in that regard back at Fort Stewart,
Georgia.
In order to redeploy out of Bosnia, each company-size
unit had to turn in all excess, completely clean all vehicles
and equipment, qualify in gunnery skills (we had already
accomplished this at Glamoc), and pass a tough 10/20
maintenance inspection. We were well prepared for all this
and had no problems. In fact, A and C Battery were two of
only a handful of units in the division to meet all
redeployment standards at 100 percent.
We planned far in advance for the redeployment.
Previously, the battalion had entered the Division/Corps/
USAREUR Excellence in Maintenance Competition and
won at all levels. This was accomplished while deployed in
Bosnia. We had initially entered this competition with the
intent of winning the division title and thus receiving
Division MAIT assistance to fix our equipment for the
redeployment. In this way we could prepare ourselves well
for the maintenance recovery phase of the redeployment.
My executive officer had the vision to prepare all excess
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equipment for turn-in both at Baumholder and in Bosnia
long before the redeployment. We simply worked what we
guessed would be the redeployment issues early during the
Bosnia deployment and thus encountered no problems
during redeployment.
At the home front we prepared to receive each battery
one at a time with the joint assistance of all battery FSGs
and the rear detachment. Baumholder had a separate plan
to receive each unit. However, since it failed to measure up
to my expectations, we, unlike other units, did our own. As
my batteries arrived at Baumholder, soldiers turned in
weapons and sensitive items, then marched to the
gymnasium where music, food, family, and pageantry
greeted their arrival. We filmed all this and later put
together a music video as a keepsake for each soldier in the
battalion.
Following closure, soldiers were released for 4 days after
which we initiated 2-weeks recovery at home station. After
a successful home station recovery (move into barracks,
draw privately owned vehicles, reestablish shop operations,
etc.), soldiers were allowed 30 days leave, and the battalion
virtually stood down.
One of the toughest challenges upon redeployment was
integrating the new soldiers with the Bosnia veterans.
Upon return from Bosnia, we had over 120 new soldiers
waiting to join a battery. To ease transition and ensure
acceptance without alienation, we maintained the rear
detachment structure (consisting of these new soldiers) to
execute routine upkeep missions until the 30-day block
leave period expired. Following everyone’s return, we
assigned the soldiers to a battery and went about business
as usual.
THE REAR DETACHMENT
This story would not be complete without once again
addressing the work of the battalion rear detachment in
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Baumholder, Germany. This operation was a great success
for two reasons. One, I designated a highly capable captain,
Grant Goldsmith, for the job. Second, we talked about the
job daily, and I empowered him to make major decisions.
Captain Goldsmith prepared and deployed almost 200
replacement soldiers, and processed at least that many out
of country back to the United States. He coordinated efforts
to deploy and redeploy all soldiers and equipment, assisted
in storage for privately owned vehicles and personal
property, provided continuous support to installation
support activities and families, turned in over $11 million in
excess equipment, reorganized battalion living and working
areas, and, in short, took care of all business, treating people
with dignity and respect.
Other battalions in Baumholder were nowhere as
successful in the rear because battalion commanders failed
to leave behind a quality leader, or attempted to rotate the
rear detachment commander. Neither of these options
worked. Life continued back in Germany, and family
members expected their needs to be consistently met
without abrupt change. When the FSG faltered, my rear
detachment commander took care of business. Other than
with my wife, I worked more closely with my rear detachment commander than anyone else.
SECTION TWO: KEY LESSONS LEARNED
Most of the key lessons learned have already been
discussed in this paper. Such lessons are more likely to be
principles and standards that were reinforced or
complemented during this peace enforcement experience.
In summation, I recommend future or current Field
Artillery battalion commanders consider the following
when planning for a peace enforcement operation:

•

Make the FSG a priority and ensure advisors to family
members can communicate with the majority of your
population. Battery commanders’ wives tend to
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assume the FSG advisor role for their husbands, but
often are unable to connect with enlisted spouses.
This means you should strongly consider a senior
noncommissioned officer’s wife for this role. My
experience is that it works best this way. Remember
that most of your population is enlisted. Sergeants
lead the way.

•

Limit the number of trusted agents, and speak with
one voice on all matters that may relate to issues
involving family members. My wife, executive officer,
and rear detachment commanders were my points of
contact regarding all family and Baumholder issues.
No other players were in the official loop. Too many
players often distort the message during a lengthy
and distant deployment.

•

Select your best captain as your rear detachment
commander. Put the structure in place on a routine
basis rather than waiting for an operational
deployment. Upon return from Bosnia, I appointed a
permanent rear detachment commander and
sergeant assistant (operating full time) to handle
things such as voters assistance, new soldier/family
orientation, etc. If the battalion were to deploy today,
we would not have to regenerate the rear detachment
and FSG leadership. It is already in place and trained.

•

Start now to gain a firm handle on nondeployables.
You cannot wait for the alert order to discover who has
what sort of problem. I identified 12 soldiers as
medically nondeployable at the start of the Bosnia
experience, but was previously unaware of their
status. We sent these soldiers through the medical
boards, and almost a year later they were still in my
unit when we redeployed to Baumholder. The Medical
Evaluation and Screening process is slow and does not
work to meet the needs of a field commander. Identify
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the medical profiles and those in hiding. Work it from
day one, before you are alerted.

•

Get to know the Division Inspector General long
before you deploy. You will no doubt hear from him on
more than one occasion, and it helps to know each
other and appreciate roles.

•

You will have your share of individuals who simply do
not want to deploy. They may resort to various
pretexts such as feigning suicide, hurting themselves,
etc. Know the proper policy and legal methods for
handling such cases. I had an officer feign suicide and
learned that the proper management of such a
situation is difficult and distracting, particularly
when preparing for an operational deployment. Do
not get caught short here.

•

Train your Field Artillerymen in their basic combat
skills, and they will be successful in any peace
environment. The tough and realistic training
imposed on my soldiers translated to successful peace
enforcement operations. We were successful because
we were trained to fight a war. Honing the combat
skills prior to deployment was made easy because of
the high standards and expectations of combat MOS
training.

•

Units must continue to train during the deployment.
Basic skills need constant attention. Soldiers are not
accustomed to carrying loaded weapons around all the
time. We had problems in the 1st Armored Division
with regard to small arms misfires. Fortunately
nobody was hurt; however, soldiers who carry loaded
weapons every day must receive constant safety
awareness training. Also, everyone needs to fire
individual weapons as much as possible when
deployed. We constructed our own small arms range
and routinely familiarized/qualified soldiers on
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assigned weapons. It was a great confidence-building
measure.

•

Maintain high standards at all times. Our soldiers
should look the part of a tough and professional Army.
This means leaders must constantly check things and
possess the moral courage to enforce discipline at all
times. This was one of my constant themes,
hammered into the officers and noncommissioned
officers on a daily basis. Remember, someone is
watching every step you take and they notice everything.

•

Security must be stressed in all you do. We allowed no
vehicle movement unless the plan was briefed,
rehearsed, PMCS verified, and mission certification
approved by the battery commander. Keep your
vehicles off the road in a peace enforcement operation.
Otherwise, vehicles should move in fours for force
protection. For my battalion, the 2-minute rule was in
effect at all times. This meant when a convoy stopped
for more than 2 minutes, drivers disembarked to
chock wheels, clean windows, and assume a force
protection stance. I held leaders accountable for this
rather simple activity, and in time the precautionary
attitude rubbed off on other things we did.

•

Maintaining high standards of appearance in
lodgment areas was critical. Other units relaxed
rules. Those that did routinely suffered accidents and
other problems. I did otherwise. Uniform standards
were in effect whenever soldiers were outside a tent or
living area. Leaders were expected to enforce what we
called “Thunder Standards.” That meant our soldiers
were always a cut above the others. Remember, if you
leave soldiers to their own devices, they will tend to
become bored and sloppy. It is simply human nature.
Pride in the unit should drive an intense desire to look
and be number one.
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•

Maintenance is everything. We eventually won the
Army Maintenance Award during the Bosnia rotation
simply because I made maintenance a top priority. I
personally stopped every vehicle marked 4-29 FA and
inspected it. It can be done even in a harsh operational
environment. Do not forget routine maintenance of
weapons, NBC gear, sets, kits, and outfits. Include
ammunition and tools. We took our eyes off the
battery mess trailers for a few months because troops
were eating in Brown and Root mess facilities. We
quickly discovered how fast these trailers could fall to
pieces if not properly maintained.

•

Take note to educate your unit on use of the Form
5988-E for vehicle maintenance. If you do not know
what this document is used for, get help now. Proper
utilization of the 5988-E by all concerned, to include
drivers and noncommissioned officers, is your key to
maintenance success.

•

Force protection can never be sacrificed. All must
understand and be able to recite the Rules of
Engagement. Prepare your soldiers by placing them
in practical learning situations to develop skills.
Soldiers must wear body armor at all times. Force
protection by sandbag construction is a continuing
process. There is a right and wrong way to construct
fighting positions. Most Field Artillerymen do it the
wrong way. We had the task force engineers inspect
every fighting position and certify it as safe. First time
through, 75 percent of the positions were unsafe due
to overhead cover weaknesses.

•

Keep the troops informed. Do whatever you need to
ensure they are the first to receive news from home.
Mail delay is always a problem in any operational
deployment. Solve it yourself. On a routine and daily
basis, my battalion established a four-vehicle convoy
to pick up and drop off mail at every battery location.
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This created a daily stop at every lodgment area to see
that our troops had mail in hand. Other units waited
for the system to reach their locations. We virtually
became the system for the battalion and thus ensured
our troops were always receiving mail. Soldiers
sincerely appreciated this approach to business. We
were looking out for them.

•

I purchased a few VCR cameras to film the activities
of each battery on a monthly basis. This provided the
families back home a good picture of life in Bosnia.
Diane did the same from Baumholder, and, over time,
each battery established a routine process of
exchanging films between the FSG and Bosnia.

•

Educate new soldier-parents. Plan orientation
sessions for soldiers prior to redeployment. A birth is
likely to occur for many of your troops during the
deployment. Some of your troops are likely first-time
parents. With the stress of the deployment, they may
not be properly prepared to assume parenting
responsibilities. Reception and integration following
a lengthy deployment are often a tough process for
soldiers and their family members. Ensure that your
chaplain is on top of this one, and you will have the
early warning on which soldiers are at risk.

•

Work with the news media and nongovernmental
organizations. They were all over the place in Bosnia.
Take the opportunities provided to tell the success
stories of your unit. Also be careful as to who serves as
an official spokesperson. In my battalion that
responsibility was limited to commanders and field
grade officers. In addition, we constantly had to deal
with letters to the editor. Some soldiers vented their
unhappiness through the European Stars and
Stripes, which often proved embarrassing to the chain
of command.
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•

Pursue after-work outlets for your soldiers. Pent-up
frustrations are best released in sports competition or
recreational activities.

•

Plan on having to use the palletized load system (PLS)
trucks for every mission outside the prescribed one.
My 18 PLS trucks virtually hauled the entire Division
from Germany to Bosnia and back. My drivers and
young sergeants were worn out and seldom provided a
break. Keep track of these soldiers, or you will lose
them to the system. Maintain positive control of the
PLS flat racks.

•

Supply accountability continues even in a peace
enforcement environment. Monthly inventories and
twice daily serial number accountability checks are a
necessity.

•

Keep an eye on discretionary funds. We discovered in
the 1st Armored Division that soldiers were ordering
all sorts of “nice to have” things such as knives,
thermos bottles, and watches. Do not let this happen.
It turns out that the order descriptors (DNSN) for
these items were listed in an issue of PS: Preventive
Maintenance Monthly, and troops from all units
attempted to take advantage of the tempting but
ill-advised situation.

•

Ensure the FA Battalion tactical operations center
(TOC) is in charge of all fire support related missions.
For us, this meant my TOC conducted nightly
rehearsals of each maneuver battalion task force fire
support plan and the employment of FA in support of
ground operations. This served command and control
well and kept the battalion fire support officers in the
loop. I also employed the TOC to track all vehicle
movement in sector, much as a taxi cab dispatcher
operates. I would not allow any vehicle of mine to
move without positive FM radio contact with the TOC
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(at all times) and constant reporting on the
surrounding situation on the ground.

•

Develop a liberal awards policy and make use of
impact awards. I probably awarded more Army
Achievement Medals than any other lieutenant
colonel in sector because it caught the attention of the
soldiers. It also served as a reminder that the senior
leadership cared. I even impact-awarded medical and
Combat Service Support soldiers from other units for
taking care of my men. We also purchased numerous
“battalion coins” and dropped one on a good soldier at
every opportunity.

•

Communications are everything. We placed a Defense
Switched Network (DSN) line in my quarters at
Baumholder, and I spoke daily to my wife and rear
detachment commander. Often I would call from my
mobile telephone in my wheeled vehicle. I also used
this capability to provide soldiers instant communications with the rear and their families when a
personal crisis warranted.

•

Work with your young leaders. Any operational
deployment is usually a career-defining moment for
your young officers and sergeants. Make it a good one
for them. You have their attention 24 hours daily, so
spend time with them and the troops. Mentor, coach,
teach. Develop the young leaders and treat them the
way you would want to be treated. Morale plays a key
role, and, without the enthusiastic support of your
junior leaders, life on the prairie is tough.

•

Define your roles and missions early in the
deployment. I found that as the threat diminished,
people assumed the Field Artillery was no longer
needed and simply taking up space. Fight the urge to
accommodate such an attitude by working closely
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with the Brigade Commander to assume roles of your
choosing.

•

Trust your noncommissioned officers. This type of
environment is where they truly earn their money.
You cannot be successful without their translating
your intent into action at ground level. I referred to
my unit as “A Sergeant’s Battalion” because I
recognized true ownership of morale, proficiency, and
getting things done.

•

Get out in front of the soldiers. Conduct award
ceremonies, promotions, information briefs, etc. It
means something when it comes from the battalion
commander. It is great for morale.

•

Make sure you are on top of the business of
containerized shipping. You will likely deploy in this
mode. Too often soldiers failed to employ loading
plans and stow the right equipment. We had to send
back to Baumholder for some overlooked items, a real
embarrassment. At home base, check what you have
inside the conex containers and supply rooms. Much
of this stuff will not go with you in a deployment. Get
rid of the unneeded surplusage. When we redeployed,
I required that we remain uploaded for a future
operational deployment. This caused the leaders to
get rid of the junk and retain only the items necessary
for warfighting.

•

Take a long look at your Prescribed Load List (PPL) of
Class IX Repair Parts. We were doing away with this
in the 1st Armored Division as I departed. However,
the PPL kept my fleet operational during the first 90
days of Bosnia. Without these repair parts, we would
never had made it in the beginning. Make sure you
have the right items to maintain the fleet for 90 days.
It took that long for the repair parts system to start
flowing in Bosnia.
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CONCLUSION
The opportunity for battalion command in a peace
enforcement environment was special from start to finish.
Rather than commanding from a garrison environment, I
had the splendid opportunity to command from the front in
an operational environment with my soldiers around me 24
hours daily. I learned more about myself as a leader and the
potential of others than I have in over 19 years of service.
The soldiers did everything asked of them and more. The
leaders learned always to place the soldiers first and force
protection foremost. Most family members supported the
cause and never gave in to the tough times.
Following our redeployment back to Baumholder, I
commanded the battalion for another 7 months. For those
last few months in command, we continued to capitalize on
the Bosnian experience and take advantage of the fact more
than 50 percent of the unit were Bosnia veterans. The team
aspect of Bosnia carried the battalion long after the
redeployment.
Frequently I converse with some of my former soldiers
who served in support of the Bosnia mission, and all
feedback has been positive. On the whole, they believe what
we did was right and are proud to have served their country
and unit. I personally believe we did things right from the
start because we were serious and had the moral courage to
enforce discipline at all times. We had sergeants in charge
with the character to do the right thing. In all, 4-29 FA was
an outstanding unit that met or exceeded all mission
requirements in Bosnia.
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APPENDIX

“ZVORNIK SEVEN” QUESTIONS
AND ANSWERS

1. Was it the correct decision to hand the seven Muslims,
who had surrendered to IFOR, to the Republika Srpska
Police?
A. Yes, it was. This was clearly an armed group
within the meaning of the Dayton agreement.
Military or civilian, it constituted a threat to peace
inside RS jurisdiction. As such, we were obliged to
turn them over to the local civilian authorities if they
had an interest in them.
We cannot, on the one hand, insist that the local civil
authorities accept their responsibilities as required
under the agreement and then, on the other, keep
them from exercising those responsibilities when
they have a clear and legally justifiable opportunity
to do so.
2. Would you do the same, given similar circumstances
again?
A. Yes, for the reasons I have just given.
However, with the benefit of hindsight, we would
have held them longer ourselves in order to establish
their bona fides within a neutral environment.
Notwithstanding this option, we would still have had
to hand them over to the RS authorities within 72
hours.
3. Why did General Nash countermand the major’s
decision and try and recover the prisoners?
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A. He did not countermand the major’s orders.
When he learned what had happened, he decided to
seek an opportunity to question the prisoners
further before the Serb police proceeded with their
investigation. The Zvornik authorities decided not to
relinquish custody, but did agree that IFOR and the
IPTF, whose mission is to monitor police procedures,
could observe and even participate in the
questioning of the suspects.
4. How long did IFOR hold the men before they were
handed to the RS Police, and how long were they
questioned?
A. They were in our troops’ custody for just over
2 hours, from about 1240 when they reached the IFOR
position until approximately 1440 when they left for
Zvornik. They were questioned by IFOR from 1300
and in the presence of Military Police and the IPTF
from approximately 1400.
5. Do you not think that if there was a possibility that
those men were from Srebrenica, and it would appear now
that there is, that you had a moral duty to ensure that they
did not fall into the hands of those they had been trying to
escape from for the past 9 months?
A. The war is over. Civilian policing and justice
are now the order of the day. Just as the
international community has the right to investigate
those responsible for war crimes and crimes against
humanity, so do both of the entities created at Dayton
have the right to investigate crimes that occur within
their jurisdiction. The IPTF will monitor the
progress of this investigation and ensure that proper
standards of police behavior are applied.
6. Have you issued new instructions to the MNDs as a
result of this incident?
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A. We have reviewed our procedures and
reminded subordinate formations of their powers
and the procedures for detention.
7. Did the RS Police “lock and load their weapons” in
response to the U.S. presence at the police station?
A. A number of RS policemen were seen with
loaded AK 47s. There was also a large crowd which
gathered around the Police Station during the time
that IFOR was present. I understand that some
threatening gestures were made.
8. What was the response to what was surely a challenge
to their authority?
A. The IFOR party left without taking any steps
that would have escalated the tension that was
already evident. Dealings between IFOR and the
police were amicable, but there was a crowd outside,
attracted by the incident. Talks concerning the
prisoners had reached the stage where the Zvornik
police had put the issue to the federal ministry, and
no answer was expected until the next day. The IFOR
party had no reason to remain.
The police are not prohibited by Dayton from
carrying long weapons outside the ZOS. This was not
an issue of noncompliance. IFOR withdrew so as not
to create an unnecessary and potentially dangerous
situation.
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CHAPTER 6
THE 28TH TRANSPORTATION BATTALION:
“EN TEMPS” SUPPORT TO
OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR

Lieutenant Colonel James D. Sharpe, Jr.
INTRODUCTION
I witnessed world events in the Nineties impinge upon
the United States Army Europe (USAREUR). During
assignments in Germany, from 1990-92 and again from
1994-96, I saw how USAREUR’s mission changed to meet
the challenges of a New World Order. USAREUR forces,
which once included four divisions and two corps
headquarters, no longer direct their resources and training
against the Soviet threat at the Fulda Gap. Instead, their
focus extends to more than 100 nations in the European
Command (EUCOM) and Central Command (CENTCOM)
areas of operation.
Today, USAREUR’s mission is to maintain a combatready, forward-deployed force of 65,000 soldiers, capable of
providing immediate responses in support of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), U.S. bilateral, U.S.
multilateral, and U.S. unilateral objectives. On any given
day in 1996, as many as 30,000 USAREUR soldiers were
deployed outside the NATO Central Region (CR) in support
of such activities as joint contact teams, combined training
events, humanitarian assistance, noncombatant
evacuation, and peacekeeping missions. Humanitarian
relief operations in Africa and Operation JOINT
ENDEAVOR (OJE) in the Balkans are just a few examples
of the expansion of USAREUR’s new mission.
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OJE is the largest military operation conducted in
Europe since World War II. USAREUR provided the
majority of the personnel required to support this NATO
operation. One unit involved in this operation since
USAREUR began planning for its involvement in the
former Yugoslavia is the 28th Transportation Battalion,
headquartered in Mannheim, Germany.
The 28th Transportation Battalion (28th TB) is
USAREUR’s largest transportation truck battalion, and its
sole line-haul operator. The battalion’s motto is “EN
TEMPS” (ON TIME). It’s “On Time” performance played a
significant role in the deployment of USAREUR forces to
the Balkans and their sustainment during the accomplishment of their peacekeeping mission. The purpose of this
monograph is to describe in some detail my experiences
with the 28th TB and the hardworking soldiers who
contributed to the success of OJE. Many of my recollections
can be credited to personal notes and briefings prepared by
Colonel Bob Kubiszewski and his staff, the staff of the 28th
TB, and Lieutenant Colonel Donnie Horner. Thanks for the
“mind-joggers.”
BACKGROUND
The 28th TB is the Army’s largest line-haul truck
transportation battalion. It is subordinate to the 37th
Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), which is the
theater transportation mode operator for the EUCOM CR
encompassing Germany and the BENELUX nations
(Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg).
In the early 1990s prior to OJE, USAREUR implemented force reductions along with the rest of the Army.
Force reductions reached the TRANSCOM and had both
positive and negative impacts on the 28th TB. On the
positive note, the battalion increased its overall strength
with the addition of one medium Truck Company (TC) and
one trailer transfer detachment (TTD). On the negative
side, these units came to the battalion as the result of the
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deactivation of the 53rd Transportation Battalion, its sister
organization. The net effect was that the theater lost the
command and control capabilities afforded by a
transportation battalion headquarters and the line-haul
resources of three medium truck companies. As deployment
in support of OJE became reality, theater line-haul
responsibilities rested solely with my battalion, and it
would continue to do so throughout the planning,
deployment, and sustainment phases of OJE.
The 28th Transportation Battalion is composed of a
headquarters and headquarters detachment (HHD), five
line-haul transportation companies, and two trailer
transfer detachments. As OJE began, our personnel
strength was at 1,015 soldiers.
Prior to the onset of OJE, the battalion provided 200
trucks daily in support of the CR Theater. Crucial to the
morale of all U.S. personnel stationed in the CR is the
delivery of mail to every postal unit. The battalion dedicates
a third of its committed trucks daily to haul over 60 tons of
mail. During the Christmas mailing season, the battalion
increases the number of dedicated mail trucks to meet
requirement surges of up to 90 tons a day. Other key
battalion missions are the Theater Hub and Spoke
Distribution System, which supports nearly 80 units from
Bremerhaven, Germany, to Vicenza, Italy, with all classes
of supplies and the aerial port clearance at Ramstein Air
Base.
I assumed command of the 28th TB on July 19, 1995. The
first year in command can best be described as eventful. As
with all new command relationships, the soldiers of the
command adjusted to my style of leadership and patiently
waited while I adjusted to command. Operationally, the
battalion worked hard supporting the increasing
transportation demands of the theater.
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PLANNING FOR OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR
In the summer of 1995, world events generated longrange planning requirements for the battalion. Although
the possibilities for U.S. involvement in the Balkans seemed
remote at the time, the new 37th TRANSCOM commander
directed that my battalion train and prepare for possible
deployment. Specifically, Colonel Kubiszewski directed
that the battalion be prepared to operate the
Arrival/Departure Control Groups (A/DACG) at multiple
locations, deploy two truck companies to the Balkans,
conduct rear detachment operations, and continue line-haul
operations in support of the theater. Although everyone’s
best guess was that no one would deploy, training schedules
for the coming months reflected this guidance and also
included soldier survival skills. We focused on “needs
training” tasks that were identified during company Army
Training and Evaluation Programs (ARTEPS) conducted
during the spring and summer.
Perhaps the smartest thing we did was to conduct a
2-day mission analysis. Immediately, I brought together my
entire staff, company commanders, their first sergeants,
truck masters, motor officers, and platoon sergeants. From
A to Z, we covered every known and possible contingency we
might face as we prepared for worst case operations. None of
us had ever been to the Balkans or had experience in
deploying units during the dead of winter. Always in the
back of my mind, and that of my senior folks, was the
possibility of entering a combat environment.
During the mission analysis, we set priorities for
training and work, decided which units would deploy first,
identified rear detachment commanders, determined which
unit would be used to provide personnel filler, established
supply and maintenance requirements, and developed a
timeline for reaching our goals. We left the 2-day analysis
with some unknowns; however, we were all singing from the
same sheet of music. We had a plan. Without a doubt, the
efforts we expended on this analysis were the primary
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factors allowing us to stay ahead of what was eventually
about to occur.
What became apparent from the start was the role our
mission analysis played in our successes. My Battalion
Maintenance Officer (BMO), CW3 Mike Dunn, and
Battalion Property Book Officer, CW2 Curtis Brown, had
accurately determined that the requisition system would be
late coming on line. As a result, they recommended that the
deploying units increase their lines of supplies and repair
parts. Supplies for the A/DACG and convoy support
missions were also requisitioned and were on hand as
deployment operations began in December 1995. Later
comments from numerous senior-level sources indicated
that the 28th TB units were some of the best-prepared units
to deploy and support OJE missions. Much credit goes to
these two warrant officers, in my opinion, the best the Army
has to offer. They always planned ahead; worked my
company commanders hard; and never left us wanting for
supplies, repair parts, or good advice.
In September 1995, the battalion S3 officer, the
battalion S3 noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC),
and I joined my brigade commander and his staff at
Grafenwoehr Training Area, Germany, to participate in a
theater-wide logistics-planning cell chaired by Major
General Jim Wright, Commander, 21st Theater Army Area
Command (TAACOM). The purpose of this planning cell
was to look at all possible logistics issues and confront any
challenges posed by the upcoming deployment to the
Balkans. Soon after the planning cell was convened, Colonel
Kubiszewski directed me to return to Mannheim so that I
could supervise my battalion’s preparations for deployment.
Major Glenn Grothe, the battalion S2/3, remained in
Grafenwoehr. His Training With Industry experience with
Carolina Freight Carriers Corporation proved invaluable in
the overall development of the OJE transportation concept.
Colonel Kubiszewski and the transporters in the
Grafenwoehr planning cell quickly realized that the overall
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transportation concept must include surface lines of
communication (LOC) from CR to the OJE area of
operations. Many planners believed that success of the
operations depended on three things: a quick deployment;
keeping American soldiers safe; and providing reliable
surface re-supply of high-priority, outsized, or overweight
cargo on a regular schedule. In order to accomplish the
latter, Colonel Kubiszewski and his OJE transportation
planning staff developed plans for EAGLE EXPRESS.
Hauling cargo over EAGLE EXPRESS became the
battalion’s first of six missions in support of OJE. As events
matured, trucks assigned to the 6966th Civilian Support
Center, my German counterpart within the TRANSCOM,
picked up most of my battalion’s theater support mission so
that we could dedicate more trucks to deployment and
re-supply operations. EAGLE EXPRESS was divided into
three legs extending nearly 1,000 miles through Germany,
Austria, Hungary, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. To
provide overnight rest and maintenance facilities along
EAGLE EXPRESS, the planning cell planned for two
Convoy Support Centers (CSC)—to be manned and
operated by my battalion. To be established later, rest stops
in Taszar, Hungary, and Slavonski Brod, Croatia, would be
manned/operated by other units, although we would have
liaison personnel at them to coordinate movement of our
assets.
Conceptually, the CSCs had to support and service
convoys of up to 150 soldiers and 50 vehicles per day. The
United States contracted for billeting, meals, facilities, and
fuel. At the request of the U.S. Army through German and
Austrian liaisons at the 21st TAACOM, the German
Bundeswehr and the Austrian Government made available
the Prince Leopold Kaserne in Regensburg, Germany, and
the Benedek Kaserne in Bruck, Austria, sites with the
resources to support the U.S. convoy requirements. Their
locations also coincided nicely with daily operating-time
restrictions imposed on drivers by USAREUR in view of the
harsh winter driving conditions. These rules dictated that
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drivers could not operate a motor vehicle in excess of 10
consecutive hours within a 24-hour period.
To accomplish the CSC mission, we deployed a
squad-size element to each location. With a lieutenant in
command, the tailored squads had a large contingent of
mechanics, a strong NCO, some truck drivers, and two
administrative personnel. Fortunately for us, several
lieutenants and NCOs were fluent in German and
developed trusting relationships with their host-nation
partners. Soon after, we instituted a 90-day rotation policy
for personnel at the CSC sites, and continued to support
these sites until relieved by V Corps in June 1996.
A battalion mission complementary to EAGLE
EXPRESS was providing convoy escorts for deploying 1st
Armored Division and V Corps units. We were directed to
provide command and control vehicles with maintenance
trail parties to each V Corps convoy that departed CR for the
Intermediate Staging Base (ISB) at Taszar, Hungary, via
EAGLE EXPRESS. V Corps planners, division transportation officers, and my S3, who returned to Mannheim after a
month’s stay in Grafenwoehr, developed a schedule to meet
the convoy requirements.
All 1st Armored Division convoys originated in my
battalion motor park. The 109th TC was given the escort
mission. Company officers and senior NCOs were
designated as convoy commanders. The 109th TC
oftentimes resorted to borrowing wreckers from sister
companies in order to provide the maintenance trail party.
From December 11-20, the 109th TC escorted V Corps unit
convoys without incident. The unit escorted two convoys per
day over the 2-week window. Each convoy averaged 20
vehicles and 50 personnel.
In late October 1995, our brigade headquarters was
designated as the Theater Executive Agent for Reception,
Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (RSOI) of
units inbound to CR. An essential mission for the RSOI was
the operation of the A/DACGs at Ramstein and Rhein Main
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Air Force Bases, located in Kaiserslautern and Frankfurt,
Germany, respectively. Per Colonel Kubiszewski’s direction
early in August, the battalion had trained and was ready to
execute the fourth of its six missions supporting OJE. As
luck would have it, I had two subordinate commanders with
some A/DACG experience—Captain Mike Frego and 1st
Lieutenant Mike Johnson. Captain Frego commanded the
69th TC in Mannheim, and 1st Lieutenant Johnson
commanded the 15th TTD in Kaiserslautern. I assigned the
69th to Rhein Main AFB, which was supposed to be the
primary aerial port of embarkation/debarkation
(APOE/APOD) for deployment. I assigned the 15th TTD to
Ramstein AFB. Ramstein was initially intended for
processing sustainment cargo only, but eventually wound
up as the APOE for much of the 1st Armored Division
headquartered at Baumholder, Germany.
The previous experience these two young officers had in
A/DACG operations proved invaluable when weather
impacted the deployment plan. As weather delayed and/or
cancelled rail, barge, and highway movements, the A/DACG
missions increased in volume of work and visibility.
A crucial battalion mission was to prepare two units—
one truck company and one trailer transfer detachment—
for deployment to the Balkans. My commanders, staff, and I
had long anticipated this call. We did our homework early
on during our mission analysis and identified the 70th TC
and the 260th TTD as units that would be early deployers
when the word came. V Corps—specifically, the 181st
Transportation Battalion (a detail that would cause some
concerns later)—would operationally control my two units.
Attaching units to other battalion headquarters is not
unusual in the Army, especially when accomplishment of
the mission is at stake. In this case, it made sense. V Corps
was in charge of the Balkan mission. The Combat Support
Command of V Corps was also going to deploy along with the
181st, which was its only transportation battalion. Since
USAREUR’s only other transportation truck battalion was
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tied up with A/DACGS, CSCs, EAGLE EXPRESS, and CR
mail deliveries, its headquarters and a majority of assets
were not available to deploy. What the 181st TB lacked, and
what the 28th TB had, were line-haul, medium truck
companies and trailer transfer units. The logical decision
was to give the 181st TB what it needed, and that is what we
did.
Colonel Kubiszewski knew the moment he gave me the
assignment that I would not like the arrangement. It is not
that I had anything against the 181st TB or its commander,
Lieutenant Colonel Roger Moore. In fact, the battalions had
a good working and social relationship. Both battalions
were located in Mannheim, Germany, and it was not
unusual to have soldiers or NCOs serve back-to-back
assignments in each battalion. But like most commanders, I
felt that I alone could best take care of MY soldiers. And all
of us in the battalion were itching to go to Bosnia and be part
of the game—not just support it from afar. The bottom-line
was that the 70th TC and 260th TTD came under the
operational control of the 181st TB and deployed via their
own means on December 11, 1995. As a matter of history,
this convoy was the first U.S. military convoy to depart for
the Balkans in support of OJE.
I vowed to the soldiers and the families of these two units
that I would soon be there to command them again. With the
help of our brigade commander, that vow was fulfilled
sooner than I thought.
Preparing the two units for deployment was an
experience worth discussing. When we received the
September notice to deploy them, the accompanying
instructions directed that the 70th TC would draw from
Combat Equipment Group, Europe (CEGE) sites the
Palletized Load System (PLS) equipment. Since the PLS
was not organic to the battalion, few drivers were licensed to
operate it. As a result, a crash familiarization and licensing
program was conducted.
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This program was successful and was soon expanded to
include the other companies’ personnel as time and mission
allowed. When training was completed, we coordinated with
CEGE to draw 48 PLS systems (to include pallets) on
December 1. The equipment draw never occurred. Instead,
on/around November 15, Colonel Kubiszewski informed me
that the 70th TC would deploy with its own organic M915
tractors and M872 trailers. V Corps’ tactical 181st TB—
specifically, the 51st TC—would perform the more tactical
PLS mission. Traditional line-haul from the ISB to forward
operating bases would remain the 70th TC mission.
This last-minute change in mission almost became a
showstopper. When given the PLS mission, I directed
Captain Woody Willis to place his M915 tractors in
“ADMIN” storage. Essentially, this meant that the
equipment would receive only the necessary maintenance to
prepare it for long-term storage. The new order demanded
detailed maintenance preparation and renewed emphasis
to beef up our repair parts inventory. For the first time since
our mission analysis, time became our enemy. I was not sure
when the unit would deploy.
My BMO, Mike Dunn, had the solution. Under his
direction, the battalion established a maintenance surge
team, consisting of critical key maintenance NCOs and
mechanics from all the units. Its job was to conduct a
thorough inspection of the units’ equipment and fix what
they could while the equipment was over the pit. Repairs
that required more time were the responsibility of the
deploying units. This team concept worked great.
Equipment inspections by both the V Corps Inspector
General and the 21st Assistant Chief of Staff, Logistics,
elicited outstanding comments.
The units were ready to deploy when the actual
deployment orders were received. As a matter of fact,
soldiers had some time (although not as much as promised)
to spend with their families prior to departing Mannheim.
This was an important point, as I remembered how much
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heat I received from the families because the battalion
was directed to draw cold weather gear from the Mannheim
Clothing Issue Facility on Thanksgiving Day. Despite my
opposition, I was overruled by USAREUR and 21st
TAACOM senior leaders. As an early deployer, the unit had
to meet this issue schedule. With flack vest on, I took every
heat-round the families delivered during the family support
group meeting that followed the next week. A memorable
experience!
OJE DEPLOYMENT
December 1995 was a busy time for the battalion and
soldiers. Every day we had 10-15 trucks hauling cargo along
EAGLE EXPRESS. The CSCs were fully manned and
operational with battalion personnel. Operation CONVOY
ESCORT was in the capable hands of the 109th TC. The
69th TC and 15th TTD were fully engaged at the A/DACG
APOEs, and the 70th TC and 260th TTD were in the
Balkans, fighting the harsh winter environment.
What were the remaining units of the battalion doing?
The 66th TC and the short-handed 68th TC (which I used as
a personnel filler for the 70th TC) were fully employed as the
Holiday surge in Christmas mail was in full swing. The
battalion staff was working 24-hour shifts, maintaining
watch over a hectic operational program. My executive
officer, battalion S3, command sergeant major, and I split
our time among the numerous sites where battalion soldiers
were working. Everyone was engaged and busy!
Arrival/Departure Control Group Operations.
The A/DACG mission was planned for, but not
considered likely to be executed to the degree it ultimately
was. During initial planning, 90 percent of 1st Armored
Division, V Corps, and echelons above corps (EAC) assets
would rail and/or convoy to the ISB at Taszar, Hungary. The
original transportation concepts for deployment of
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USAREUR forces to Bosnia-Herzegovina were by European
rail overland convoy.
The A/DACG missions turned ugly on December 20
when weather precluded navigation of the land and river
routes that were the primary modes for deployment of the
1st Armored Division. Rail strikes in France and internal
sabotage by German rail workers resulted in insufficient
railcars to meet the demanding workload imposed by the
U.S. deployment. As a result, air deployment became the
immediate fix for a deployment scenario that was rapidly
falling behind schedule.
Both the 69th TC and the 15th TTD successfully handled
the shift in primary deployment transport modes with the
normal confusion and inconvenience associated with
last-minute changes. The combination of long hours,
teamwork, and strong NCOs helped these two units process
4,000 passengers, 2,500 pieces of rolling stock, and over
40,000 short tons of cargo through their APOEs. The 69th
TC and 15th TTD remained in place until relieved by 1st
Theater Army Movement Control Agency (TAMCA) in early
February 1996. But their relief was short in duration. In
March, I began deploying the units to the Intermediate
Staging Base at Taszar, Hungary, as relief for the 70th TC
and 260th TTD that deployed to the Balkans in December.
OPCON Issues.
I mentioned earlier that the 70th TC and 260th TTD
were placed under the operational control of the 181st TB
prior to deploying to the Balkans. That did not negate my
responsibility to support my two subordinate units. From
the time they deployed, the two unit commanders looked to
me for moral and physical support. Almost daily, the 28th
TB sent a tractor/trailer combination via EAGLE EXPRESS
to rapidly reinforce the units with re-supply and emergency
repair parts. The 181st TB did not have M915 tractors,
forklifts, or “Yard dogs” within their Modified Table of
Organization and Equipment; therefore, the 70th TC and
180

260th TTD relied entirely on the 28th TB for support of its
equipment.
Failure to cut the umbilical cord with my two
subordinate units caused some friction between the two
transportation battalions. The friction centered over dual
loyalties and which battalion’s Family Support Group
would service the families of the deployed soldiers. What
added fuel to the fire was a rumor that began before
deployment and continued throughout December.
When the two units deployed with the 181st TB, no one
was certain how long they would remain under the 181st
TB. My brigade commander told me that my battalion
headquarters must be prepared to deploy—when he was not
sure, but more likely prior to February 1. However, there
were rumors that organizations deployed for the expected
1-year tour of duty in the Balkans could expect to remain
intact as part of the restructuring of USAREUR. This
information caused great consternation for the soldiers of
the two deployed 28th units, but also for the families of these
same soldiers.
The dual-loyalty issue was the result of poor communication between the commander of the 181st TB and myself.
This was quickly remedied when Lieutenant Colonel Moore
and I agreed that the 28th would remain the resupply
channel for the 70th TC and 260th TTD until the requisition
process became established in the ISB. Day-to-day
command and control of the two units was the 181st TB
responsibility. Operationally, this arrangement worked
smoothly due to the professionalism of all commanders and
personnel involved; however, the 70th TC and 260th TTD
remained emotionally tied to the 28th TB. Herein lies the
problem with the Family Support Groups.
Both battalions were proud of the efforts of their Family
Support Groups whose leadership came from the wives of
the battalion commanders. Both wives were energetic,
enthusiastic, and proud individuals, believing that their
individual FSG was the best to service the families of the
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deployed 28th TB units. Trouble was quickly stemmed
when Lieutenant Colonel Moore and I agreed that the 28th
FSG would support the 70th TC and 260th TTD. This was
another example of where better “up front” communication
was needed at the battalion commander level.
Once the deployment phase ended, 28th TB units
involved in A/DACG and convoy escort operations were
relieved of these responsibilities. Simultaneously, the
Holiday mail surge came to an end. Theater line-haul assets
were now focused to support EAGLE EXPRESS and the
Balkan-deployed units. On February 1, Colonel
Kubiszewski received the warning order from Major
General Wright, the Commander, 21st TAACOM, to deploy
the 37th TRANSCOM and 28th TB headquarters. This was
the battalion’s fifth mission in support of OJE. The
deployment of the battalion headquarters resulted in the
return of the 70th TC and 260th TTD to the 28th TB family
and helped me keep my vow to my soldiers and their
families.
Split-Based Operations.
In order to manage simultaneously two major operations
spread over 1,000 miles, Colonel Kubiszewski and I
concluded that split-based operations for our headquarters
were in order. Each command selected key staff and support
personnel to deploy to the ISB. We established a combined
TRANSCOM and 28th TB operations cell at the staging
area in Taszar, Hungary. Colonel Kubiszewski positioned
key personnel at sites throughout the AOR as the brigade’s
eyes and ears. In essence, these key officers and NCOs
became the brigade’s liaisons to V Corps, 21st TAACOM,
and 1st Armored Division headquarters. They provided
invaluable information and increased his ability to send
trucks and personnel when and where they were most
desperately needed. Split-based operations proved critical
to the success of the battalion and key to the rotation plan
that I was later able to work out with Colonel Kubiszewski.
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When I split my battalion headquarters, 50 percent of
each staff section deployed. Section chiefs and their
NCOICs were separated. If one deployed, the other would
remain in garrison to run their operations in the rear. Since
a joint operations cell was formed, I was able to leave Major
Grothe—much to his dismay—in Mannheim, to orchestrate
EAGLE EXPRESS and the increasing theater support
missions. Also, he would remain responsible, along with my
Command Sergeant Major, for ensuring that training and
preparation for phase II (rotation) continued.
On February 15, 1996, I deployed with approximately 40
soldiers from the battalion staff and the 109th TC. The total
deployed package for the 28th was two medium truck
companies, one trailer transfer detachment, and one-half of
my battalion staff—approximately 410 personnel. In the
battalion rear, my executive officer, Major Donnie Horner,
commanded three medium truck companies, one trailer
transfer detachment, one-half of the battalion staff, and
rear detachments for each of the deployed units—
approximately 600 personnel. As we later reflected on our
duties, we agreed duties in the garrison rear were far more
demanding than duty in the Balkans. Most demanding of all
were the family support issues.
For the next 6 months, Major Horner and I split time at
both locations. My rotation looked like this: 3 weeks
forward, then 3 weeks in garrison. Colonel Kubiszewski,
Major Horner, and I agreed that this arrangement allowed
me the flexibility to command my battalion best. Just as
important to the battalion, it kept Major Horner and me
involved in both arenas and minimized any disruptions to
ongoing coordination, training, and/or operations. The
biggest benefit from this arrangement was the continued
communications link that we maintained with all the
battalion’s soldiers and their families. Soldiers and spouses
appreciated that their senior leadership shared the same
experiences as the deployed soldiers. Upon our return to
garrison, we would share some of the experiences with them
at family support gatherings. Additionally, my returns to
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garrison permitted me to review our battalion’s training,
operations, and maintenance programs to ensure that they
were in keeping with my intent. I also got to attend the
battalion newcomers’ briefings, which I believed were
essential to our new personnel integration program.
REAR DETACHMENT OPERATIONS
Perhaps one of my most pleasant surprises was the
conduct of the battalion’s rear detachments. During our
mission analysis, unit commanders identified NCOs to
perform the duties of the rear detachment commanders. We
established two criteria for these critical personnel. First,
we wanted an NCO who was very familiar with the
Mannheim community and Germany. The minimum
requirement was that the NCO must have served multiple
tours in Germany and in Mannheim. I mentioned earlier
that many NCOs moved between the 28th and 181st TBs
often, so this criterion was not too difficult to meet. We
looked for NCOs married to Germans or who spoke German.
And we wanted NCOs who had, at least, 1 year remaining
on their current tour. Second, we wanted an NCO who
everyone considered to be one of the unit’s best, brightest,
and strongest. Nothing less would make it in this job. We
anticipated numerous family problems: pay, health,
children, school, jobs, ID cards, and transportation, even
though we did our best to resolve issues before they became
problems when deployment began.
We did a pretty good job in selecting winners for our rear
detachments. The leadership, organizational, and people
skills these fine NCOs displayed during OJE were
instrumental to our battalion’s successes. They initiated
unit car pools for commissary and Post Exchange runs. They
ensured that mail got to the families without privately
owned vehicles. They ran down pay issues, ID card issues,
child care issues, and landlord issues. They secured a van
from the community motor pool and operated a hospital
shuttle 3 days each week. To their great credit, we received
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no IG or congressional inquiries related to rear detachment
and family support/service issues during OJE.
One of our better decisions, and one designed to relieve
some of the pressures on the rear detachment commanders,
was the decision to consolidate them at offices within the
battalion headquarters and place them under the
operational control of Captain Chuck Meadows, the
commander of the 68th TC. The 68th TC had the best overall
family support group program and was not designated to
deploy since I used the unit to fill personnel shortages in the
other units before they deployed. And since Chuck’s FSG
program was so strong, I knew the rear detachment
commanders would get genuine support, to include UCMJ,
from him when required. Chuck did not disappoint me;
neither did the rear detachment commanders.
USAREUR’s Drivers’ Academy (Forward).
As the deployment proceeded and more personnel
arrived in the Balkans, my boss directed that we establish a
USAREUR Driver’s Academy (Forward) in the ISB. With
our sixth battalion mission now assigned, my Command
Sergeant Major, Tim Lynes, identified key personnel from
our battalion’s garrison Driver’s Academy to deploy to the
ISB and act as instructors and administrative facilitators.
The academy party deployed to Taszar in early January and
within 2 weeks was conducting the initial drivers’ course to
approximately 20 soldiers.
To be eligible to attend, soldiers must already have had
in possession a valid USAREUR driving license and
Standard Form 46 (Operator Vehicle License). The course
was not designed to teach soldiers how to operate assigned
vehicles. Its curriculum was designed to augment mine
training that was mandatory for all deploying USAREUR
soldiers. The forward academy provided to soldiers going
into Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina a 3-day orientation
course, with classes covering situational awareness, convoy
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procedures, driving techniques, operator maintenance, and
safety.
I was very proud of this training achievement. In short
time, the USAREUR Drivers’ Academy (FWD) successfully
trained over 4,000 soldiers from various military
occupational specialties to include infantry, military police,
artillery, tankers, and truck drivers. Remaining under the
battalion’s administration, the faculty expanded to include
both 21st TAACOM and V Corps instructors. A testament to
the professional impact that these instructors and their
training had on USAREUR soldiers is evident in the low
number of vehicle accidents that occurred during OJE. The
facility hosted numerous visitors to include Secretary of the
Army Togo West; General William W. Crouch,
Commander-in-Chief, USAREUR; and Lieutenant General
John Abrams, V Corps Commander.
More OPCON Issues.
Soon after the deployment phase ended and the
battalion headquarters was in place in Taszar, we received
operational control of Bravo Company, 701st Main Support
Battalion. This is a heavy truck company outfitted with the
Heavy Equipment Transport System (HETS). The unit
deployed to the Balkans to assist the 181st in the movement
of heavy armored vehicles south of the Sava River. When
deployment was completed, HET assets organic to the 181st
were sufficient to support operations south of the Sava
River. Heavy support in the ISB was the responsibility of
the 29th Area Support Group. Logically, B/701st should
have re-deployed to CR. In fact, Major General Wright
directed that the unit return to CR; however, Lieutenant
General Abrams rescinded his order. Instead, the unit was
placed under my control.
Morale quickly became a problem in this unit. With the
unit having no obvious mission, I volunteered it as a VIP
stop to give them some semblance of worth. Additionally,
and with the support of Colonel Kubiszewski, I sent half the
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unit home to Wuerzburg, Germany. Unit personnel rotated
from CR to the ISB every 30 days. Quickly, morale turned
around. The unit proudly and professionally showed off
their equipment. Tours of the ISB inside HET systems
became the norm for visiting dignitaries from our allies and
own country. In coordination with the 181st, my operations
cell was able to secure some HET missions south of the Sava
River. For 4 months, this unit operated as one of my
subordinate units and always performed in a magnificent
manner. I was proud to be associated with them. The unit
returned to CR after the deployment phase of Operation
JOINT GUARD was completed.
Defense Transportation Tracking System.
The battalion’s execution of EAGLE EXPRESS provided
the Army an opportunity to test emerging technology in
support of in-transit visibility initiatives. One type of
tracking technology field-tested by the Combined Arms
Support Command during OJE was the Defense
Transportation Tracking System (DTTS).
DTTS is designed to ascertain the location of trucks and
cargo via satellite tracking connectivity. It provided us with
in-transit visibility over our trucks and drivers, which
proved crucial since safety oftentimes took a back seat to the
extreme weather and road conditions endured by my
drivers. Operationally, it permitted communications
between vehicle operators and their units. This particular
capability proved to be a lifesaver when 1st Lieutenant Glen
Hampton, serving as a convoy commander, initiated a call
for help using this communication means.
On February 6, 1996, as a platoon leader in the 109th
TC, he was leading a convoy of 20 trucks from Tuzla,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, to Slavonski Brod, Croatia, when one
of the lead trucks hit a patch of black ice as it emerged from a
tunnel on the road. The driver lost control, causing his truck
and trailer to jack-knife in the middle of the road. As his
truck jack-knifed, the truck next in line hit the first truck
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and flipped. Trucks emerging from the tunnel could not
react quickly enough to avoid collision. As a result, six
trucks were involved in the accident. Drivers from two
vehicles were seriously hurt, with leg and neck injuries.
Lieutenant Hampton, who had FM radio and CB
communications, was unable to raise any stations for
assistance. As the hurt drivers were stabilized, he
transmitted a help message via the DTTS to any monitoring
station. The 28th operations cell in the garrison rear
immediately retrieved the message to include the convoy’s
location. The rear operations called the forward operations
cell, which alerted local area MEDEVAC for assistance.
Within 30 minutes of the accident, a MEDEVAC helicopter
was at the scene of the accident. Both injured soldiers were
treated and released back to their units.
MAINTENANCE RECYCLING PLAN
Support of OJE took a tremendous toll on the M915s
assigned to the battalion. Prior to OJE, my battalion’s
operationally ready (OR) rate averaged 94 percent. After 4
demanding months of supporting the 800-mile EAGLE
EXPRESS and suffering the wear and tear accelerated by
the immature road conditions, the OR rate struggled to stay
above 86 percent.
M915s were designed with a wear-life of 300,000 miles
per chassis and engine. During their deployment, 70th and
109th TC trucks accumulated on the average 140,000 miles
on chassis that had 200,000 plus miles on them prior to
deployment. On an average, the 28th TB supported the ISB
and V Corps sustainment operations with 45 trucks a day.
This equated to approximately 232 tons of cargo each day,
covering an average of 9,700 miles a day. By comparison,
trucks in CR and even those supporting EAGLE EXPRESS
accumulated on the average 93,000 miles per chassis over
the same 4 months.
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Drivers were also beginning to show signs of fatigue. The
number of fender benders was growing, although the
number of major accidents remained extremely low. What
to do? If the current USAREUR policy of 1 year on station
(meaning in the Balkans) remained in effect, the declining
availability of assets in the 70th and 109th could have a
serious effect on redeployment operations. Colonel
Kubiszewski and I devised a plan to fix our maintenance
problem—a maintenance-recycling plan. The plan
permitted my deployed units to recycle to garrison and
concentrate on much-needed maintenance repairs to
overworked equipment.
Under the aegis of EAGLE EXPRESS, we executed a
recycling plan designed to gradually transition units from
Central Region to relieve the units in Taszar. Fresh trucks
and drivers from the 66th and 69th TC with resupply from
CR began to infiltrate into the ISB every other day, while
tired trucks and drivers from the 70th and 109th recycled
back to CR via EAGLE EXPRESS with retrograde
equipment on the same schedule. To the supply and
transportation system, there was no evident degradation in
the support or service we provided. Essential overlap of key
personnel (truck masters, first sergeants, and supply and
motor sergeants) took place over the course of a few days.
The departing commander relinquished command and
control to the inbound commander only after each company
transitioned 51 percent of personnel and equipment to their
new locations.
In mid-March, the 70th TC recycled back to CR, while
the 69th deployed to the Balkan AOR. Once this rotation
was complete, the 109th recycled to CR and was relieved by
the 66th TC. Since maintenance priority demanded the
quick rotation of M915 trucks over yard dogs and forklifts, I
kept the 260th in the Balkan AOR until May, when it was
relieved by the 15th TTD.
The maintenance-recycling plan successfully enabled
the 28th TB to provide reliable, seamless line-haul support
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for OJE. It allowed us to continue the same degree of
support to Operation JOINT GUARD (OJG). Equipment got
the maintenance that was long overdue; equally important,
soldiers’ and families’ morale reached unequaled heights.
Our soldiers, who had proven themselves under tough
conditions and who were proud of themselves for their
accomplishments, returned to heroes’ welcomes and some
well-deserved rest.
For the newly deployed soldiers, the precedence was set.
We had in place an approved maintenance-recycling plan
supported by all the USAREUR leadership. Fully aware
that they would return to garrison in late summer, these
soldiers eagerly and proudly assumed the missions their
predecessors had earlier accomplished.
THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN
Despite the significant achievements, the battalion and I
also endured some tough experiences. For example,
throughout the planning phase, we were not sure until
mid-November that deployment operations were going to
go. And not until December 8, did we get the final GO to
deploy the 70th and 260th on December 11. For families and
soldiers, the waiting was terrible. On top of that, the
deployment mode for the units varied week by week. I’ve
already described the CEGE draw scenario. Coupled with
the equipment draw, the unit was scheduled to deploy to the
Balkan AOR by rail—then by barge—then back to rail. This
flip-flopping of carrier mode continued for months until the
decision to void the PLS draw was issued. When I was told
that we’d use our organic equipment, my decision to convoy
was quickly endorsed by my senior chain of command.
We never expected to operate a full-scale A/DACG at
Ramstein Air Base. Every planning session indicated that
major unit deployments would originate from Rhein Main.
Ramstein would be dedicated for resupply operations only.
The CG, 1st Armored Division argued that convoy
operations from Baumholder to Rhein Main would cause
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unnecessary wear and tear on his units’ equipment and
demanded the use of Ramstein as a major APOE for his
headquarters—despite the vocal protests of senior Air Force
personnel.
Our battalion’s safety record was pretty darn good;
however, close calls did occur. I earlier described the black
ice incident. Several more black ice incidents occurred, as
well as an accident caused by the decay of the road surface
by heavy rain. In this incident, a tractor and trailer slid
down a 25-foot embankment as the road surface collapsed.
Fortunately, the worst accidents resulted in only broken
legs and/or arms.
A not-so-proud incident occurred when two soldiers
assigned to the 109th TC violated General Order #1, which
stipulated zero consumption of alcoholic beverages. The
soldiers were in the ISB and returning to their company
area from an ISB-sponsored event. During a routine
Military Police (MP) gate check, they became belligerent
with the on-duty military police. A quick search of their
utility vehicle revealed an open container of coke. Closer
inspection revealed the odor of alcohol from the container,
and the two soldiers were arrested. I was furious and
embarrassed by this violation of policy. The soldiers
eventually were processed out of the Army.
Two other incidents that caused the pucker factor to rise
were a tent fire and the near loss of a weapon. During the
height of deployment operations, truck platoons operated
independently from their company headquarters. In one
incident, a platoon from the 70th TC was supporting the
movement of containers across the Sava River. During this
operation, a fuel spill occurred while soldiers were lighting
kerosene stoves. A fire ensued and could not be contained by
the NCO at the scene. As a result, the fire spread to the tent.
All articles within the tent were destroyed; however, no
injuries occurred. We were extremely lucky on that day!
Luck remained with us throughout our deployment. On
another occasion, a platoon from the 109th TC, while
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supporting the movement of fuel tankers, lost an assigned
weapon belonging to a young soldier. After reporting the
loss through the chain of command, the platoon spent an
entire night looking for the weapon. Finally, the platoon
leader went to the local MP unit for assistance. To his great
relief, the weapon was in the possession of the military
police who found the weapon lying alongside the road.
CONCLUSION
Despite these close calls, I am very proud of the overall
accomplishments of the battalion and its soldiers. The
battalion proved its worth by its operation of the A/DACG
sites at Ramstein and Rhein Main Air Bases, conduct of
convoy escorts and convoy support centers, and line-haul
operations in support of Theater and EAGLE EXPRESS
missions. Consider that the battalion also deployed half its
strength to Taszar, Hungary, re-deployed that half and then
deployed the other half, concurrently while conducting a
majority of its CR theater support mission. Adding to that
the conduct of the USAREUR Drivers’ Academy (FWD), it is
hard to contain my pride and admiration. Finally, and I
intentionally did not mention this in the main text of this
monograph, is the fact that my battalion won both the
USAREUR Battalion Maintenance and Supply Excellence
competitions while supporting OJE.
Teamwork and professional pride contributed to our
successes. Every soldier played his/her significant role in
helping the 28th support the Army’s largest military
operation conducted in the European Theater since World
War II. From December 1995 to the time of my change of
command in July 1996, the battalion drove nearly 8 million
miles; moved over 172,000 tons of cargo and equipment; and
exceeded the Army’s safety standard for military vehicle
accidents.
This accomplishment over 7 months is phenomenal
when compared to the battalion’s entire performance
during the previous calendar year. The total battalion
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mileage during my first year in command was six million
miles—the same annual mileage incurred during my
predecessor’s total watch.
More than anything else, I believe the thoroughness of
our initial mission analysis prepared us to succeed. From it,
my staff and subordinate leaders received direction and
priorities. By constantly massaging requirements as reality
changed, we were able to stay ahead of the power curve and
properly prepare for MOST contingencies. Weekly updates,
which turned into daily updates as deployment neared,
provided us the mechanism to track sensitive requisition
issues or adjust priorities of work as envisioned by the
maintenance surge team concept.
I am indebted to the professional efforts of a seriously
dedicated staff, led by Donnie Horner, and to some very
aggressive company commanders and first sergeants. I will
always be grateful to the soldiers and families for their hard
work and teamwork. Together, they executed the plan I
gave them. I appreciated the guidance and mentoring of
Colonel Bob Kubiszewski. A great boss—he knew when to
lead, when to teach, and when to stand by and just watch.
Kudos are due to his staff, who always worked in concert
with mine to accomplish the mission. Finally, my love and
appreciation to my wife for her constant support, allowing
me to play soldier when she would much rather I was
delivering the mail in Columbia, South Carolina.
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CHAPTER 7
WORKHORSE IN BOSNIA

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas M. Dockens
BATTALION PROLOGUE
The 127th Aviation Support Battalion (ASB), which we
affectionately call “Workhorse,” signifies the outstanding
combat service support provided to the 4th Aviation Brigade
and 1-1 Cavalry Squadron. This battalion’s 518 soldiers,
with specialties of 56 different military occupational skills
(MOSs), provided quality aviation intermediate
maintenance (AVIM) and direct support ground
maintenance (DS). This support included all classes of
supply and coordination for medical, ammunition, and
secure communication maintenance. From May 1, 1995,
through May 15, 1996, the battalion professionally
supported 140 helicopters, including two AH-64 battalions,
one UH-60 battalion, and one Air Cavalry Squadron.
Additionally, the battalion supported 27 M-1 Tanks, 47
M2/3 Infantry Fighting Vehicles, and 850 wheeled vehicles.
The 127th ASB also provided area community support and
proudly continued to uphold its IRON EAGLE support
tradition.
INTRODUCTION
This personal experience monograph offers my account
of the deployment and operations of the 127th Aviation
Support Battalion (ASB) in support of Task Force Eagle
from May 1, 1994, through May 15, 1995. Task Force Eagle
was the American-led peace enforcement headquarters
deployed to Bosnia. My account will describe unit train-up,
predeployment requirements, and maintenance and
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logistics operations in support of the 4th Aviation Brigade,
1-1 Cavalry Squadron, and eventually of all Operation
JOINT ENDEAVOR aviation forces.
The 1st Armored Division commander, Major General
William Nash, commanded Task Force Eagle. Task Force
Eagle deployed following the 1995 NATO-imposed cease
fire, which halted the carnage in the Former Yugoslavia.
(Figure 8 shows the IFOR Deployment). Following the
Dayton Peace agreement, the 1st Armored Division, as a
part of NATO’s Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction
Corps, was ordered to Bosnia-Herzegovina as part of
Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR. (See Figure 9.) The Task
Force assumed Area of Responsibility (AOR) control in
Tuzla on December 20, 1995. After the historic bridging of
the Sava River on December 31, 1995, the Division entered
Bosnia-Herzegovina. The mission was to enforce the cease
fire, supervise the marking of boundaries, and maintain the
zone of separation (ZOS) between the former warring
factions (FWF). (See Figure 10.)

Figure 8. IFOR Deployment.
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Figure 9. Dayton Agreement Map.

Figure 10. Zones of Operation.
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The 127th ASB is a Combat Service Support (CSS) unit
consisting of three companies—a headquarters company,
ground maintenance company, and aviation intermediate
maintenance company. The unit personnel authorization is
518 soldiers who are responsible for over 100 pieces of
rolling stock—six 5,000 gallon fuel tankers, one tank
recovery track vehicle, 35 5-ton tractors, and over 30 vans
and flatbed trailers.
The ASB’s structure provides maximum flexibility to the
overall Division Support Command (DISCOM) and
Aviation Brigade commanders, based on mission, enemy,
terrain, troops, and time available (METT-T). The battalion
actually works for the DISCOM commander. However, in
real-world deployments such as Bosnia, the ASB is
colocated with the aviation brigade and task-organized as
required. The mission of the ASB is to provide direct
logistical support to the aviation brigade in concert with the
overall Division Support Command’s support plan. This
logistical support achieves the tactical logistics functions of
manning, arming, fueling, fixing, moving the force, and
sustaining soldiers and their systems.
PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING
The battalion started the initial train-up at Grafenwoehr, Germany, on May 1, 1993. This was the 1AD’s
scheduled semiannual gunnery exercise for individual and
crew-served weapons training and qualification. The
battalion conducted weapons and qualification training as
well as logistical support for both the 4th Aviation Brigade
and 1-1 Cav for the entire month of May. The battalion
gunnery exercise continued for 1 week, with emphasis on
weapons maintenance, battle sight zero of weapons, and
qualification on basic weapons. The support operations
lasted 3 weeks and included maintenance, refuel and
arming, supply, and movement of supplies in support of M-1
Abrams tanks, M2 Cavalry Fighting vehicles, and AH-1
Cobra and AH-64 attack helicopters. The unit also
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conducted extensive basic soldier skills training (first aid,
call for fires, NBC, and communication skills) throughout
the 4-week training period. All training, exercises, and
operations involved peacekeeping or peace enforcement
scenarios. In addition to normal training, each soldier
received area specific training, particularly mine lane
training. This training was mandatory for all soldiers in
United States Army Europe (USAREUR) prior to
deployment to the Bosnia AOR. At the end of May, the
battalion deployed to Hohenfels, Germany, for transition to
peacekeeping/peace enforcement exercises at the Combat
Maneuver Training Center (CMTC). This training lasted an
additional 4 weeks.
The exercise at CMTC started with a 1-week train-up,
followed by 3 weeks “in the box.” In the box designates the
evaluation process during CMTC exercises. Observer
Controllers (OCs) provide exercise oversight and an After
Action Review (AAR) at the conclusion of training.
The training for the battalion CMTC rotation tested the
physical, mental, and operational mettle of the battalion.
The unit conducted arm, fix, fuel, and sustain logistical
support operations for both the 1-1 Cav and 2-227th Attack
Helicopter Battalion (AHB). The 1-1 Cav ground and air
troops conducted operations in the CMTC training area,
and the 2-227th AHB conducted operations in an assembly
area located 35 miles from CMTC. This separation
presented a significant problem, with the available support
assets dispersed among four different task-organized teams
conducting 24-hour operations. Little did the battalion
anticipate that this would be the mode of operation for the
deployment to Bosnia. This exercise prepared the unit for
flexible and forward-support activities that would prove
valuable in the months ahead. The next challenge for the
battalion came by means of scenarios with media and
civilians on the battlefield. Through these scenarios, most of
our soldiers encountered new situations that provided a
valuable learning experience. Also, the battalion’s
perimeter defense and internal base security were tested
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along with a myriad of situations to test the commanders
and battalion staff. The CMTC (OCs) continued day and
night. In situation after situation, trainers checked and
re-checked battalion Standard Operating Procedures
(SOPs) and overall training readiness.
After 3 weeks in the box, the battalion was ready to move
back into CMTC proper for clean-up and a day of rest.
However, on the last night of training, the 2-227th AHB was
conducting a simulated AH-64 deep attack mission. The
mission involved two companies of 16 AH-64s. At
approximately 0230 hours, the battalion S3 came to my tent
for an unexpected and abrupt wake-up call. At 0200 hours,
one AH-64 from the 2-227th had flown into wires 30 miles
south of our location. The aircraft had struck the wires with
the tail rotor blades. This sudden stoppage of the blades
caused the shaft of the tail rotor to break. The pilots then
lost control of the aircraft and crashed into the side of a large
German distribution building. There was significant
damage after the aircraft slammed into the side of the
building and crashed on a trailer parked at the loading dock
not five feet from the building. The trailer actually softened
the blow, and the pilots escaped without injury. Ironically,
the trailer was filled with toilet paper. A team departed the
battalion area the next morning for recovery of the crashed
AH-64, while the rest of the battalion deployed to CMTC
proper. The completely destroyed AH-64 spilled
approximately 200 gallons of jet fuel, creating an
environmental crisis. Firemen, the mayor, the police, and, of
course, the media were there to give advice and guidance.
This aircraft recovery turned into a major mission—a highly
visible one. The German authorities as well as the
USAREUR chain of command had a vested interest in the
clean-up and recovery operation. The recovery took 6 days.
All three of the battalion’s companies performed well in this
unexpected and demanding mission. So our vigorous
predeployment training concluded with a very realistic
mission that tested the unit’s mettle; but not without
significant problems.
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THE PRESIDENT’S VISIT AND THE REALITY
OF DEPLOYMENT
President Bill Clinton visited 1AD in Baumholder in
early December to tell us face-to-face about his decision for
deployment. The 127th ASB luckily formed 15 feet from the
stage as the President revealed the impending deployment,
which we all had anticipated. The deployment to Bosnia
would commence as soon as possible. Our President and
Congress had once again summoned the U.S. military to
serve our nation in a foreign land. The President’s visit set
the stage for deployment of the 127th ASB to BosniaHerzegovina.
Certainly the possibility of a lengthy deployment in the
middle of winter worried the 1AD leadership—myself
included. The 1AD forces were already exhausted from
training and predeployment activities. We were now
concerned for the safety and welfare of our most precious
asset, our soldiers. But I recalled a passage from
Clausewitz’s On War about the essence of a soldier’s spirit
and a professional Army:
There are only two sources of this [military] spirit . . . . The first
is a series of victorious wars; the second, frequent exertions of
the Army to the utmost limits of its strength. Nothing else will
show a soldier the full extent of his capacities. The more a
general is accustomed to place a heavy burden on his soldiers,
the more he can depend on their response. A soldier is just as
proud of the hardship he has overcome as of the dangers he has
faced. In short, the seed will grow only in the soil of constant
activity and exertion.

DEPLOYMENT
At 2230 hours, Sunday, December 17, 1995, the
DISCOM commander called. He wanted to know if the
battalion could load a train for deployment to the
Intermediate Staging Base (ISB) in Hungary the next day.
The answer was yes and no. The battalion had equipment
staged, inspected, and ready for rail operations. However,
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the battalion movement was not scheduled for 3 weeks. This
meant an acceleration of single soldiers’ turn-in of personal
property and cars, interruption of Christmas plans, and a
complete change in the overall battalion deployment plan.
Another minor point: We still did not have a plan from our
higher headquarters. Yes, the battalion was in the process
of loading trains; but we did not have a deployment plan.
The first train arrived configured for MilVans (a 40-foot
metal container). However, the battalion’s MilVans were
still en route to our location. The battalion staff quickly
assembled the first priority rolling stock for rail
deployment, six 5,000 gallon fuel tankers. The tankers were
a priority item because of the requirement to establish a
Forward Area Rearm and Refuel Point (FARP) before the
arrival of aircraft in the ISB. The first train departed the
next day with fuel tankers and 40 soldiers on board to
provide en route security. This was the beginning of the
battalion deployment by rail from three different railhead
locations.
The rail operations continued as the battalion readied
the aviation brigade for aircraft self-deployment. This
self-deployment to the ISB in Hungary would include over
100 helicopters. The battalion coordinated refuel support in
Germany, Austria, and Hungary along the route of flight.
Also, CH-47 aircraft transported maintenance soldiers for
support and possible recovery aircraft operations.
The advance party deployed to the ISB by C-17 aircraft
on December 20. Their mission was to coordinate aircraft
parking and maintenance facilities at a small Hungarian
commercial airfield (affectionately called Workhorse
International Airfield, or WIAA). An additional mission was
to locate an environmentally appropriate location for the
FARP. This crucial task was time-sensitive because of the
requirement to deploy eight AH-64s through the ISB to
Tuzla’s main airfield. The division commander wanted
attack aircraft on the ground in Tuzla, so the refuel issue
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established our sequence plan for logistics operations in the
ISB.
I deployed on Christmas Eve by C-17 and landed as two
battalion trains arrived in the ISB. There were 100 soldiers
from the battalion on the ground conducting rail off-load
and aircraft support operations on V Corps aircraft from the
12th Aviation Brigade. We got the picture quickly: the
battalion would support all aircraft involved in the mission
both north and south of the Sava River. This was absolutely
an unplanned requirement, but the soldiers quickly
improvised and provided quality assistance to all. This total
support requirement hit home Christmas eve. I received a
call from USAREUR Forward Headquarters—the
command and control headquarters located at an old MiG
airbase in Tazar, Hungary, approximately ten miles from
WIAA. The message: report to headquarters to receive a
mission for recovering an aircraft that had gone down in
Bosnia.
The UH-60 aircraft of the Intervention Force (IFOR)
Commander, Admiral Lopez, had encountered
maintenance problems in Bosnia, but his pilots safely
landed the aircraft. It was located in Bosnia near the area of
Banja Luka. Because of severe mechanical problems, the
aircraft could not continue flight and would require an
aircraft aerial recovery mission in Bosnia. This recovery
was completed before the 1-1 Cav crossed the Sava River.
Thus the 127th ASB conducted the first tactical operation in
support of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR. The aerial
recovery mission team included an infantry squad deployed
from Tuzla for security, two AH-64s, two UH-60s, one
CH-47, and a downed aircraft recovery team from the
battalion. The team deployed on December 27, with the
mission to rig the aircraft for a CH-47 sling load and fly the
downed aircraft back to the ISB for repair. The team
departed at 1000 hours and returned 6 hours later, mission
complete—a successful operation.
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INITIAL SUPPORT OPERATIONS, ISB
After arriving at the ISB, the unit provided maintenance
support for all aviation units involved in the mission, to
include the command and control aircraft supporting the V
Corps commander and the Commander in Chief of
USAREUR. This was not a planned activity. Eventually,
over 130 aircraft were supported under the logistical
umbrella of the battalion in very extreme weather and
austere working and living conditions. Furthermore, the
command and control structure that the battalion would
operate under was ambiguous, to say the least.
As stated earlier, the battalion was assigned to the 1AD
DISCOM and worked for the DISCOM commander. During
deployments, the battalion worked for the 1AD 4th Aviation
Brigade commander but was under the direct control of the
DISCOM and Assistant Division Commander, Support
(ADC-S). However, while in the ISB, the battalion had
another command layer, USAREUR Forward Headquarters (a three-star headquarters) and 21st TAACOM (a
two-star headquarters). This meant that on a given day, the
battalion received missions from four different headquarters, usually involving competing resources. This
placed the battalion in a tenuous situation. The fact that the
battalion was deployed in Bosnia, Croatia, and Hungary
placed the soldiers directly under units with different
guidance, rules, and policies. However, we had one rule that
we lived by: do not violate the 1AD Division commander’s
guidance, rules, or policies. This proved to be a very wise
decision, which kept the battalion and myself out of trouble!
Upon arrival in the ISB, we found only one small hanger
available for maintenance. There were no plans for any
other facilities, and absolutely no consideration for soldiers
working in extreme weather conditions. We were suppose to
improvise until called forward for movement to Tuzla. The
basis of this rationale was that Army equipment did not
break so why have facilities for maintenance. This mind-set
quickly changed when the “commander’s” aircraft could not
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launch for early morning flights because of ice and snow.
When helicopter rotor blades are exposed to snow and ice,
they tend to freeze up. This requires an extended period for
de-icing and snow removal, which is very manpower and
resource intensive, a process the chain did not understand,
causing frustrations and agony for the aviation battalion
and brigade commanders.
The battalion closed at the ISB on December 28, with 438
soldiers and 98 percent of organic equipment without an
accident or incident. The snow was approximately eight
inches deep, with the average temperature hovering at 25
degrees Fahrenheit. The battalion had the one small hanger
for aircraft maintenance and one maintenance building for
ground vehicles. These facilities were to support over 100
aircraft and 500 vehicles for the first 3 weeks of the
operation, a task too great with the limited available space.
We could perform some operations outside, but these were
very limited. Frankly, it was too windy and cold for the
conduct of any extended outdoor maintenance operations.
Moreover, the majority of the tools were loaded for transport
down range. Where were the maintenance tents? The
answer: same as the tools, loaded in Milvans ready for
shipment to the Bosnia AOR.
The aviation brigade began conducting daily training
and support missions in the local flying area, as well as
operational missions to Bosnia. Continuity was the key for
sustained CSS to the brigade. The battalion adopted flexible
maintenance policies to support continuously changing
missions and force-projection AH-64 operations in Tuzla.
The aviation brigade commander and I formulated a logistic
support plan to accommodate the fluid operational
environment. This plan had to be flexible, sustainable for an
extended period, timely, and forward-looking to achieve
success.
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SUPPORT PLAN
The aviation brigade would be located Tuzla West
Airfield in Bosnia. Because of the horrid weather and
limited space at Tuzla West Airfield, we decided to establish
a maintenance hub in the ISB. In other words, the battalion
would build a base camp in Hungary. This concept
supported immediate aircraft and ground maintenance,
and provided our troops with a workplace somewhat
sheltered from the frigid outdoors.
The availability of immediate maintenance is
particularly important for aircraft because 75 percent of the
scheduled phase maintenance depends on the number of
hours flown. Phase maintenance requires an extensive
inspection of the aircraft. This inspection usually takes 2
weeks of down time. The AH-64 phase inspection comes
with every 200 aircraft hours, and the average flight time
for each aircraft per day was 4-6 hours. At this rate, without
sustained maintenance operations, the entire fleet would
require phase maintenance inspection simultaneously.
Also, the aircraft and vehicles had to stay ready for
immediate deployment into Bosnia.
CLAM SHELL CONSTRUCTION
Clam shells are temporary aircraft maintenance
facilities controlled by the Aviation Support Command
(AVSCOM) in St. Louis. The battalion was allocated seven
clam shells for Task Force Eagle support, three in the ISB
and four earmarked for Tuzla. The distribution and priority
for clam shells were a battalion responsibility in concert
with the DISCOM and Assistant Division CommanderSupport (ADC-S). Erection of these shells required a team
from AVSCOM with augmentation from the ASB or
supported unit. The clam shell is 100’ x 50’ and 40 feet high,
with an electric door on each end. They come with lights,
heaters, and generators—basically self-contained. The
clam shells proved to be worth their weight in gold because
they warded off the snow, ice, and extreme temperatures. Of
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course, this was the coldest winter in 10 years for this area,
and every commander in 1AD wanted his own clam shell.
Yes, you guessed it, a controversy developed on priority and
need for clam shell support.
The clam shell issue abruptly became a daily briefing
item for the USAREUR Forward and 21st TAACOM
commanders. All clam shells had been designated for 1AD
units in support of Bosnia operations, but this plan was
abruptly changed. USAREUR Forward was now the
decisionmaker for distribution of all clam shells in support
of OJE.
CLASS IX OPERATIONS, ISB
The battalion was the first unit from 1AD to close on the
ISB. The other three division forward support battalions
(FSB) and main support battalion (MSB) were still in
central region loading trains. Because the MSB was not
available, the ASB was assigned the mission as the main
Class IX (repair parts) supply point for Task Force Eagle.
This meant that every class IX supply part and requisition
would come through the ASB for the next 30-45 days. The
class IX section processed over 300 parts requisitions a day
until the MSB established operations in late January. At
one time, the battalion had over 300 Air Force 463L pallets
fully loaded for distribution down range into Bosnia, to
include a pallet loaded with tank mine rollers. The 21st
TAACOM commander had been looking for these mine
rollers for 3 days and was told that they were still in
Germany. He called me on a different subject to discuss
five-ton truck support in support of Sava River operations
when the mine roller issue came up. After I told him where
the equipment was, he wanted the mine rollers, and he
wanted the ASB to deliver them to the Sava River. The
reason he wanted the battalion to transport this equipment
was that it was the only unit closed on the ISB with the right
equipment and personnel. To put this in perspective, the
battalion was receiving missions from the 21st TAACOM
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commander while assigned to the 1AD DISCOM while
working for the 4th aviation brigade commander. As
discussed earlier, this command relationship continued
until I changed command May 15, 1996.
FORWARD AREA REFUEL REARM (FARP)
OPERATIONS
The designs for the refuel and rearm site factored in
safety margins for blast zone consideration. The blast area
of 30 millimeter ammo and Hellfire missiles required
establishment of a protective surrounding area free of
troops and aircraft. MilVans filled with MREs partitioned
the area from an accidental discharge of a weapon system;
in other words, we improvised based on METT-T. Because of
this safety requirement, the safety officer located the rearm
pads at the northern edge of the airfield away from
maintenance and living facilities.
FORWARD SUPPORT PLAN FOR BOSNIA AOR
The battalion developed the concept of support as far
forward as possible with four task-organized teams. The
first two teams deployed in association the with 1-1 and 1/4
Cav ground and air troops. The aviation brigade deployed to
Tuzla West Airfield with two ASB task-organized teams of
130 battalion soldiers and support equipment. This team
included the class IX warehouse, a section from the III/V
platoon (fuel and ammo), a heavy ground/air maintenance
section, and a robust command and control element.
INITIAL OPERATIONS, TUZLA AOR
Tuzla West Airfield is an old MiG auxiliary airfield
connected to Tuzla Main airfield by a 3-kilometer access
road. The only facilities on Tuzla West were four open
concrete bunkers that we used for supply and maintenance.
The clam shells had not arrived when we started using the
airfield, so the severe weather restricted aircraft
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maintenance. The weather also restricted flight operations
because of low ceilings, poor visibility, and ice and snow on
the aircraft blades. These adverse conditions posed a
tremendous problem for early morning flight operations.
The de-icing process commenced 4 hours before scheduled
flights.
The battalion received another unplanned mission in the
Tuzla AOR. This mission called for the battalion to
construct a JP-8 fuel bulk storage system in support of the
Tuzla area. A bulk storage system is built by means of a
series of 10,000 gallon collapsible fuel bags laid on the
ground in four-sided revetments. The engineers constructed
the system. In this instance, the bulk system fuel amounted
to 40,000 gallons. Besides this bulk storage, the battalion
operated the retail fuel facility (gas pumps, if you will) on
Tuzla Main Airfield in support of Task Force Eagle
headquarters. The total fuel dispersed from these two
systems averaged 35,000 gallons a day. We operated for 6
months without an accident or environmental incident.
Again because the MSB had not arrived in Tuzla, the
ASB established class IX warehouse and supply operations.
This mission called for transaction of requisitions, supply
distribution, and storage of all Task Force Eagle parts and
equipment for a 45-day period.
SUSTAINMENT OPERATIONS, ISB
The battalion continued to prepare for internal and
external operations. The internal preparation involved
construction of the airfield base camp and tactical loading of
equipment for convoy into Bosnia. External preparation
and support involved continued CSS to supported units.
The ground and aircraft maintenance hub enabled us to
overcome the weather and sustain the intense OPTEMPO
of the aviation units. Without this hub, the aviation
brigade’s phase maintenance schedule would have come to a
grinding halt.
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The ground/air refuel and supply functions—to include
aviation intensively managed items (AIMI)—were fully
operational by December 28. The supply distribution point
had developed into a half-acre storage area, which
facilitated distribution of supplies to units in Bosnia. The
distribution of supplies included medium-lift CH-47
aircraft, intra-theater Air Force C-130 assets, and internal
five-ton tractor-trailers. Within a 2-week period, the
battalion airlifted and convoyed 300 pallets containing over
10,000 parts and equipment to the Tuzla AOR. The CH-47
unit assigned to the battalion flew over 35 sorties in support
of this critical resupply mission, which included mine rollers
for M-1 tanks and M-2 Bradley engines.
The phase inspection schedule continued with two
AH-64s and one UH-60 inducted in the program. Our
primary objective was to complete as many phase
inspections as possible in order to build the flying hour
reserve (bank time). Given the average number of daily
flight hours, the battalion staff estimated the requirement
for 30 phase inspections to keep pace with the first 6 months
of operations. This amount was three times the number of
man-hours needed during normal operations in Central
Region, Germany.
CONSTRUCTION OF WORKHORSE
INTERNATIONAL AIRFIELD
Another unplanned requirement was construction of a
working airfield at the ISB. This airfield was not a part of
the operational plan, so the battalion started from zero. The
airfield layout included a tent city, crash rescue facility, and
air traffic control tower, and and it entailed establishment
of a perimeter defense plan. This tent city would include
tents, latrine/shower facilities, an aid station, and a dining
facility. This base camp supported over 600 soldiers and
civilians from eight different units. Battalion soldiers’ living
facilities (the actual tents) were our first priority. The
battalion Command Sergeant Major (CSM) arranged for the
Air Force unit (code name Prime Beef) to construct the tent
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city. Each 20-soldier tent had a wooden floor, half-wood
sides, with lights and electricity.
Next we had to construct shower/latrines and a dining
facility large enough to accommodate this small city. This
effort included coordination meetings for funding and
approval with 21st Theater Command and Brown & Root,
the military LOGCAP representative. Brown & Root
provided construction support for all units deployed in
support of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR. The
construction process for shower/latrines and dining facility
involved 3 weeks of detailed planning. The next big
construction project provided a 4-acre motor park and a
huge tent for tactical vehicle maintenance. Guard towers
were also built on the four corners of the airfield perimeter
for additional security.
SUSTAINMENT OPERATIONS, TUZLA
The forward support sections continued to provide CSS
to all aviation units operating in the AOR. Unscheduled
maintenance and day/night launch and recovery operations
proceeded on a normal schedule. The brigade averaged
approximately 25 aircraft flights per day.
A team of civilian contractors from commercial
companies deployed to provide specialized aviation
maintenance support. The majority of this augmentation
serviced the AH-64 night system and OH-58D aircraft
survivability equipment. The contractor’s service proved a
valuable asset in minimizing aircraft downtime due to
problems with these highly technical systems.
Clam shell construction continued into late February.
Tuzla Main Airfield received two clam shells, and Tuzla
West received one for aviation maintenance activities. Clam
shell construction consumed a tremendous amount of the
battalion’s time and resources. However, the effort paid
huge dividends for sustained maintenance operations.
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Force protection became a necessary burden for all
support missions; security details took soldiers away from
assigned duties. Perimeter/gate guards and other security
details consumed 12-15 soldiers per 12-hour period.
Further, the Task Force Eagle commander’s four-vehicle
convoy rule limited the unit’s ability to provide timely
resupply and maintenance. This four-vehicles rule entailed
convoy movements at platoon level and required eight
soldiers for each convoy mission. Also, at least one convoy
vehicle required a crew-served weapon.
SUMMARY
The battalion was able to accomplish this very tough and
demanding mission because of the highly trained and
motivated soldiers assigned. One in particular was the
battalion CSM. We were blessed with this outstanding
soldier who loved his job and the soldiers that he led. Tough,
determined, stubborn, and professional, CSM Bedford was
an inspiration to the soldiers of the 1AD and to me.
The doctrinal guidance provided in FM 100-5 and FM
1-500 provided the framework for the battalion Combat
Service Support plan. However, our soldiers’ ability to
anticipate and provide responsive support enabled the
aviation units to project their might. The most important
characteristic of this deployment was the battalion’s ability
to respond flexibly to any mission. The individual soldier’s
performance and the team effort of the “Workhorse”
battalion ranged from outstanding to superb. The unity of
effort and integration of tactics, techniques, and procedures
created an atmosphere of skilled professionals delivering
sustained and reliable logistical support. This support
guaranteed the success of all Task Force Eagle’s aviation
assets. Despite harsh weather and unanticipated missions,
the battalion supported the process of bringing peace to a
war-torn area of the world. I feel extremely honored to have
been a part of this mission. A bonus was to have served with
and commanded the 127th Aviation Support Battalion.
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CHAPTER 8
PREPARATION AND DEPLOYMENT
OF THE INITIAL MEDICAL FORCE
IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION
JOINT ENDEAVOR

Colonel William T. Bester
Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR began in December 1995
in an attempt to enforce a peaceful resolution to the ongoing
ethnic conflict in the Balkans. Over 20,000 American
soldiers deployed into the Bosnian Theater in support of this
effort. A critical part of this deployment was the medical
support for soldiers deploying into or through the
Intermediate Staging Base (ISB) in Taszar, Hungary; along
the Main Supply Routes (MSR) in Croatia; and in key
locations in the American sector in Bosnia. This monograph
will look at one portion of that medical support, that
provided by the 67th Combat Support Hospital (CSH),
home-based in Wuerzburg, Germany.
The 67th CSH is a 236-bed, Deployable Medical Systems
(DEPMEDS) hospital. In 1995, it was the only hospital in
the U.S. Army that served a dual role as both a full-up
TO&E hospital and a full-time TDA facility supporting the
Wuerzburg, Germany, catchment area. This meant that all
the professional and personnel resources designated to
deploy with the 67th CSH also served day to day in the
Wuerzburg Medical Activity (MEDDAC) hospital caring for
those soldiers and their family members needing peacetime
health care.
Upon my arrival at the unit in June of 1994, I quickly
realized that the 67th CSH had, for some time, been
preparing for a possible deployment into the Balkans to
support some form of peace enforcement by the U.S.
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military. As early as 1993, some single-parent military
members were being encouraged to leave their children in
the continental United States and go to Germany alone
because of the high probability of a deployment shortly after
their arrival. Although there was frequent talk of a possible
deployment, the cry “Wolf!” had been sounded so often, and
for so long, that upon my arrival any mention of a
deployment was taken lightly and without concern or belief
that it would actually occur.
Approximately 15 months later, however, the
atmosphere changed. By autumn 1995, there were more
high-level command meetings and briefings regarding the
possible support of a Balkan peace enforcement operation
than I had seen since my arrival in Europe. In September
1995, we were tasked to support a multi-national exercise in
Grafenwoehr, Germany. During October frequent inquiries
into unit status and readiness came down to us from higher
command.
As peace talks progressed, the reality of a possible
deployment began to strike home. In November the talk was
not “whether” we would deploy, but rather “when.”
However, many remained skeptical. Then, in early
November we were ordered to deploy the CSH to
Grafenwoehr for a validation exercise. All units designated
as units to deploy in support of any peace enforcement
measures in the Balkans were required to “validate” that
they were trained, prepared, and equipped to immediately
respond to such a deployment.
The validation exercise was of grave concern to those of
us in the CSH—purely from an equipment readiness
perspective. The weather was extremely rainy during this
period, and had been so for some time. Our major concern
was the time needed to recover and clean the hospital tents,
facilities, and equipment upon return from the validation
exercise. We felt that our recent primary medical support of
a major multi-national exercise “validated” that we were
prepared to deploy immediately and support any plan or
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scenario tasked down to us. We requested an exemption
from the validation exercise, but were told that all units
deploying would validate, regardless of any recent training
or exercise experiences. We therefore moved the unit to
Grafenwoehr for the validation exercise, still concerned that
a deployment notice soon after our return could prevent us
from recovering fully.
The validation exercise turned out worse than we even
expected. We were given a site for the establishment of the
hospital in a field that immediately turned to aboveankle-deep mud early in the construction phase. By the time
the hospital was fully established, there was mud and
standing water throughout the entire facility. All of our
equipment, medical and nonmedical, along with the interior
of the hospital was covered with mud. The rains continued
throughout the exercise, and by the time we disassembled
the hospital and packed up to return home, it was virtually
impossible to clean our equipment properly due to the site
we were established on and the lack of available cleaning
resources.
Immediately upon return to garrison, we identified
teams to clean, re-inventory, and restock the hospital.
These teams worked two 12-hour shifts to allow us to
recover the hospital and return as quickly as possible to our
pre-exercise state of readiness. In less than 1 week, the
hospital, with its entire complement of equipment and
vehicles, was positioned back in the motor pool and ready for
immediate deployment if called upon to do so.
Once we returned from the validation exercise and had
the equipment cleaned and positioned, a marked increase in
anxiety began to develop regarding our inevitable
deployment and the period when it would take place. Would
we leave before Thanksgiving? Would we leave before
Christmas? Who would go? How long would we be gone?
These were just a few of the questions frequently being
asked throughout the organization. We were receiving very
little information regarding these questions from our higher
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command, because the National Command Authorities
(NCA) were not making any final decisions until the results
of the Dayton Peace Accords could be evaluated and subsequently acted upon.
However, there soon developed a feeling throughout the
command that information was being withheld, and this led
to a growing level of frustration. We, the command group,
soon realized that we needed to schedule frequent
information updates to provide all information that we
knew to be true at that point, squelch the many rumors that
were circulating throughout the command, and answer the
multitude of questions that our soldiers and their family
members had. We determined to present daily briefings at
1600 in the hospital chapel. We decided on a policy to pass
along all information we received that day with the rare
exception of any classified or sensitive material, and opened
up the briefings to all soldiers and their family members.
This decision to hold daily briefings was probably one of
the most effective measures we initiated prior to
deployment. In a matter of a couple of days, we were able to
pass along enough relevant information to put virtually an
end to the numerous rumors running rampant throughout
the organization. And, because our soldiers and their
families were being supplied with the most current
information the command possessed, their ability to
prepare for the inevitable deployment was enhanced.
However, as the days of November, and then early
December, passed by, no date for deployment was
announced. At the end of the first week of December, the
Commander called me into the office and said that if we
deployed in increments, he wanted me to go as the Advance
Party Commander and that he would follow in the final
wave. However, we still had no information regarding a
deployment date, or how we would flow our troops into the
theater.
Then, on the evening of December 10, I received a call at
home from our Deputy Commander for Administration
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stating that he just received word that a train was
positioned at Kitzingen, Germany (some 10 miles from our
motor pool), for us to begin loading up the hospital for
possible deployment sometime during the upcoming week.
The next morning, I arrived at work and immediately got
involved with the ongoing rail load plans that we had
initiated the evening before. The plan called for 24-hour
around the clock loading until all the equipment and
vehicles were loaded. Meanwhile, rumors began to surface
regarding when the unit would deploy. The rumors included
leaving immediately or by the end of the week (December
17). Still, no word regarding a firm departure date arrived
from higher headquarters.
At the 1600 briefing to the soldiers and their family
members on December 11, we stated that no deployment
date or time had been forwarded to us at this point, but that
we expected to be notified very soon. We announced that if
one’s name was on the 32-bed Hospital Unit Base (HUB),
he/she should be prepared to leave as early as tomorrow.
After answering a few questions, we returned to our offices
to see if the Medical Brigade had any information regarding
our departure date.
At approximately 1800, we received notification from
brigade regarding our departure. We were told we would
deploy 100 personnel, with equipment and vehicles, in two
50-member increments. The first group would leave at 1200
on December 12; the second group would leave at 1800. The
remainder of the unit (some 200 individuals) would follow at
some later date. This date would be established once the
Advanced Party got into Theater and established an initial
medical treatment facility. We immediately got on the
telephone to contact all those individuals scheduled to
depart on December 12. By 2100, all of the personnel had
been notified.
I arrived at work early the next morning and met with
the Commander. After reviewing our deployment plan one
final time, he told me he wanted to form the first wave of
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soldiers up at 1130 for a formal send-off. After some words of
praise and encouragement from both the Commander and
myself, the soldiers bid farewell to family and friends and
loaded up on buses for the 30-minute ride to Kitzingen. We
arrived at the railhead at 1245 and immediately
downloaded rucks and A-bags and then in-processed with
the Personnel Services Branch. The soldiers were given
soup and juice while waiting for the arrival of the passenger
train. The train was scheduled to depart at 1430. However,
delays resulted in us leaving at 1600. Prior to departure, we
had loaded an immense amount of Meals Ready to Eat
(MREs) and water. We were not sure exactly how long the
trip was going to take, but were told it would be a 2-3 day
trip and that we would not be allowed to leave the train. It
was for this reason that I decided to take as much food and
water as we could safely store on the train.
Our destination was Taszar, Hungary, which had been
designated as the Intermediate Staging Base (ISB) for
Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR (OJE). Taszar was a town
none of us had heard of prior to the deployment, and
Hungary was a country only a couple of our personnel had
visited. Yet, over the next few months, over 20,000
American service men and women would either be assigned
in the Taszar area or deploy through it on their way into
Croatia and Bosnia.
After approximately 3 hours, our train passed through
Schweinfurt, Germany (a 40-minute automobile drive from
Kitzingen). The problem, we were to find out later, was that
our train had the lowest priority on the German rail system
and therefore was placed on secondary rail routes to avoid
negatively impacting on regularly scheduled German
passenger and freight rail traffic.
At 0100 on Wednesday, December 13, we were
awakened by Czech Republic government officials and
required to show our documents authorizing our travel
through the Czech Republic. We were awakened two more
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times throughout the night to present the same documentation to other authorities in other towns.
We traveled through the Czech Republic for most of
December 13. At approximately 1700, we reached the
Slovakian border where we exchanged escort officers. At
each border, a military officer from that country would
board the train and act as an escort until we got to the next
border crossing. Unfortunately, these escort officers could
not speak English, leaving us without the capability of
communications with rail personnel regarding our current
location and our estimated time of arrival into Taszar.
We reached the Hungarian border at about 2130 on
December 13. For reasons still unknown to us, we sat at the
border for more than 3 hours before the train continued on
its way at approximately 0100 on December 14.
I woke up at about 0600, and the train was stopped once
again. We had apparently been stopped for some time
considering the amount of snow that had accumulated on
our rail cars and on the track in front of us. We had
absolutely no idea where in Hungary we were, or how close
we might be to our final destination. I moved throughout the
passenger car that I was assigned in order to determine how
everyone was doing and whether we had any problems that
needed to be addressed. We soon discovered that the
running water on the train had stopped, thus preventing us
from washing our hands or flushing the toilets. At the same
time, I discovered that heat had gone out in the second
passenger car, and the temperature was dropping to a
critical point. I immediately contacted the engineer. Neither
he nor any of his crew spoke one word of English, and none of
our personnel spoke Hungarian. After “sign-languaging”
our way through the issue, the engineer was finally able to
communicate to me that we were only a few minutes from
Taszar. We got the train rolling again shortly thereafter and
pulled into the loading dock in Taszar at about 0930.
We arrived to an environment of utter chaos. I had
various individuals directing me to do five different
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actions—all at the same time. Once I established the fact
that our soldiers could only do one thing at a time and that
we needed to move through the unloading process in an
orderly and organized fashion, we were able to bring some
structure to our actions. We expeditiously unloaded all the
rucksacks, A-bags, MREs, and water. This process took
about 45 minutes. We then assigned a detail to clean the two
passenger cars while the rest of the unit loaded the personal
gear, MREs, and water on two buses that had been assigned
to us for transporting the soldiers and our personal
equipment. We also had an additional detail assisting in
downloading our vehicles and hospital equipment.
The one event that I was totally unprepared for was the
number of news media personnel that descended upon us
like a swarm of bees shortly after our arrival. I quickly
asked the ISB public affairs officer to give us a couple of
minutes before we met with them. I used this time to remind
our soldiers to answer their questions honestly, but to not
speculate on any issue that we were not prepared to
address. We were here to provide medical support to all
soldiers deploying into and through the ISB, and our
responses should be directed toward what our mission was
and not to try to answer questions that were not in our realm
of responsibility or authority. The interviews went well. Our
soldiers were proud to address questions related to our
mission in the ISB, but were extremely careful not to try to
speculate on questions pertaining to non-medical issues.
Taszar was a Russian MiG Base prior to the end of the
Cold War. After the Cold War ended, the base was shut
down with the exception of a few buildings on the airfield
that were utilized by the Hungarian forces. The MiGs were
flown only rarely, and the remainder of the military base
slipped into a state of disrepair. Upon our arrival, we were
directed toward old barracks buildings some two miles from
the airfield and railhead area. The buildings had not been
used in over 5 years, and, as we were approaching them, we
all pictured the worst. We soon arrived at the barracks
building that had been designated as “temporary” billeting
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for our initial 100-person contingent. We were all pleasantly
surprised. Although the building was physically in poor
shape, it had heat, hot and cold running water, six male
shower stalls, and three female shower stalls. We were
fortunate to have not only these luxuries, but also to be
afforded the opportunity to billet in a permanent structure
with concrete floors. There was no complaining heard from
any of our soldiers.
We spent the next hour unpacking the buses and moving
all the packs, weapons, MREs, and water into the barracks.
We immediately established an arms room in a caged-in
area that appeared to have been an arms room during the
Russian occupation. After everything was removed from the
buses, I told everyone to break for lunch. A mess facility was
located across the street from our barracks. Although there
was no food being provided at this point, it was a great place
for our soldiers to be able to sit down at tables and have hot
coffee or juice with their MREs.
After lunch, we formed back up at the barracks. The
First Sergeant had located a large number of metal bed
frames to the rear of the building, and one of the other senior
NCOs had discovered a number of old mattresses in a
storage area in the building. We immediately identified
teams to clean rooms, carry metal bed frames, carry
mattresses, and assemble the bed frames in the rooms. The
First Sergeant, the Chief Wardmaster, and I then went
around the barracks, identifying how many soldiers would
be billeted in each room. The space available was extremely
limited, thereby requiring us to double-bunk in every room.
In addition, we needed to include, and establish beds for, the
nearly 60 additional members of our unit due to arrive
sometime during the day.
By 1630, the entire barracks was cleaned and the beds
assembled. We formed up the soldiers, congratulated them
on their efforts thus far, and announced (per guidance from
the Medical Brigade staff) that all protective masks would
be checked in at the weapons room and that, for the time
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being, load-bearing equipment (LBE) would not be
required. Upon completion of their protective mask turn-in,
we released the soldiers to dinner.
I immediately went to USAREUR Forward Headquarters to meet with Lieutenant Colonel Moloff, V Corps
Surgeon, to discuss what our initial operational mission
was. After some discussion, he stated that, at the current
time, we would only have a sick call mission. I then
proceeded to dinner. We were provided with a hot meal for
dinner that evening, the first since we left home. This
proved to be a great morale booster. At dinner, I discussed
our sick call mission with our senior physicians, nurses, and
NCOs, and they then left to begin locating and preparing a
site suitable to provide sick call capability.
Shortly after their departure, the Medical Brigade
Sergeant Major came charging into the dining facility and
stated that they had just had a meeting with Brigadier
General Bell, the Corps Chief of Staff, who stated that he
wanted the “hospital up and functioning," with operating
room (OR) capability, by close of business tomorrow. I then
asked for clarification on “up and functioning” and was told
that we should have a functioning emergency medical
treatment (EMT) facility along with “some” in-patient
capability. Because of this sudden change in requirements, I
immediately called a staff meeting with my key clinical and
operational officers and NCOs to formulate a plan of action
to meet these newly established requirements directed by
Brigadier General Bell.
The Medical Brigade had arranged a site directly across
from the airfield on a concrete aircraft pad. The U.S. Air
Force had been given all these aircraft pads prior to our
arrival, but agreed to allow us to use one-half of one pad for a
“temporary” site for our initial facility until the ground
could be prepared at a different site some one mile away.
After our staff meeting, a handful of us proceeded to the
identified aircraft pad to lay out and measure a course of
action for the following day. It was now about 2000, and the
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site given to us was under about two feet of snow. After
doing some minor snow removal by shovel to determine
where the edges of the concrete pad ended, we marked off
where we would erect our EMT, operating room, and central
materiel supply (sterilization equipment). The next issue
would be snow removal from the aircraft pad.
The fact that we were the first unit of any size to arrive
at the ISB resulted in the nonavailability of a number of
resources. One resource we could not get was snow removal
equipment. It was now 2200, and we tried to determine
what our options were. If we shoveled the site out the next
day, we would lose valuable daylight hours that could then
result in constructing part of the hospital in the dark. This is
not necessarily a critical issue, but the risk for injury would
increase if we were constructing the external facility in the
dark. It was at this point that I noticed a snow plow out
clearing the runway some 1,000 meters from us. I instructed
one of our soldiers to drive out to the runway and tell the
snow plow operator that we were in urgent need of snow
removal from the site we were to establish the hospital on.
In a matter of a few minutes, the plow was following the
CSH vehicle off the runway and over to our site. He began
plowing the area for us and approximately 2 1/2 hours later
had the aircraft pad and the surrounding area completely
cleared.
We returned to the barracks and got to sleep at about
0200. At 0345, I was awakened to be told that the second
trainload of individuals had just arrived. The primary staff
got up to greet the two busloads and assist them in
unloading their equipment, securing weapons and
protective masks, and placing them in specific rooms. I
instructed them to get to sleep, and that they would be
awakened at approximately 1200 to have lunch and then
proceed to the site to assist in establishing the hospital.
We then got the first trainload of individuals up and off
to breakfast. We held a post-breakfast formation at 0730
and then moved everyone to the site. We broke the unit into
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teams and had one team erect the EMT while the other team
put up the OR and CMS. We decided to run the three
sections in parallel. Patients would enter the facility from
the front of the EMT where we would establish a
registration and triage area. The patient would then move
to the middle of the EMT where he would be seen by a health
care provider and rendered medical treatment. In the rear
of the EMT, our plan was to place four intensive-care beds
for any soldiers requiring in-patient care. To the rear of the
EMT, a controlled entrance would be erected to allow
passage into our CMS area. This area could provide sterile
instruments to both the OR and the EMT, yet be out of the
flow of normal patient and staff activity. On the backside of
CMS, we would erect another passageway into the
Operating Room area.
We were able to position all the pieces of equipment for
this first phase without any major difficulties. The second
phase of construction planned for this first day of operations
was to locate our x-ray and laboratory “boxes” alongside the
EMT/CMS/OR complex. However, the contracted truck
driver stated he could not drive the truck into the
designated locations to drop these expansible boxes because
he would get stuck in the mud surrounding the aircraft pad.
We therefore called for a crane to unload the expansibles.
Approximately 2 hours later, one arrived at the scene. The
crane operator attempted to unload the laboratory
expansible for over 3 hours. However, his crane was not
large enough to complete the job. So, both the x-ray
expansible and the laboratory expansible placement needed
to be postponed until the following day.
The next issue we needed to address was the absence of
fuel for our generators that provide power for heat, lighting,
and medical equipment within the hospital. We were having
difficulty scheduling a fuel truck to transport fuel to our
hospital site. After many attempts at arranging for a fuel
truck, one finally arrived on the scene. However, he arrived
with no fuel. After discovering he was empty, he left to
resupply, and it was some 2 hours before he returned. Upon
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his return, he inserted the fuel line into the generator tank,
only to find that the fuel line was frozen. He continued to
attempt to pump the fuel, however, and soon burnt out the
motor which pumps the fuel. Once again, he left the scene
and returned some 90 minutes later with a full operational
fuel tanker. We now had fuel for our generators, which
allowed us to heat and light the inside of our facility and
thus enable us to complete the interior establishment of the
hospital.
In spite of the external resource problems described
above, the unit moved methodically and expeditiously in
erecting the hospital complex. By 1200, the external
portions of the EMT, CMS, and OR were up and positioned.
The difficulty with obtaining fuel earlier in the day
somewhat delayed our ability to complete the interior
construction. However, by 2000 that evening our enlisted
soldiers and officers had completed a highly successful day.
We had a fully functioning EMT with four intensive-care
in-patient beds, a completely supplied CMS, and an
operating room equipped with two surgical tables.
In addition to the hospital construction, we had also been
tasked to establish a sick call facility in a barracks building
close to the one we were billeted in. We had identified an old
arms room and used that for our sick call area. It allowed us
to lock up our pharmaceuticals at night without concern for
their security. One nurse, one physician, and one medic
were assigned to this area. They established the sick call
area in a matter of 2 hours and then proceeded to provide
health care daily at this site.
The construction of the remainder of the facility was
constrained by two primary factors. The first was space. Our
instructions were to place as much of the hospital on the half
of aircraft pad as we could. After measuring the dimensions
required for additions to the hospital, we determined that
we could only place the x-ray and laboratory expansibles in
the space allowed. Lieutenant General Abrams, V Corps
Commander, then sent word that the entire aircraft pad
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was ours. Once we received this additional space, we
determined we could place an additional 12-bed IntensiveCare Unit (ICU) and a 20-bed Intermediate-Care Ward
(ICW).
The other limiting factor was the availability of heavy
equipment side-loaders to unload our equipment from the
trucks they were transported on. Our ability to construct
the hospital was directly limited by the amount of
equipment the side-loaders could unload during the day.
On the third day, Lieutenant General Abrams asked me
what we needed in order to construct the entire hospital on
the current site. After consultation with my primary staff
and extensive measurement of the area surrounding the
aircraft pad, we determined that if we could have all the
grassy area surrounding the pad prepped (graded) and then
have rock laid down in the prepped area, we could
accommodate the entire hospital set-up in that specific
location. Lieutenant General Abrams reviewed our
proposal, approved a $199,000 contract to do the necessary
ground preparation, and directed the project proceed
immediately. In a matter of 4 days, the entire area had been
graded and 3 layers of rock laid to stabilize the ground and
make it feasible to support the weight of the CSH. Once the
ground preparation was completed, construction continued
at a pace consistent with the availability of heavy
equipment to down load our hospital equipment. In a matter
of 3 weeks from our arrival in Taszar, we had the following
hospital resources on ground, staffed, and operational:

•

Optometry Clinic

•

Dental Clinic with two dental chairs

•

Physical Therapy Department

•

Orthopedic Clinic

•

Obstetrics/Gynogological examination area
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•

Pharmacy

•

X-ray to include fluoroscopy

•

Laboratory

•

Blood Bank

•

EMT

•

2 Operating Rooms with 4 operating tables

•

2 CMS

•

1 12-bed ICU

•

1 fully staffed 20-bed ICW

•

2 fully equipped stand-by 2-bed ICWs

•

Medical Maintenance Section

•

Briefing Room

•

Tactical Operation Center (TOC)

•

Patient Administration Division

•

Chaplain Section

•

Personnel Section

•

Logistics Division

•

Psychiatric Clinic

•

Dining Facility

In addition, we were given some land space adjoining our
hospital area to establish our motor pool. This proved
extremely beneficial due to its close proximity to the
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hospital area and our consequent ability to turn vehicles
around quickly if needed.
The remainder of the hospital (some 150 additional
personnel) arrived on December 19. With our complete
complement of personnel and a rapidly maturing theater,
we were prepared to meet the health care needs of the
20,000-plus soldiers scheduled to deploy through the ISB
into Bosnia and for the approximately 5,000 soldiers
assigned to duty in the Taszar/Kaposvar area.
Three items of special interest should be noted regarding
our health care support to Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR.
First, we made the decision very early on to invite the
Aeromedical Evacuation Liaison Team (AELT) to
physically establish themselves inside the walls of the
hospital. To my knowledge, this is the first time that the
AELT has been physically collocated in an Army hospital.
This decision paid big dividends throughout the operation.
The inclusion of the AELT on the CSH health care team
greatly enhanced our ability to coordinate necessary
aeromedical evacuations. Our ability to better understand
the AELT’s capabilities and requirements, and the AELT’s
ability to understand our needs, resulted in a more efficient
and effective system for aeromedical evacuation.
Second, in February 1996, we received the newest model
Computed Tomography (CT) Scan developed for TO&E use.
We connected the CT Scan (which also was housed in an
expansible) to our preexisting X-Ray Department.
Constructed to the side of the CT Scan, yet attached to it,
was a CT “reading room.” This reading room provided the
equipment and space necessary for our radiologists to
interpret the results of the CT Scan. This radiographic
device provided a capability heretofore not available to our
physician staff. Prior to the arrival of the CT Scan, we had
transferred some 75 patients to the local Kaposvar
Hungarian Medical Center for CT Scans in their facility.
This highly sophisticated piece of equipment allowed our
physicians to make a more definitive diagnosis on our
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soldiers in a much quicker time frame, thus greatly
increasing the quality of care we were providing.
In conjunction with the CT Scan, we also were provided
the necessary equipment for a teleradiology system. Teleradiology enables health care providers anywhere in the
Bosnian Theater who have x-ray capabilities, to
electronically send the results of their radiographic studies
to the CSH for evaluation by the radiologist. The CSH had
the only radiologist in the Bosnian/Croatian/Hungarian AO
and, accordingly, was the receiving center of radiographic
exams throughout the Theater. This proved extremely
useful for the 212th Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH)
located in Tuzla, Bosnia. They were the only other U.S.
hospital in theater, but did not have the availability of a
radiologist. Teleradiology allowed physicians at the 212th
MASH to send their results immediately to the CSH for
professional radiological review; those results were then
returned to the 212th MASH expeditiously via electronic
transmission. Again, the end result was an increase in the
quality of health care provided to our soldiers.
Third, host nation health care support was readily
available, and the quality was generally on par with U.S.
health care. Their laboratory facilities were more
sophisticated than the CSH’s, so we periodically sent
laboratory specimens to the Hungarians when their
facilities exceeded the capabilities of the CSH. During the
first 9 months of deployment, we utilized the local
Hungarian laboratory approximately 360 times. In
addition, we utilized the Hungarian medical center for
surgical intervention requirements that exceeded the
capabilities of our staff or our equipment. For example, a
couple of soldiers needed neurosurgical procedures that we
could not provide at the CSH. They were surgically treated
in the Hungarian medical facility with excellent
post-operative results. Other soldiers needed endoscopic
procedures that we could not provide (due to equipment
restrictions); thus these soldiers were cared for at the host
nation facility as well. Our preference was to care for all of
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our soldiers in a U.S. facility, but when staffing, equipment,
or urgency dictated otherwise, it was extremely helpful to
have such a high-quality host nation medical facility so
readily available.
The final issue I would like to address within the
confines of this paper is that of additional taskings. Not
unlike any exercise or real world operation, we were tasked
to provide CSH resources outside the walls of the CSH. One
of the first taskings we received was to provide medical
support (medics plus an ambulance) at all the railheads.
Next, health care clinics began to surface throughout the
area. Outside the hospital, we supported clinics at Taszar
Main, Kaposvar, Kaposjulak, the Life Support Area, and
Taborflava Training Area. These clinics required
professional and enlisted staffing that we often provided or
supported from our staff assigned to the 67th CSH.
One of our larger early commitments came in a tasking
to send a 20-bed ICW forward with the 212th MASH when
they arrived in Theater in mid-January. Our requirement
was to send the 20-bed ward, all of its equipment and
supplies, all the nursing personnel required to support it,
and additional physician support. The impact of this
tasking was more morale-related than operational. The
requirement to split off a part of any unit for an extended
period of time can have an adverse effect on the morale of
both those departing and those remaining.
The heaviest tasking, manpower-wise, was one we
received in February to begin the JOINT ENDEAVOR
Medical Screening (JEMS) Program. This program was a
newly initiated Department of Defense directed program of
health screening, education, and medical/psychological
surveillance for soldiers and civilians returning from
Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR. It was a labor-intensive
program requiring enlisted, nursing, and physician
resources on a daily basis. The time required varied daily,
being dependent on the number of soldiers redeploying
through the ISB. Most days involved 2-4 hours, with some
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days going as high as 8 hours. The JEMS process entailed
the following:

•

Hepatitis A Booster

•

Psychological Questionnaire

•

Medical Questionnaire

•

Medical Threat Briefing

•

Psychological Briefing

•

Blood Samples

•

Medical Threat Fact Sheet.

The blood samples were obtained and then shipped to
Rockville, Maryland, where they remain frozen in a vault,
readily available for examination if a soldier is afflicted with
some disease in the future that he feels may be linked to his
deployment in Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR.
In addition, professional medical and psychiatric staff
were available to review the medical and psychiatric
questionnaires to determine if any soldiers needed
immediate intervention or intervention once he/she
returned to their home station.
Shortly after the start of the JEMS program, it was
determined that all returning soldiers would have a routine
dental examination in conjunction with their JEMS. This
additional tasking was given to the dental facility of the
67th CSH, further impacting on our staffing situation.
The deployment of the 67th CSH to Operation JOINT
ENDEAVOR was an extremely successful deployment.
Fortunately, casualties and injuries were low. From
December 1995 to March 1997, the CSH conducted the
following medical activities:

•

Treated 801 In-patients
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•

Treated 19,899 Outpatients

•

33,423 Medical Redeployment Screenings

•

24,065 Dental Redeployment Screenings

•

280 Air Evacuations

•

1037 Host Nation Referrals

The 67th CSH spent 485 days deployed in the Bosnian
Theater. As of April 1, 1998, the 67th CSH had deployed
approximately 100 soldiers back into the Bosnian Theater.
The outstanding performance of this unit at every level of
rank and professional standing is an example for future
medical units to emulate. The AMEDD’s motto “Proud to
Care” was never better exemplified.
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CHAPTER 9
A REAR DETACHMENT COMMANDER
IN OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR

Lieutenant Colonel Sherrie L. Balko
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS AND PURPOSE
It is hard to know where to begin to thank the many
great soldiers and Americans who helped me survive my
year’s tenure as a Rear Detachment Commander. I chose
not to use names in this paper beyond those in the following
paragraph, because my accounting talks in generalities
about the members of the detachment and does not go into
specific situations. There also were many personnel
changes over the course of the year, and I did not want to
accidentally forget someone.
That said, I would be remiss if I did not thank some of the
key leaders who shouldered most of the burdens, had more
than their fair share of face time with me, and served at
least half of the deployment in the rear detachment. My
subordinate commanders, Diane Fortini, Rich DuBreuil
and Scott Baier were absolutely awesome. I only hope that
their next assignments were a bit more fun. My staff, who
were significantly underpaid for all the responsibility they
had, Maria Drew, Brian Dockery, Scott Pearson, Tony Hale,
Wendy Rivers, Mo Cashman, and Derryk Julien, kept the
brigade in the game. My right-hand man, Sergeant Major
Johnson, kept me squared away and let me know when I
was getting ready to do something dumb. A special thanks
goes to Lisa Stein, who did a lot more then the title
“secretary” would suggest. She kept the Headquarters
afloat and the paperwork moving, even when the rest of us
went to the field. I also want to acknowledge Jeanne Slupik
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and Steve Walker, commanders of the two battalions that
did not deploy. They were always there when I needed some
help, and they overlooked most of the errors my junior staff
made. They were true team players and good friends. Last,
some very special ladies who not only took care of the
families, but also made it their mission to look after me: Deb
Culbert, Anne Premo, Hattie Graham, and Kelly Tate were
the epitome of great Family Support Group Leaders.
These folks and many others were all part of the success
story told in this monograph. I will never be able to
adequately thank them for their dedication and tireless
efforts. It was a wild ride and I am glad they were aboard.
This monograph is an accounting of the life of the rear
detachment commander of the 22d Signal Brigade, V Corps,
United States Army Europe during the brigade’s deployment as part of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR (OJE). It is
not a diary, instead it is a look at key aspects and certain
events of the year-long deployment and describes how the
various elements of the rear detachments managed them. If
the reader has never had an opportunity to serve in one,
especially overseas, it will be an eye-opener. The intent of
this paper, then, is to share my experiences, observations,
and lessons learned with others who may find themselves in
a similar situation or are trying to develop a plan now for
future rear detachments.
THE WARNING ORDER
They say timing is everything. Well, that was very true
for the 22d Signal Brigade’s leadership early in October
1995. The warning order of a possible deployment to Bosnia
came as the brigade’s key leaders and staff were gathered
together at an off-site during the 3-day training holiday for
Columbus Day. The brigade commander had to absent
himself to attend the V Corps briefing, and, when he came
back late that night, he officially broke the news. Elements
of the brigade, under the command of the 1st Armored
Division, would be deploying to Bosnia-Herzegovina, if and
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when the warring factions signed the Dayton Peace
Accords. For the brigade, the first cut at forces had the
brigade Headquarters, the 17th Signal Battalion, and the
440th Signal Battalion deploying with the division signal
battalion. Eventually, the 17th was cut from the list,
although one of their platoons and some additional teams
did go. The announcement that my battalion was going to be
the Base Support Battalion’s “pusher” unit and I was going
to be the brigade’s Rear Detachment Commander was
extremely disappointing to me. A pusher unit is responsible
for facilitating the movement of other organizations
through air and railheads by providing the personnel to run
the loading operations. Clearly that meant that I was going
to miss all of the action. Well, nothing could have been
further from the truth.
PREPARING FOR THE DEPLOYMENT
The brigade, as an organization, had not deployed
before, except for some selective teams during the Gulf War.
There were no Standing Operational Procedures for
deploying or for rear detachment operations. Fortunately,
there were a number of soldiers who had either gone to the
Gulf or participated in a more recent deployment, so we
were not working totally in the dark. My own personal
experience was in Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM,
when the battalion of which I was the Executive Officer
(XO), deployed with VII Corps. Having “been there, done
that,” I thought I knew it all, or at least most of it. The truth
is, the only similarity was that both deployments originated
in Germany. There, the similarity ceased.
The first difference that contradicted my expectations of
the deployment was the train-up and validation exercise,
held at the Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels Training Areas that
Corps was developing for the 1st Armored Division Task
Force. The intent was to rehearse and then validate the
plan, while training the division’s staffs. Simultaneously,
there was a requirement to train every deploying soldier in
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the unique tasks required for the upcoming mission (cold
weather operations, mine identification and clearing, etc.)
plus validate individual weapons qualification. Unlike the
Gulf, this required deploying units from home stations,
especially the staffs. They essentially stopped working on
pre-deployment activities and headed to the field. Although
the exercise and subsequent validation were absolutely
essential, it made coordinating the deployment extremely
difficult. The telephone trunks out of Grafenwoehr always
stayed busy. The exercise also caused the brigade to put rear
detachment development on the back burner until the
return to garrison. Last, the separation of soldiers from
their families, with a deployment imminent, increased the
stress levels for all. For me, the exercise required my
battalion to be out at Grafenwoehr for over a month, as we
provided the tactical communications that supported the
whole thing. So my attention remained on the exercise, the
personnel cross-leveling that we were being constantly
levied for, the training of my Delta Company that was going
to Taszar, Hungary, and the 12 or so signal teams that I had
been tasked to provide to other signal units. Clearly my
attention was not on my upcoming rear detachment
responsibilities.
My return to garrison a month later did not improve that
situation. As a battalion commander, my focus remained on
preparing my soldiers and their equipment and trying to
keep a handle on property accountability. The taskings for
equipment, like those for personnel, came fast and furious.
As the brigade’s Rear Detachment Commander, I did attend
every deployment briefing within the brigade, mostly to
introduce myself to the families, but it also provided an
opportunity to hear what was troubling them. I was able to
resolve a couple of those issues with the local community
staff, so it was time well spent. But as the month of
November came to a close and reports or rumors of units
deploying at any time were running rampant, the brigade
commander, his wife, and I agreed it was time to start the
weekly Family Member Briefings. The briefings were to be
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an opportunity for me to update the families on the current
situation, discuss upcoming events and troop movements, if
any, and provide information on community events and
services. Other attendees with information to share were
provided an opportunity to speak and then I would close
with the question-and-answer period. I must admit there
were questions that I did not have an answer to. So on
December 8, 1995, I began the briefings that were conducted
until December 1996, when the units started coming home,
and the rest of the redeployment schedule was set. The
attendance ranged from a nearly full chapel, where I
conducted them, to ten spouses. In June 1996, I made the
decision to have the briefings only once a month, as there
just was not enough activity at home or down range to
support weekly briefings. The briefings proved to be a good
tool, even if it only gave the family members an opportunity
to vent or me an opportunity to quell rumors. It was worth
the effort.
DEPLOYMENT
The month of December was very tense. Everyone knew
it was just a matter of time. There were many false starts,
and soldiers and families alike jumped whenever the phone
rang. Fortunately, most of the brigade’s soldiers were able
to spend Christmas at home. Units and teams supporting
operations in Tazar, Hungary, and advance parties going
into Tuzla Air Base, Bosnia-Herzegovina, were, for the most
part, the only elements that deployed before the holidays.
But as the month drew to a close, the railheads became
busier, and anxiety grew. As advance party elements of the
brigade were starting to head out, I was forced to start
taking an interest in the brigade’s Rear Detachment staff,
as they were now running the Crisis Action Center,
managing all deployments, and submitting reports to the
Corps. Fortunately for me, most of the soldiers working
there were from my battalion (an earlier tasking), and, if
there was a problem, they knew whom to call. As for the rest
of the staff, it looked a little thin, but there was nothing I
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could do to change it now. The good news was that there was
at least one knowledgeable person per staff section staying
behind, excluding the S-2. But I knew deep down inside that
I could not have a robust staff, as every able-bodied person
was needed in Bosnia-Herzegovina. What I failed to realize
at the time was how important my little staff and new rear
detachment commanders would be.
THE DUST SETTLES
It was not until the end of January that I finally had an
idea of what lay ahead. All of our deployments were done,
but there were daily calls from deployed units, asking for
additional items to be shipped their way. Routine and not so
routine paperwork was starting to pile up on the brigade
commander’s desk, and the staff kept calling to get my
approval on a myriad of issues. So I was slowly forced to
wean myself away from my nearly total focus on my
battalion, and I began to spend half the day at the brigade.
One of the first things I had to do was to move some
members of my battalion to the brigade staff. This was
essential because there just were not enough soldiers to
answer the phones or fill critical billets like the Logistics
Officer (S-4) and the Intelligence Officer (S-2). It did not
make me, the battalion commander, very happy, but it was
the right thing to do.
My change of command at the end of February was a
blessing in disguise. I was now able to focus completely on
the operations of the brigade. The timing could not have
been better. Unlike DESERT SHIELD/STORM where a
stop-loss personnel policy was in effect, the deployment for
OJE required troops to have only 90 days or more remaining
in their tours to be deployable. That meant that come the
first of March, rear detachments would need to start
out-processing those returning soldiers. This just
overwhelmed the rear detachments, as their resources were
already taxed to the limits by the mission of in-processing
new soldiers. Although in-processing sounds easy, it was
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not. The rear detachments had to receive new soldiers into
the unit, properly in-process them, make sure they were
fully deployable (some were not), qualify them on their
assigned weapon, send them to Grafenwoehr for BosniaHerzegovina specific training, and take them to Ramstein
Air Force Base for their flight to Bosnia- Herzegovina. If the
new soldiers brought families with them, and many did,
there were more actions to complete. The implied tasks are
too numerous to mention, but it was a daunting challenge
for those young commanders. So you can imagine how much
more cumbersome it became when soldiers started to filter
back to out-process.
Although the detachments were doing the best job they
could, there were many, both at Corps and in BosniaHerzegovina, who thought that the process was taking
entirely too long. A “well-meaning” staff officer at Corps
developed a timeline that showed how it should take only 21
days or so for a new soldier to go through the required hoops
and be ready to deploy. That became the standard, and all of
a sudden we were building spreadsheets, depicting where
everyone was in the process, and sending it daily to the
corps headquarters and to the brigade. Unfortunately the
timeline was built assuming a perfect world, but our world
was decidedly imperfect. So we had to write lots of
justifications for those who did not meet the standard. For
the first few months, that was nearly everybody, as there
were insufficient seats for the training at Grafenwoehr and
for the flight to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Heaven help us if a
soldier had other problems like a preexisting medical
problem or some other personal issue. But the pressure to
meet the standard never abated, and those first few weeks
were pretty tough on the morale of the rear detachments.
Eventually the backlog disappeared and the rear
detachments met the standard.
As you can see, the rear detachment commanders had
their hands full and were constantly being asked to do more
(and do it faster) with less. It is only fitting to take a look at
these tireless heroes.
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THE SUBORDINATE REAR DETACHMENT
COMMANDERS
A thankless but vitally important job during this
particular deployment was that of rear detachment
commander. The two in the brigade that reported directly to
me commanded the 440th Signal Battalion and the
brigade’s Headquarters and Headquarters Company
(HHC). Their responsibilities compared to their rank and
resources were overwhelming. But their commanders had
chosen well, and I had the pleasure of working with two
extremely professional officers who consistently kept their
heads in the game and never gave into the enormous
pressure they faced everyday. This proved to be very
important, as they had lots of challenges.
First, the size of the detachment was pitiful to say the
least. The commander was a junior captain or a senior first
lieutenant with either a master sergeant or sergeant first
class to fill the first sergeant’s position. They had a handful
of soldiers to assist them, many of whom were in a
nondeployable status. Their Military Occupational
Specialties (MOS) did not match the jobs they had to do. But
there were certain missions that had to be performed
regardless of their experience. Needless to say, there was a
lot of on-the-job training (OJT) required.
One of the concerns at corps was the accountability of the
soldiers, because there just was not any subordinate
leadership like platoon sergeants or section chiefs built into
the rear detachment organizations. My commanders
conducted their accountability formations prior to
beginning physical training (PT) and at the close of the day.
More often than that was not very realistic, and it worked
for us. Apparently, there were a couple of units who had no
method of daily accountability.
As mentioned, the in- and out-processing of the unit’s
soldiers was a constant challenge. To make it easier for the
soldiers and to standardize the procedure, the rear
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detachments developed standard operating procedures
(SOPs) and checklists for each stage of the process. These
proved to be most beneficial, because it told each soldier
exactly what tasks had to be done and how to do them (the
standard), and what hours they could be accomplished in.
This was essential because supply rooms and arms rooms
could not be open all day long, and the leaders could not be
everywhere to answer questions.
In order to transition soldiers in and out of the unit, the
detachments had to run a supply room and an arms room.
To lessen the manpower requirements, remaining supplies
and weapons were consolidated into one detachment arms
room and supply room in the battalion. Properly operating
these was more challenging, since supply clerks and
armorers require skills and knowledge that signal soldiers
do not readily possess. There was no good solution for this
problem except for OJT. I had the S-2 from one of the other
battalions conduct security inspections and instruction in
maintaining the paperwork and control of the keys. If a
weapon needed maintenance, it was taken directly to the
Direct Support Maintenance facility. We were not capable of
performing organizational maintenance. On the supply
side, hand receipts were used to keep accountability, but,
with soldiers coming and going daily, it was a difficult task.
When supplies needed to be ordered, the detachments had
to go to my property book officer (PBO) for assistance, as the
rear detachments did not have a document register or
money of their own.
The one resource always in short supply, but always in
great demand, was transportation. Seven days a week the
rear detachment commanders had to haul soldiers to and
from training and airfields. The brigade had left a couple of
tactical vehicles behind, but almost all of those had shelters
mounted on them. The Transportation Motor Pool (TMP)
tried valiantly to meet all the requirements, but clearly had
not foreseen the increase in demand. To be truthful, no one
accurately predicted the rear detachments’ requirements
for support vehicles. Soldiers had to be taken to ranges and
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to Grafenwoehr for deployment-specific training. Grafenwoehr on a good day was a 4-hour drive, and anywhere from
1-10 soldiers with weapons and duffel bags would attend
any one class. Vehicles were constantly running to and from
Ramstein and Rhein Main airbases, the Privately Owned
Vehicle (POV) storage lots, and hospitals. More times than
not, the TMP came through, but there were many times
when we had to go hat-in-hand to nondeployed units to
wrest a vehicle or two from them.
Another problematic issue was the soldier who had been
categorized as nondeployable. When the warning order for
OJE came, great efforts were made to bring as many as
possible to a deployable status. Those soldiers whose status
could not be upgraded for whatever reason stayed back in
the rear detachments. In some units they numbered in the
teens and twenties. For most rear detachment commanders,
these soldiers comprised the detachment’s work force and
were very valuable in the conduct of daily operations.
Unfortunately, the brigade, like many other units
throughout Europe, was not manned at 100 percent of its
authorized strength. So every one of these nondeployable
soldiers compounded the personnel shortages of the
deployed units. Initially, as the operation started, the
shortages were fixed by pulling soldiers out of nondeploying
units. But that method had to stop when the Germanybased units started to report critically low personnel ratings
in their monthly Unit Status Reports. The solution from
higher headquarters was to reduce the number of nondeployable soldiers, so new soldiers could be assigned.
Getting rid of nondeployable soldiers was a tedious,
bureaucratic procedure that had stumped battalion and
company commanders long before the operation, but now
the rear detachment commanders had to find the answers.
This became an emotional issue with the rear detachments,
as many of these soldiers were key members of their little
staffs, who were doing yeomans’ work. If properly processed,
these soldiers would be discharged from the Army and their
“deployable” replacement would be processed for duty with
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the unit downrange. This was akin to shooting yourself in
the foot, and commanders kept questioning the sanity of
this exercise. Without great enthusiasm, the commanders
struggled with kind-hearted doctors (who kept writing
continuous temporary profiles) and the snail-like pace of the
Medical Review Board and the subsequent reviews that
followed for those with permanent medical problems. We
made only minimal headway for the amount of time and
energy that was expended on this mission. This was one
battle that was not won.
Another unplanned mission that quickly received a lot of
attention was the state of cleanliness of now empty barracks
rooms, storerooms, team rooms, and offices. I will not debate
whether the speed of the deployment did or did not provide
sufficient time to inspect and clean areas, but in every unit
that deployed, leaders caught up in the planning and
execution failed to check their soldiers’ work and living
areas. So the first few months found the detachments
hauling tons of trash and cleaning rooms. This was a major
project that consumed lots of time and manpower that were
not there. While walking through the areas, I also found lots
of military equipment that was either in need of turn-in or
excess to the unit. Where the clean-up took about half of the
year, the turn-in of the excess stuff took more than the other
half, requiring assistance from other units to load and move
the material. That mission was totally uncalled for.
If that was not enough for my rear detachment
commanders to handle, there was a USAREUR-wide
decision to renovate the barracks for returning soldiers. The
renovation included painting the rooms and installing drop
ceilings, wall-to-wall carpeting, and new furnishings. It was
a commendable project, but it entailed a lot of scarce manual
labor from the rear detachments for tasks like removing old
furniture. Fortunately, the soldiers returning to out-process
did not need the full 30 days they were allotted, so they
became a small temporary work force that did most of the
work. And the deployed soldiers wondered why we needed
“so many” soldiers in the rear.
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Those were some of the major missions that faced my
unit rear detachment commanders. I am sure there were
more, but those hard-working leaders took care of them,
without my ever knowing about it. As the Rear Detachment
Commander for the brigade, they were only part of my
responsibility. Just as important and equally demanding
was the rest of the brigade who did not deploy. And to assist
me in that role was another group of equally hard working
soldiers, my staff.
THE BRIGADE STAFF
It took me a while to appreciate fully the enormity of the
task of running a brigade. I know this is hard to believe, but
it is tougher than commanding a battalion. I also had a
skeleton crew for a staff, and nearly all of the staff officers
were lieutenants. These officers were responsible not only
for supporting the deployed force, but also the two
battalions remaining in Germany. The corps headquarters
expected my little staff to continue business as usual. That
meant actively monitoring and reporting personnel
accountability, maintenance status, and training status,
plus supporting other units’ exercises. Even more
unbelievable was the expectation that we would also
conduct the annual command inspections for both
battalions and their external evaluations (EXEVAL). This
was quite overwhelming for all of us, but every one of my
staff sections pulled it off. Sometimes it was not pretty, but
the job got done. For me, every day was a long professional
development class, with me trying to impart my knowledge
and experience to my young staff. They were fast learners,
and I enjoyed every opportunity I had to train the officers,
noncommissioned officers, and soldiers in the new or
additional responsibilities they had just inherited.
The S-1 had the most contentious job. There was a
mandate to keep the deployed units at a 90 percent fill,
while trying to keep the battalions left in Germany at a 70
percent fill. This kept the soldiers of the S-1 on a treadmill
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that never stopped, as the demands always exceeded the
personnel resources. Projected inbounds from the corps
headquarters always looked likely, but rarely, if ever, did all
the soldiers show up. So the S-1 had to talk daily with the
Corps G-1, scrubbing the list to ensure diverted soldiers
were found and/or replaced. This was an essential task that
had to be done every day. Daily conversations or e-mail with
the deployed S-1 decided whether a new soldier would be
sent down to them or stay in one of the Germany-based
units. Eventually a decision was reached, and,as expected,
it normally benefited the deployed units. Those units that
did not deploy always suffered from a significant lack of
personnel. The corps blamed the personnel shortfalls on an
inaccurate Standard Installation Database for Personnel
(SIDPERS), and we spent untold hours purging the system
with our local Personnel Detachment. But in the end we
were something less than successful because external
powers kept adding erroneous data, and we could never
totally clean it up.
Another bane to the daily existence of the S-1 was the
unending number of personnel actions and awards that
kept flowing in. At first, they came not only from the units in
the rear but also from the deployed units. That stopped
when the personnel and finance units finally deployed and
became operational. But the remaining administrative load
quickly overwhelmed the abilities of the S-1 staff. This was
an emotional issue throughout the deployment, as my small
S-1 staff was not able to process all of those personnel
actions in a timely manner. We did the best we could and
eventually eliminated the backlog. But it was not easy, and,
unfortunately, we did not take care of some soldiers the way
they should have been.
Although not a vital position, the administrative
specialist running the S-2 section was kept busy just trying
to verify the security clearances of incoming soldiers to the
brigade and monitoring soldiers who needed to complete
their periodic security clearance updates. This soldier also
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kept track of the classified information that came to the
Headquarters.
Unlike the lone S-2, the S-3 section had several soldiers,
for good reason. Like the one that supported the brigade
prior to the deployment, my S-3 section had its hands full
managing the full range of operational and training
missions for the nondeployed units and supporting the rear
detachments.
One of the first challenges was the numerous taskings
for personnel and equipment that we received from corps.
Each required an assessment of the impact on the unit and
often ended up in a lively debate between one of my
lieutenants or captains and a major or lieutenant colonel on
the corps staff. The conversations were always professional,
and, believe it or not, we won almost as many as we lost.
Something that none of us appreciated at the beginning
was the frequency of taskings to provide tactical communications support to all of the corps and USAREUR exercises
involving non-OJE units. Fortunately, I had great soldiers
who worked overtime running those requirements into the
ground and developing solid operations orders. To their
credit, every exercise had a well-developed communications network that more than met the requirements.
The most intensive requirement imposed on the S-3 was
to develop and conduct EXEVALs for the two battalions.
This required all members of the headquarters staff to chip
in to build challenging scenarios, tasks, conditions, and
standards for each event, and an extensive operations
order. This was a huge event as the EXEVAL within the
corps is an annual culminating event for our units, much
like the one the combat units undergo at the Combined
Maneuver Training Center. We got the corps to provide the
opposing force (OPFOR) and a chemical decontamination
unit to support the evaluation. The rest of the work was laid
upon the shoulders of my staff led by the S-3, and they came
through with flying colors. They conducted the warning
order brief, the operations order brief, trained up the
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observers/controllers and role players, and conducted a
rehearsal for the OPFOR and everybody else. Then we
emptied out the building and spent 10 days in the field
executing the evaluation. It was a tremendous undertaking,
and my young warriors made me proud.
The other major event the S-3 handled was the lead for
the dreaded Annual Command Inspection of the battalions.
Those inspections, which the staff orchestrated, required a
lot of outside support by subject matter experts. The S-3 had
the staff update the checklists, conduct the weeklong
inspections, give the out-brief, and then provide a final
written report that was distributed a month later. Like the
EXEVAL, the inspections were a huge drain on the staff
because they were extremely time intensive.
When not busy, the S-3 also managed the Unit Status
Report (USR), training ammunition, the semiannual
training brief to the corps’ Deputy Commanding General
(DCG), and all briefings to visiting general officers. The S-3
also oversaw the Crisis Action Center, which still monitored
all personnel deployments, equipment passing between the
rear and forward deployed units, and acted as the Staff Duty
Officer for the brigade.
The S-4 section was also kept very busy. One of the
toughest missions was property accountability. In
accordance with the guidance received from corps, a
separate property book was established for the equipment
that was deployed. The Property Book Officer (PBO) from
the 440th was responsible for the deployed equipment. The
brigade’s PBO stayed with the Rear Detachment and was
responsible for the equipment that remained. Although the
two rear detachment commanders had done inventories and
signed hand receipts, there were some discrepancies. That
was because of inventories being rushed, last-minute
changes being made to equipment lists, and the tremendous
amount of equipment that was transferred within and
outside of the brigade. Keeping an accurate equipment
status was a nearly insurmountable task. The PBO spent
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considerable time updating the books as new equipment
kept arriving. Normally it would be transferred to the
deployed property book, and there were frequent requests
for additional items from deployed commanders that were
also transferred. There was also the challenge of accounting
for equipment that soldiers brought back with them when
they out-processed and equipment new soldiers took down
with them after in-processing. This kept the property books
somewhat unbalanced until everyone returned to Germany.
Property accountability was not the only mission in the
S-4’s shop. A major effort involved the budget. Fortunately,
the comptroller civilians did not deploy, but for those
assuming positions way above their pay grades, there was a
steep learning curve. Especially tough was fighting for the
next year’s budget and undergoing the year-end close.
Throughout the deployment, there were constant requests
from corps to take monies from the subordinate commands
to finance the deployment and other unplanned events. As a
result, I saw my budget shop almost weekly.
With two battalions worth of equipment in Germany, the
brigade S-4 also had to monitor their maintenance status
and help where possible. At brigade, we hosted monthly
maintenance and supply reviews with the battalion XOs
and their maintenance staffs, along with the
representatives from the Direct Support Units, the Combat
Support Groups, the Corps Support Command (COSCOM),
and other agencies who specialized in motor or communications maintenance. These were held prior to a similar
meeting at Corps where I had to brief the DCG every month.
Those meetings could be brutal if you did not have your act
together, but my guys kept me well prepared.
The S-4 assisted the Rear Detachments with the excess
equipment turn-in. As nothing can get turned back to the
supply system without a condition code and a document
number, the S-4 always had lots to do here. The brigade had
mounds of equipment to move, and this operation was still
ongoing as the units started their redeployment.
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THE FAMILY SUPPORT GROUP LEADERS
Not everyone who was mission essential to the brigade’s
daily operations wore uniforms. One vital group worked just
as hard, if not harder, and they needed no supervision. This
group was the Family Support Group Leaders (FSGLs).
The year would have been a lot tougher if it had not been
for the FSGLs. These “volunteers” were the unsung heroes
of the deployment. They were often the first people
subjected to the emotional outbursts of families that were
experiencing difficulties. How they persevered (none of ours
quit) is a true story of selfless service.
Having profited from lessons learned during DESERT
SHIELD/STORM, USAREUR had regulated the Family
Support Group (FSG) program, and it was alive and well. So
there was a significant program already in place that
needed only some fine-tuning. FSGLs were already
conducting monthly meetings, and many were publishing
monthly newsletters, too. The FSG became an
informational avenue for many of the families. But there
were many who really did not need that association with
others from their own unit to get through the deployment.
Therein lay the challenge of trying to get the word out. It
was impossible to get all of them together. But the FSGLs
felt compelled to reach out and try to include all families. It
was a tough proposition.
To ease the strain of the separation, the rear detachment
commanders established rooms where the families could
come in and use either the phone or e-mail to converse with
their spouses. As members of a signal brigade, most soldiers
had telephones in their work areas, so they could
communicate in real-time with their significant others back
in Germany. That became a problem when trying to control
rumors. And it was always a concern that, should there be a
major injury or death to one of our soldiers, a neighbor
would inform the affected family before the Army did.
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Fortunately, we never had to deal with an incident that
required family notification.
The FSGLs were an essential part of the rear
detachment team. They took care of many of the problems
that families were undergoing. They worked with their unit
rear detachment commanders to take care of institutional
problems, and most, if not all, of them were resolved to the
family member’s satisfaction. They were also vital
participants in the preparation for the reunion (redeployment) ceremonies.
It was my philosophy to have lunch or dinner at least
once a month with the brigade commander’s spouse. The
informal setting allowed both of us to talk about issues
concerning families and their problems or frustrations. For
me, it was time well spent. I also made a habit of calling the
Battalion FSGLs at least once a month to see how they were
doing and to offer my assistance to solve any problems they
might have. Trust me, these ladies (in my case, they were all
ladies) did yeoman’s work, and they handled a lot of family
issues that did not have to come to the attention of the rear
detachment commanders. Thank heavens. They were a
godsend, and it was my opinion that the least I could do was
to engage them and, if nothing else, let them vent a little. A
major responsibility of the rear detachment commander is
to take care of families and the FSGLs were the avenue to do
it efficiently.
TRAINING FOR THE ELEMENTS
OF THE REAR DETACHMENT
One of the more positive aspects of this deployment was
the tremendous effort expended by USAREUR to train both
the rear detachment leadership and the FSGLs. The rear
detachment leadership team (officer and senior NCO)
conducted mandatory week-long training that covered
many of the responsibilities that a command team would
have and those deployment special issues that would affect
them. I attended, but it was not very informative for me
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because I was at the end of my tour as a battalion
commander. However, for the young lieutenants and
captains without any previous command experience who
were selected to be rear detachment commanders, it was a
great week. But all of us were required to attend, and it was
done well. The speakers were key members of the
USAREUR staff, to include General William W. Crouch, the
USAREUR Commander.
For the FSGLs, there were seminars with experts in
fields like stress management and interpersonal
relationships to help them handle the seemingly constant
demands of their families. These also provided them a
forum to share similar problems and solutions that have
worked. For the FSGLs, it was a great break from the daily
routine. Those who were able to attend found it to be a
valuable experience, but the often-short notification for
those seminars truly hurt the FSGLs that had young
children and had no day care solutions. Most of them never
attended. Day care was always a problem and, more times
than not, overlooked.
I would be remiss if I did not mention the training
sessions and get-togethers that our local base support
battalion held. Normally once a month, there were sessions
for rear detachment commanders, FSGLs, and family
members in general. The community was always trying to
make our lives easier.
LESSONS LEARNED
I have already related many of the points that were
learned. So as not to belabor the points, I will highlight the
important ones in bullet format.

•

If the rose gets pinned on you, get interested quick.

•

Stay interested in your FSGLs.
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•

Good rear detachment commanders are a must. If
possible, pick one that can stay for the entire time.

•

Deployments without a stop-loss policy require a
larger rear detachment and more resources.

•

Rear detachments cannot consist solely of temporary
and permanently profiled soldiers.

•

Get as much permanent motor pool support as you
can.

•

Use SOPs and checklists.

•

Be prepared to get lots of visitors. Some will actually
help you.

•

Ask for help when you need it.

CONCLUSION
The appropriate way to end this tale is with the
redeployment which all of us had looked forward to from the
beginning. Like all good military operations, it was planned,
briefed, back-briefed, rehearsed, executed, and reviewed.
The soldiers took care of the set-up and tear-down, and the
families handled the decorations and the goodies. From
mid-October through mid-December, contracted busses
made the long haul from Taszar, Hungary, to Kasernes in
Germany, where anxious families and friends awaited their
loved ones. Having been separated from their soldiers, the
company commanders had to quickly account for the
soldiers and sensitive items and knock out a couple
administrative tasks before marching their units to the gym
where the return ceremony was held. Accompanied by lots
of patriotic songs, the short ceremony was concluded with
an order from me for the company commander to dismiss
the troops. Bedlam ensued as Lee Greenwood’s “God Bless
the USA” rang out in the background. It was a miracle that
no one got hurt as families and friends poured out of the
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bleachers and soldiers charged them in a crush for a long
overdue reunion. There was not a dry eye in the place, to
include mine. I presided over eight such ceremonies, and
each one was equally moving. The dedication of the rear
detachments and families in providing a fitting tribute to
their returning heroes was not lost on those standing in
formation on the gym floor. And it was worth the effort
because those soldiers had earned that recognition and
more.
After every last soldier had returned safely (the brigade
did not have any serious casualties), I had a moment to
reflect back on that tumultuous year. What struck me most
was the tremendous attitude and spirit all members of the
rear detachments had. To a man (or woman), every one of
them had wanted to go with their unit instead of being
relegated to the rear. Out-manned, out-gunned, and
under-appreciated, they could have tossed in the towel on
numerous occasions, but they never did. Just as important,
everything they did was done well, a demonstration of their
great pride. And if someone needed help, they rolled up their
sleeves and jumped in. It was truly amazing. For me, if I had
to do it all again, I would take that team any day. After all,
they made my job easy. And if you do not believe me, ask the
Department of the Army Inspector General (DAIG). The
crowning moment for the team was Lieutenant General
Bates’ visit to the brigade. V Corps had picked us for the
visit because the brigade had figured out how to do it right.
The DAIG was indeed impressed and took copies of the
SOPs and checklists that the detachments had created to
show other commands. Enough said.
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AFTERWORD

Dr. Douglas V. Johnson II
The National Defense University recently published a
collection of essays on the intervention force (IFOR) in
Bosnia constituting a worthy review of policy decisions in
that endeavor (Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR Experience,
Larry K. Wentz, ed., 1997). The present collection of
monographs discusses the consequences of those policy
decisions down at the level where the proverbial “rubber
meets the road.”
As USAWC students continue to contribute their
experiences to the Personal Experience Monograph
Program, additional compendia may well be forthcoming,
telling the readers what truth looks like from all aspects of
an engagement that could prove to be equal in length to the
occupation and restoration of Germany and Japan following
World War II. In one sense, as a speaker at a recent
conference on Civil Dimensions of Military Operations
noted, this too is a war, but it is a war against war. If it is
treated in that sense, the casualty count is more likely to be
low and the success more enduring. The situation may even
transform over time to the point where the need for soldiers
diminishes, but that will not be soon.
Students of peace operations need to pay particular
attention to Colonel Peter Dausen’s essay on communications, focusing not so much on the technical process of
establishing telecommunications as on the difficulty of
doing business with “friends and allies” who are working
under a somewhat different mandate. Allies in war and
“friends and allies” in peace operations may not react as
cooperatively as one might expect. The lesson may be that,
absent enough stress or danger to cause willing cooperation
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and burden sharing, one may expect to confront political
agendas that give new meaning to the term “unity of effort.”
Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey Hammond is the only
contributor who took his unit to and brought it back from
the Bosnian theater. His training in connection with that
experience is worth remembering, but the reader should
note that except for the dispersed nature of his unit’s
operations, its daily activities were quite similar to the
established tactics, techniques, and procedures required in
wartime. There were obvious exceptions—camouflage was
replaced by a conscious effort to achieve visibility. But it is
not too difficult to recover from that practice.
I could not help marveling at the ability of these units
and their soldiers and leaders to adapt effectively to the
vagaries of rapidly changing policies. That they were able to
do so speaks volumes about the effectiveness of the training
and leadership they have been receiving. That they have
reacted effectively as a mostly married force says a great
deal for the strength of their families and their willingness
to make sacrifices. The nation owes a debt of gratitude to
them all, and to those who are following in their footsteps, it
owes more than gratitude. It owes them time and resources.
Since it cannot give them time, it must give them resources.
Finally, on a philosophical note, many of the criteria laid
down in the so-called “Weinberger Doctrine” of 1984 are
evident in this operation. And even though his criteria were
never intended to be enshrined as doctrine, they were at
least to be viewed as informal policy—a kind of guide for
determining when to go to war. Whether the Bosnian
intervention was in our “vital national interest” or not
depends upon how we look at war in the Balkans—and most
of us fear it. Once before, in events leading to the Great War,
it leapt the boundaries of that international backwater.
When we put our troops in Bosnia, we did so with military
and political objectives that were as clear as the situation
allowed. Further, we knew full well how to accomplish our
initial military objectives and—taking a page from General
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Colin Powell’s philosophy—we went in with enough force to
remove doubt of our intentions or abilities. Then, as we
reevaluated the situation, we reduced forces according to
the reduced need.
Whether the American people will continue to support
this involvement remains to be seen. As long as casualties
are restricted to accidents, their tolerance will probably
continue despite the relatively high expense. Such tolerance
may not be all good, for it may signal their lack of interest as
well. It may also reflect the absence of CNN coverage of a
spectacularly bloody nature. In short, American public
support is likely to remain problematic. Nobody can
question that muscular peacemaking in this region was
undertaken only when all other options had been
exhausted, short of allowing genocide. The “Last Resort”
criterion of the Weinberger Doctrine was fully satisfied.
When the final chapter of this operation is written, I
trust that the personal accounts of those involved, such as
these here recorded, will be acknowledged with appropriate
pride and gratitude.
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